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General (Ret) McCaffrey's latest operational assessment.

It mostly mirrors what I've been getting from the Blogger's Rountable interviews... that those areas we have the most direct input to, are doing well.

[I listen in and participate on a lot of telephone interviews with senior leaders in Iraq. GEN McCaffrey's assessment pretty much mirrors what those men and women are saying - sans any sugar coating that tends to creep in when a leader is talking to press. I was pleased to see the parallels, since it means the senior leaders, while being as upbeat as they could be, weren't being disingenuous.]

To those of us who have an deeply personal emotional investment in the Armed Forces, 2(c) is especially relevant.

Those areas we do not - i.e., the Iraqi central government, are not. But we're showing the Iraqi people, by and large, what can work, and giving them space to do it... but they're the ones who are going to have to build a government that can work. Heh. Not that we've currently got that good an example going ourselves...

The bottom line up front:

3. THE END GAME:
It is too late to decide on the Iraqi exit strategy with the current Administration. However, the Secretary of Defense and CENTCOM can set the next Administration up for success by getting down to 12 + Brigade Combat teams before January of 2009 ---and by massively resourcing the creation of an adequate Iraqi Security Force.
We also need to make the case to Congress that significant US financial resources are needed to get the Iraqi economy going. ($3 billion per year for five years.) The nation-building process is the key to a successful US Military withdrawal---and will save enormous money and grief in the long run to avoid a failed Iraqi state.
Clearly we must continue the current sensible approach by Secretary of State Rice to open dialog with Syria, Turkey, and the Iranians---and to focus Arab attention with Saudi leadership on a US diplomatic offensive to mitigate the confrontation between Israel and the Arab states. We must also build a coalition to mitigate the dangers of a nuclear armed Iran.
The dysfunctional central government of Iraq, the warring Shia/Sunni/Kurdish factions, and the unworkable Iraqi constitution will only be put right by the Iraqis in their own time---and in their own way. It is entirely credible that a functioning Iraqi state will slowly emerge from the bottom up…with a small US military and diplomatic presence holding together in loose fashion the central government. The US must also hold at bay Iraq’s neighbors from the desperate mischief they might cause that could lead to all out Civil War with regional involvement.
A successful withdrawal from Iraq with the emergence of a responsible unified Iraqi nation is vitally important to the security of the American people and the Mid-East. We are clearly no longer on a downward spiral. However, the ultimate outcome is still quite seriously in doubt.

Barry R McCaffrey
General USA (Ret)
Adjunct Professor of International Affairs
Department of Social Sciences, USMA
West Point, NY.

Emphasis mine.

The bullet points to support the conclusion:

1. THE BOTTOM LINE---AN OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT:

a. VIOLENCE DOWN DRAMATICALLY:

b. AL QAEDA TACTICALLY DEFEATED AND TRYING TO REGENERATE:

c. IRAQI SECURITY FORCES KEY FACTOR IN SUCCESSFUL INTERNAL SECURITY:

d. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WORK:

e. POPULATION AND REFUGEES IN MISERY:

f. ECONOMY SHOWING SIGNS OF COMING BACK:

g. US COMBAT FORCES NOW DOMINATING THE CIVIL WAR:

h. SUNNI ARABS WANT BACK IN--- BEFORE US FORCES DEPART:

i. SHIA ARABS HOLDING IN CEASEFIRE—STRUGGLE FOR INTERNAL POWER:

j. DOMINANCE OF CRIMINAL ELEMENTS:

k. THE KURDS---AN AUTOMOMOUS SUCCESSFUL REGION:

2. THE WAY AHEAD:

a. THE CENTRAL US MILITARY PURPOSE MUST BE TO CREATE ADEQUATE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES:

b. THE US ARMY IS TOO SMALL AND POORLY RESOURCED TO CONTINUE SUCCESSFUL COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN AT THE CURRENT LEVEL:

c. HEALING THE MORAL FISSURES IN THE ARMED FORCES: [this is too important to leave as a simple bullet -the Armorer]

The leadership of Secretary Bob Gates in DOD has produced a dramatic transformation of our national security effort which under the Rumsfeld leadership was characterized by: a failing under-resourced counter-insurgency strategy; illegal DOD orders on the abuse of human rights; disrespect for the media and the Congress and the other departments of government; massive self-denial on wartime intelligence; and an internal civilian-imposed integrity problem in the Armed Forces---that punished candor, de-centralized operations, and commanders initiative.
Admiral Mullen as CJCS and Admiral Fallon as CENTCOM Commander bring hard-nosed realism and integrity of decision-making to an open and collaborative process which re-emerged as Mr. Rumsfeld left office. (Mr. Rumsfeld was an American patriot, of great personal talent, energy, experience, bureaucratic cleverness, and charisma---who operated with personal arrogance, intimidation and disrespect for the military, lack of forthright candor, avoidance of personal responsibility, and fundamental bad judgment.)
Secretary Gates has turned the situation around with little drama in a remarkable display of wisdom, integrity, and effective senior leadership of a very complex and powerful organization. General Petraeus now has the complete latitude and trust in his own Departmental senior civilian leadership to have successfully changed the command climate in the combat force in Iraq. His commanders now are empowered to act in concert with strategic guidance. They can frankly level with the media and external visitors. I heard this from many senior leaders -- from three star General to Captain Company commanders.

