[Kat]
First, I want to thank Cannoneer 4 for directing us to the blog by Jennifer Hlad who is blogging and reporting the "court of inquiry" into the incident on March 4 where Marines were attacked by a suicide vehicle bomb, believe that was followed up by small arms fire (SAF), returned fire and a number of Afghanis (19 killed, 34 wounded) were killed and injured, either by the blast, by small arms fire from Marines or insurgents and, even possibly, self inflicted wounds based on testimony from one Afghan physician.
According to Hlad, this is the first Marine "court of inquiry" since 1956 "after a drill instructor marched a platoon of recruits into Ribbon Creek". The hand out that Hlad received describes a court of inquiry as this:
According to the release from Gibson, “the convening authority wanted the facts and evidence available to be evaluated by a panel of senior officers with combat experience in order to get as complete an understanding as what occured and where responsibility may lay before making any further decisions.”
Basically, before they start laying charges, they want to know if there is anything that really needs charged and who. The original and subsequent investigation were hampered by time, space and security issues that precluded any real investigations as a civilian would perceive in a civilian situation. By the time that the first team to respond arrived at the scene (only 30 minutes after incident), most of the bodies of the wounded or killed had been removed. What remained were a few vehicles, some debris and some blood.
The PRT commander and an investigator noted that Afghan tradition was to bury the dead before sunset and that the attack took place on Rte 1 which was paved and led to a hospital in either direction. The investigator also noted three other frustrations in trying to ascertain the details:
1) They were not able to get to the site until well after the incident (thus, hard evidence and witnesses could be gone or tampered with)
2) They did not get to interview any Afghan witnesses until after "solatia payments" had been made ("solatia" as it sounds is "solace" payments for injured, dead and damage to property).
3) They were only allowed 60 minutes on the ground due to "security" issues in the area.
It's difficult to make any assumptions as yet as to what and who might be responsible, if anyone, outside of the persons attacking the Marines. However, within the testimony there are important issues that are reflected in the struggle to date by the Marine Commandant to get Marines into Afghanistan. It's all about doctrine and who rules the turf. Plus a little thrown in about the brand new Marine Special Operations Forces and whether they are supported or accepted among the many Army, Navy and even Air Force SOCs.
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The Marines are built to fight, according to the Commandant. You can ask any Marine what his primary mission is and get the same answer. The Marines believe that the fight in Iraq is about over and the fight in Afghanistan is heating up. They want to go where there is action. Of course, there is a lot of "Ooh-Rah" in that statement that misses the relationship building and training of indigenous forces in Al Anbar that, according to the latest intel summaries, has turned that area into Sunday morning in Maine. (H/T Michael Yon).
While the army is still struggling somewhat in the larger, more urban areas and in the north to quell AQI and various other "insurgents". Of course, each area presents its own problems from terrain to demographics, so comparisons on that scale are not applicable. Apples to Oranges, they say, and that is right. Yet, there is still pride in accomplishment and belief that what the Marines bring to the fight is the "lean and mean" of armed forces.
While the Army finally pushed out of large bases into COPs, PBs and smaller FOBs in order to accomplish COIN, the marines have been living in and eating dirt with their Iraqi counterparts for sometime. The conditions, Michael Totten once explained, that their grandfathers would have recognized on Iwo or in the Chosen. They are very quick and very deadly when necessary. As the saying goes, "best friend or worst enemy". The Marines believed in securing the territory and the people first, with force as necessary and that belief eventually won them the respect of the tribal leaders and sheiks. They believed the Marines when they said they wouldn't leave them to the mercy of Al Qaida. That trust translated into the development of the "Awakening" and the extension into other CLCs across Iraq.
Those are a few of the capabilities that the Marines believe they will bring to the fight in Afghanistan.
The Army, on the other hand, is not excited about the advent of the Marines on their turf. From their perspective, the Marines are the hammer in a field of operations that requires a scalpel and infinite patience. The PRTs (reconstruction teams), have divvied up Afghanistan into regions that they control along with their NATO counterparts. Their focus is largely on "reconstruction" and relationship building, leaving the "ops" to Army Spec Ops in those areas as much as possible along with very small patrol units.
Barring Helmand, of course, which remains largely in the hands of the Taliban with various treaties and agreements in place that keep down violence to a degree. Some of which the Afghan National Government is none too pleased about and ended with expelling a German and a British UN worker at the end of 2007. The Brits were forced to take Musa Qala back with force after the agreements fell through.
The Army sees themselves as the velvet glove, small foot print, light hand on the reins. In fact, the entire NATO force is appx 40,000 or 1/4th the force in Iraq covering an area slightly larger than Iraq with approximately the same population. Though, in Afghanistan, that population is spread out over a slightly wider area, there are still large urban populations as in Iraq. These urban areas, including Jalalabad, Kandahar and Kabul, have seen an up tick in attacks on NATO forces.
