Ralph is... unsparing in his criticism, as is his wont:

A year after its publication, the Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual remains deeply disturbing, both for the practical dangers it creates and for the dishonest approach employed to craft it.

The most immediate indication of the manual’s limitations has been Army Gen. David Petraeus’ approach to counterinsurgency in Iraq. The manual envisions COIN operations by that Age of Aquarius troubadour, Donovan, wearing his love like heaven as he proceeds to lead terrorists, insurgents and militiamen to a jamboree at Atlantis. Although the finalized document did, ultimately, allow that deadly force might sometimes be required, it preached — beware doctrine that preaches — understanding, engagement and chat. It was a politically correct document for a politically correct age.

Ralph shows his age with his metaphoric choices, doesn't he?

The bit above is followed by a little pat on the back for the General:

Entrusted with the mission of turning Iraq around, Petraeus turned out to be a marvelously focused and methodical killer, able to set aside the dysfunctional aspects of the doctrine he had signed off on. Given the responsibility of command, he recognized that, when all the frills are stripped away, counterinsurgency warfare is about killing those who need killing, helping those who need help — and knowing the difference between the two (we spent our first four years in Iraq striking out on all three counts).

What prompted this post, and it's name, was this bit from Ralph:

To wit, the most over-cited bit of nonsense from the manual is the claim that counterinsurgency warfare is only 20 percent military and 80 percent political. No analysis of this indefensible proposition occurred. It was quoted because it suited the pre-formulated argument. Well, the source of that line was Gen. Chang Ting-chen, one of Mao’s less-distinguished subordinates. Had the authors bothered to look at Mao’s writings, they would have read that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” that “whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army,” and that “only with guns can the whole world be transformed.”

Sorry, but Mao didn’t believe that round-table discussions were a substitute for killing his enemies, party purges, mass executions and the Cultural Revolution. Mao believed in force. In our COIN manual, he’s presented as a flower child.

Now, the day after I'm reading this, I get an email that is essentially this post from Fort Scott Kansas blogger Bill Hoyt, who blogs at El Borak:

I really hate to play the grinch

especially when all seems to be going according to the plan:

Is the troop surge in Iraq working? ...

There is no question that violence in Iraq has ebbed since the troop surge announced by Bush in January reached its full capacity in June with about 162,000 troops. Even Rep. John Murtha, D-Pa., chairman of the House subcommittee that controls defense spending, a key ally of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-San Francisco, and a leading Democratic opponent of the war, recently returned from Iraq saying, "I think the surge is working."
The only problem is that it's not going only according to our plan, but Mao Zedong's as well.

Having finished all my history books for the week, I jumped with both feet into one that I purchased a while back but have been ignoring, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes' "The Sling and the Stone," a book about 4th Generation Warfare (4GW). In it Hammes examines the changes in warfare over the past few centuries and specifically since WWII, when the world shifted from state vs. state maneuver warfare (3GW) to the kind of asymmetrical warfare that states generally lose, precisely the kind of warfare we are involved in in Iraq.

As ever, you should read both of those posts completely, not just my excerpts, and have the full context! In case you've been lazy... Click here: El Borak, or Ralph Peters.

I've put the rest (where I actually say something original rather than just quote others) in the Flash Traffic/Extended Entry.

My thoughts? Peters brings up a not-new problem with the uses of history, but I'm with him completely on the idea that officers should immerse themselves in military history, spanning the ages, and I get grumpy with the "one book wonders" that Peter's excoriates. Of course, the fact that I immersed myself in military history and not pro-football and basketball and even taught military history at the Field Artillery school might color my attitude a bit...

This has *never* been a war we could win, in the traditional sense of the word, especially absent a willingness to commit to the level of violence that caused Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan to throw in the towel (nor would that have been justified, in my view). What we're
trying to do there is change the dynamic, and put a vector in place that is more favorable, or at
least less dangerous, to us. There *is* a whiff of imperialism in that formulation, though not of the type and extent of which we're often accused, from within and without. We aren't there to colonize and exploit - we tried to do something in-between the smash-and-grab nature of the China Relief Expedition and the Extreme Make-Over, Nazi Germany/Japan Edition double-feature. We were also wanting to try to kick the Middle East out of the rut it had been in since 1947, by sending a message to oligarchic dictatorships - which are always focused
around "I want to stay in power (and alive)" and not so much around truly good governance for the benefit of the people - "We can take you, personally, down, if you piss us off enough."

The problem, of course, is that the enemy always gets a vote. And so do your allies (just ask Winston Churchill about his plans for WWII vice what ended up happening). Therein lies the greatest flaw in the overarching plan - we seemingly forgot that not everybody was going to see our way forward as the way forward. And they would exercise their vote - whether it be through violence or obstructionism, or behind-the-scenes maneuvering.

Which brings me back to El Borak:

One mistake we are making is expecting the enemy will be fool enough* to throw his strength against ours - and taking his failure to do so as evidence of weakness. But he is not such a fool. The enemy** is instead following the first dicta of Mao and of 4GW, simply withdrawing as we advance. Throwing his fighters against the best the US has to offer is a surefire way of losing, at least on the battlefield (see: Tet Offensive). He knows he cannot face us muzzle to muzzle, and he also knows that to win he must simply avoid losing. Someday we will go home, but he lives there.

This is only a war the Iraqis themselves can win. Precisely because they "live there." And we have to recognize that we can only set the conditions to give them a chance. They have to want to take advantage of it. Which means they have to be as willing to take risks and be tough as the other guy does. Or, all we'll have done is change the names.

But, since we're unable and unwilling to do more... every day that passes means our ability to influence things is waning, and the Iraqis have to step up to the plate and decide what they want the place to be. And that's gonna be hard, since it's going to mean setting aside the compulsion for revenge, while still keeping a wary eye out for those who will still seek to seize what they can, by violence and banditry.