It strikes me that there is a lot of room for "soft power" aficionados... from USGOV agencies through the Euros and on to the UN to step up and play a role here. There's a lot of talking, let's see some walking.


Download the pdf and read it for yourself. And you should, the supporting text for the bullets gives the context.

7 Comments

You know, not to defend Rumsfeld, which I have in the past, but this in particular strikes me as interesting:
and an internal civilian-imposed integrity problem in the Armed Forces---that punished candor, de-centralized operations, and commanders initiative.
I kept thinking about the book Generation Kill and a few others that I read regarding the beginning of the war. I was thinking that the military didn't get that way in the one year of Rumsfeld's leadership. Punishing candor and commanders initiative. I would find it interesting if it really changed any way significantly outside of the five sided building and upper echelon. If it did, is it really in response to Gate's leadership? Or was it more about the generals?
 
John, I personally believe Gen. McCaffrey has the right information, but in the wrong order. There are some tragic events that have happened on or 17 Dec 2007. Please remember that date! In the "Army Times" there was a piece written by Kelly Kennedy - Staff Writer. The article states or at least infers that a platoon commited "mutiny on the battlefield." The writer appears to have focused only on the perceived mutiny and not on the whole picture. It appears the article was the result of the writer's observation and not on any findings of a administrative process or courts martial. There were no stated "reasons and basis" or "mitigating and aggravating factors for this event." There has been some discussion on this subject at "Blackfive", look for "Troops Mutiny in Iraq? Not quite." on 12/15/2007. Shortcut, go to right hand column, come down to "The Imperial Armorer wants YOU!" Go 8 lines down from there you have Blackfive. For "Neptunus Lex, same column, stay in the same box, 6 lines above, the "LEGAL NOTICE TO SPAMMERS", you'll find "Neptunus Lex." You want to look for a thread called, "A Hard Read." Do yourself a favor and read the comments and links, it will give you a much wider picture. The "Army Times" link for the article is in Lex's website. Please maintain respect for Gen. McCaffrey. He may not have even been in this country at the time. You decide what the order should be for his document. With due respects to all, Grumpy
 
Um, Grumpy, there was nothing in my post critical of Gen McCaffrey. And I've read the stuff at Matt's and Lex's. I chose not to open a discussion here because I had nothing to add to their discussion. Perhaps I just don't understand what you're after?
 
John, my only suggestion is this- We need to work together to find ways to support our troops, not put them down. I believe you were NOT critical of Gen McCaffrey at any time. I do not believe he was even aware of the event. To you and the "Castle", I believe you have always shown respect, even when you did not agree. This has been especially true with one particularly GRUMPY old Vet, me. This subject is now closed! One last thing, I hope you get your power and lives back together again. Then, Merry Christmas! Forever Grumpy
 
What's wrong with criticizing McCaffrey? I'm not saying he should be, but I wouldn't be overly sensitive about it if I were so accused. Having worked closely with a lot of generals, mostly Army and Air Force, the more I did, the less blinded by their physical, intellectual and moral auras did I become. I'm sure there are a few in that group who think Barry is a bit of a...pill. I take his "AAR" with a grain of salt. I'm sure some, maybe most, of it is spot on, but just because he's McCaffery doesn't mean it's 100% accurate. I don't take what I hear on Fox News, conservative talk radio or read in National Review at face value either. Besides, Hell hath no fury like a General Officer Corps not suitably cow-tow'd to by a civilian boss (in this case Rumsfeld). I think a lot of what Barry says about Old Scratch (Rumsfeld, in the eyes of any of the stars who had their ears boxed by him) is payback. What's REALLY cool is that we have two very good generals in place right now, precisely where it counts (Patreaus, whom I don't know personally and Odierno, who I do). I know there are plenty more. And they're all pretty smart. They're not all GOOD, though--some are goofs professionally, some morally, some a combination of both--and being willing to raise the BS flag is one of the things milblogs should be all about. ...Which is why I thoroughly enjoy reading John of Argghhh! when he goes on a bender about Abu Ghrab, the VA, etc.
 
One line that caught my attention and gave me an insight into where General McCaffrey's mind is about the IA. - He wants the IA's 13 existing and forming divisions to have 9,000 armored vehicles and is agitating for funds for them. The two thoughts that come to mind is: 1. He wants the entire current IA mechanized. 9,000 / 13 = 690 armored vehicles per division. At 42 per Bn, that is 15 Bns in each division with armored vehicles. If he was already factoring in the newly announced transfer of two peshmerga divisions to the IA, then it is 14 armor/mech battalions per Div. The IA is standardizing at 12 line battalions to the division (4 Bdes/3 Bns each). 2. Is it possible that he is laying the groundwork for a large donation of MRAPs that the service chiefs are not happy with? Keep the versions that we like the performance in the field and donate (dump) the rest on the IA? Still results in a fully motorized IA and leaves the GoI budget to concentrate on heavy armor and jets...
 
PS Either way, he is looking at the IA converting over to foreign threats (Iran) vice COIN and you do not do that unless you think the security side is well in hand...
 
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