The army isn't interested in hammers unless they are building schools and hospitals. They see the Marines' penchant for "killing people and breaking things" as a disaster for their long term plans in Afghanistan. Those plans are to fight only if absolutely necessary, build the infrastructure and relationships to tie the Afghan people to the central government in hopes that they will eventually see that as a better alternative than supporting the Taliban and other extremists. At the same time, building enough strength into the central government and armed forces of Afghanistan that it can maintain some control.
The size and make up of the US and NATO forces presume the inability to fully secure the population. Several NATO countries have forces in country with a mandate to build and defend themselves only. They are not mandated for offensive operations. Those nations that are mandated for offensive ops, like Canada, the Dutch, Australia and England have very small contingents in place compared to the US forces, but have born the brunt of fighting along with US forces since 2001.
Even among NATO allies, doctrine has become a sticky subject. The recent dust up with Defense Secretary Gates and other NATO allies is just the latest permutation of a difference in strategy, tactics and expected outcomes. The advent of the Marines in Afghanistan is just the spice added to the pot.
And, while everyone argues about doctrine and attempts to protect their turf, in Afghanistan, there are whole populations still under control of the Taliban. More than half of the schools that are "opened" by the PRT are eventually closed by force, destroyed directly or students and teachers threatened until they don't go. The paved roads not only make it easier for legitimate commerce and security forces to traverse the country, but for the insurgents and opium traders as well.
The main complaint among tribal elders is not that the US or its allies are too aggressive, but that they come in to the area, make a bunch of promises and then leave. The Taliban arrives and the tribe is right back where it started or worse.
The whole issue of doctrine is present all over this court of inquiry. Coming into Afghanistan, the Marine Special Operations Forces look like the red-headed step child. On their way in, they discover they have little operations support. They have no radio technicians, no mechanics and lack various other support personnel and equipment. No one is willing to give any up and they are having to beg and borrow just to get by. Their commander reports this up the chain of command, but resolution does not seem to appear.
On arrival, they are greeted with a jaundiced eye. They actually have to explain to the AO commanders what they can do for them and why they are there. While they are already on the ground. After they sort that out, they are shown around the AO with apparent warnings that, while they could plan their own operations, they had to coordinate them, not just through the joint task force central command, but also with the PRT command as well and that the PRT command could veto those operations.
There is classified testimony that may be leaving out parts of the story, but there are overtones that suggest that the Marines did not follow this process. The PRT commander did not sound happy about it. On the day the Marines were attacked, the commander said he had no idea they were going on mission. The Marines said they coordinated with another unit and that they had submitted their operation plans to JTFC.
In the middle of all this, there are several situations described that highlight the difference in doctrine. While at Torkham Gate near the Pakistan border, the Marines witness an army unit going through their "fire response" tactics. The gunners are wrapped up in major armor in their turrets and they are practicing dropping down inside the humvee when they are attacked. One Marine points out that the Marines are not trained to do that. They are trained to fire back and push through the ambush. That's what they were doing in Iraq and that is what they did in Afghanistan.
During the drive to Torkham Gate, most cars get out of the way. Those that don't, the Marines throw rocks at their cars to make them move. In Iraq, they would have used flares, but the Marines say they don't have any in Afghanistan (part of their supply problem?) and the Spec Ops briefing said to use rocks so they don't have to fire at the cars. On the way back, the cars are not moving and attempt to weave in and out of the convoy, making the Marines more tense. Hand and arm signals aren't working and neither are the rocks. The Marines are contemplating firing warning shots. At this time, several cars drive towards them. The Marines throw a rock to make them move. The taxi swerves to the side, but a van packed with explosives does not. That's when the Marines were attacked.
Finally, on egressing the area, the Marines are much more aggressive about clearing traffic out of their way and use warning shots into car blocks to force cars back or away. They did as they were trained and left the area quickly to return to base "driving through the ambush". The PRT commander says this is not what the Army does. He said they would secure the area, check for civilian casualties to be evac'd and get basic information on the situation.
Is that last part always true? Or, is that the hoped for practice? Some reported instances from Afghanistan would seem to imply that securing the area and checking for civilian casualties directly after an incident instead of driving through the ambush or through to the next objective is not 100% true. In which case, you have to wonder why the PRT commander felt the need to expound on that.
In the end, the question of the Marines actions on March 4, 2007 seems to come down to doctrine and training. That question seems to be the sticking point for getting Marines back into Afghanistan this entire time. What are the Marines going to be doing in Afghanistan and where? The Army is interested in reconstruction and limited firefights. The Marines, as one notes, are trained to go into a "hot battle space" and "take control of it".
Last, though briefly touched on, the MARSOC might want to review the planned MSOFs and make sure that, when they go in, they are self sufficient or have a real support base to insure proper supplies, equipment and repairs.
There is a lot more to read and take away from the inquiry. Please read Jennifer Hlad's blog and subsequent updates at Court of Inquiry.
[On a separate note, re: rocks v. flares for warning vehicles away - its interesting to note how long it took the enemy to translate tactics from Iraq into Afghanistan, such as SVBIEDs, EFPs and the general make up of complex ambushes and then to see that our own ability to translate simple tactics and equipment into Afghanistan may be just as slow or worse]
