Last Friday in my continuing series of interviews with the senior leadership of 3rd Infantry Division/Taskforce Marne, I spoke to Command Sergeant Major Jesse L. Andrews, Jr. for about 45 minutes by phone. Topics covered included general security, the first graduating class of the new Iraqi NCO Academy headed up by 3ID, and the strategy of and living conditions on Combat Outposts. As the senior enlisted soldier in the battalion, he also answered questions about homefront support, and retention and morale in 3ID in the face of a heavy deployment schedule. Throughout the interview, CSM Andrews showed tremendous enthusiasm and positivity about conditions on the ground in Iraq and the attitudes of the soldiers for whom he is responsible.

The security situation continues much as Colonel McKnight described it last week, though CSM Andrews added that combat in Arab Jabour (Operation Marne Thunderbolt) is largely over for now, with activities turning to stabilization, cleanup, and community development. He also offered the new tidbit that only one in seven attacks on coalition soldiers results in damage to people or equipment. Combined with McKnight's report of about four incidents a day, that means a damage-causing attack happens an average of only once every other day in their Area of Operations. We are reading news of a great deal of insurgent/terrorist activity in northern parts of Iraq, but Multi-national Division Central (3ID's command) is obviously much more peaceful.

The big story from the CSM's perspective was that the new Iraqi NCO Academy graduated its first ("test") class on Friday, and he seemed to relish the chance to talk about it. The academy is modeled after 3ID's Warrior Leader Course--the first level of training enlisted personnel receive on their way to becoming NCOs--but it has been distilled into bare essentials that are directly applicable to needs of the Iraqi Security Forces. It is shaped to provide “the most bang for the buck," said CSM Andrews, with the guiding standards of providing skills that are "relevant, repeated [during the course], and retained." The goal is newly-trained Iraqi NCOs who can go out and “make a difference” in their own units as they share their skills and lead by example.

Most Arab militaries do not have a robust NCO tradition. There is a strong social class distinction between officer and NCO, with officers being wealthy and politically-connected, while the soldiers they command are uneducated, questionably trained, and lacking in any social standing. The old Iraqi army was no exception, and so a trained and professional NCO corps is a new concept for them.

CSM Andrews described his briefings on the NCO Academy with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) generals and brigade commanders throughout 3ID's AO as a matter of education: "Here’s what we’re trying to do, a new concept we want to provide." Once he'd explained the goals and how it was modeled on American training, the ISF leaders were extremely excited. "When I finished the brief, the only questions were 'When does it start, and how many slots can I have?'" They were even more impressed when they visited the classes in session. "We received rave reviews...The ISF leadership sat in the back and observed with their own translator." He reported their approval was obvious and they thanked the Americans for offering the instruction. "The Iraqis are really digging the training."

Academy curriculum included basic NCO duties and responsibilities, values, Iraqi ethnicities, the Iraqi oath of service, basic first aid/combat medicine, map reading, combat awareness, marksmanship, combatives, physical fitness, patroling, IED/sniper response, and beginning MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain) training such as breaking down doors and clearing/securing a room, almost all of which were new concepts/skills for the students. When I asked if any changes were planned in the curriculum due to lessons learned in training the first Academy class, CSM Andrews said they didn't plan any major changes, but they'd learned a little about the Iraqi NCOs. The students did not do particularly well with classroom instruction, and so the instructors had to adjust the training proportions to include a much greater emphasis on hands-on, experiential learning, which was very effective. The instructors also discovered they they had to carefully distill instruction styles to "focus on providing clarity," both because of time constraints and the instructional backgrounds of the students.

I asked CSM Andrews if he had seen significant changes in perspective, philosophy or outlook among the Academy students in such a short (two-week) course. He was forcefully positive on that point, describing a strong difference in them between his welcoming speech and his graduation speech. On the first day of classes, he had emphasized to the students "how important it was to build this foundation in the ISF." And he pointed out the significance of this kind of class in the American military: "[It] is a base, a foundation for the rest of your career," he advised them. Upon encountering the students again at the graduation ceremony on Thursday, he reported he could instantly observe their growth. "They really took it to heart."

This NCO training is a big piece of building a professional and humane Iraqi military that can take over when the Americans leave, and a it's a huge culture shift. However, CSM Andrews is obviously confident that the American-style reliance on an NCO corps will take hold within the ISF. He sees Iraqi officers "adjusting great" to learning to rely on their developing NCOs, and predicts the training NCOs receive at the Academy will further increase their credibility in the eyes of their officers.

[Part II is up.]