Counterinsurgency: Forest and Trees

UPDATE: Audio, and transcript. Also, check out COL Roper's bio: three master's degrees, one in nuclear physics.

LT G recently wrote about Counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN) from the ground point of view. This morning, I got the chance to hear about it from the "big picture" perspective in a DoD Blogger's Roundtable. The guest was Colonel Daniel S. Roper, Director, U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center at Ft. Leavenworth, who recently spent time evaluating Counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. The center was set up by General Petraeus to be as COL Roper put it, "the focal point connecting all the different efforts developing and implementing COIN doctrine." The mission is to provide "oversight" for COIN integration, to improve the capability of the military to operate in a "full-spectrum COIN environment."

The Counterinsurgency Center has six objectives, or "lines of effort" in completing the mission: Integrating coin initiatives within and across government agencies and military branches, researching historical COIN efforts and practices, improving the COIN doctrine, educating the military about COIN concepts and techniques, advising leaders and organizations, and conducting outreach to military and civilian entities. The latter is considered "one of the extremely important areas." It is part of a broader--beyond military--effort. The Roundtable is included in this, part of the effort to communicate the methods and concepts of COIN to America and the wider world, such as academia, think tanks, and even international partners such as Canada, the UK, Germany, and France.

COL Roper spent a significant amount of time in Iraq last year from September to November, and his conclusions were the focus of his presentation before opening things up to bloggers' questions. He also provided a fascinating pdf for background, which shows how broad and integrated into military operations true COIN doctrine is conceived to be

In his second visit last fall (October and November), COL Roper reported that he saw a "noticeable increase" in momentum in COIN operations across Coalition forces, which he attributed only partially to the increase in force size due to the surge. He also reported a sense among personnel on the ground that al Qaeda was "off-balance," but headed for Mosul; they were gearing up for the expected operations in the Mosul area. He added that there was a great awareness that AQ has a history of "regeneration," and so this wasn't going to be easy.

Most importantly, COL Roper reported noticing a marked (but mixed) improvement in Iraqi army and military forces. Of particular interest to COL Roper was that Coalition forces--from the top-down--appeared to be focused on "success" rather than simple "win" or "lose." He said that win/lose is a politically-colored concept, but success is measurable and results-focused, so use of that term seemed to be an indicator to him that COIN concepts have infiltrated the perspectives of personnel at all operational levels.

One thing from his report that was encouraging is that the U.S. military in Iraq is finding that the insurgents and terrorists seem to be not so much ideologues as opportunists. The rank-and-file trigger-pullers are "not fully focused on re-establishing the Caliphate." Rather, they are more focused on protecting their families or making money. This jives with everything I heard in my interview with 3rd ID leadership--the turning away from AQ, the success of the CLCs on a local level, the detainee release program, and the military's focus on creating stability and building opportunity for average Iraqis.

The U.S. is relying heavily on the boots on the ground to accomplish COIN-based stability and rebuilding operations. As COL Roper puts it, "All politics are local... All politics and security are local... Guys on the ground are the ones we need to empower." He pointed out the areas of weakness or incomplete implementation of the COIN strategy, but overall seemed pleased with the ability of Coalition forces to implement COIN at the lowest levels of military activity. "Most impressive to me was that very junior leaders were true warrior-statesmen [who] spent more time passing out candy and playing with kids in the street than firing their weapons."

A number of bloggers in this roundtable had a history of embedding with the troops and were extremely knowledgeable, bringing up a variety of interesting related topics. Of particular interest was the extent to which NATO and other allies are working with U.S. COIN leaders to both learn from the US developments and share their own experiences/ideas. COL Roper describe it as Lieutenant Colonels through Major Generals of the various countries "copying each others' homework."

COL Roper also spent time discussing identification of the "tipping point" wherein military efforts are no longer productive in a situation and political considerations must take the lead. As he put it, the implementation of COIN strategy has yielded benefits in the security area, which is a "downpayment for potential political reconciliation." However, the military is frustrated with the slow pace at which the political growth and reconciliation is occurring. He drew on a great football analogy: The Offensive Line has opened a hole in the defense, and now the quarterback and running back have to take advantage of it; the hole can be held open for only so long.

My question was about the capability and issues COL Roper observed in the Iraqi Security Forces (local and national police, and army). He reported that when he saw them last Fall, the Iraqi Army was more reliable and successful than the police, with the capability to conduct complete tactical-level operations. Their big challenge right now is logistics. Because Saddam supplied units according to his whim rather than actual need, the concept of a military logistics system is "atrophied beyond description," especially from the point of view of someone coming from a Western military perspective.

On the Iraqi police side of things, corruption has been more a problem, with there being a greater difficulty identifying hard-core insurgents or hardened criminal elements. However, COL Roper emphasized that this is not an across-the-board description, as it varies widely by location--from city to city and even within bigger cities such as Baghdad.

Another big point in the questioning was whether or not the military was getting the support it needs from civilian government agencies. The short answer is "No." COL Roper described the Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as "absolutely tremendous." However, there are "not nearly enough of them in order to bring their great skills to bear." The bright spot is that the Department of Defense, State Department and USAID recently signed on to a manual that suggests desire to work as an inter-agency team, but resourcing is the real issue. As COl Roper said, it's "hard to find people of the right training, attitude and expertise to excel in an environment where "you have to make a lot of it up on your own," and called it a function of the problem that the military is at war while the nation as a whole isn't. Also of note on the subject was COL Roper's mention of efforts to create joint training for Iraq PRTs, similar to the way MITTs train Iraqi military units.

Other topics covered were the reception of COIN doctrine at the highest levels of the military, and concerns about a "window of opportunity" closing in Iraq. I'll add the audio and transcript links as soon as they're up.