Comments for Schizophrenic War Take 2

Comments for Schizophrenic War Take 2 We're the Military and Airpower Guys of Jonah Goldberg of National Review Online + a stray we found wandering around looking lost. All original material JHD, BHD, JR, WT, and KA 2003-2010 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/schizophrenic_w_1.html Thu, 21 Jan 2010 16:34:18 Z Movable Type 4.12 en Copyright 2010 http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification Schizophrenic War Take 2 In Schizophrenic War on Sunday, I talked about reading two books on the war in Iraq and the different views of the war each presented. "Waging Peace" was about civil affairs in a war zone and Buzzel's "My War" is basically an infantryman's shooting war. The apparent inability to reconcile these two seemingly opposite views of "war" during an insurgency (global and localized) apparently paralyzed (and still does) our political, philosophical and strategic thinking. Case in point. Sanchez's speech on the Democrat weekly address stirred up a conversation at Small Wars. Most commentors thought that Sanchez was basically trying to... http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/schizophrenic_w_1.html http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/schizophrenic_w_1.html Mon, 26 Nov 2007 08:27:05 -0600 Comment from kat-missouri on 2007-11-26 Even if Sanchez had pushed for a COIN strategy early on, and the troops to implement it, he would have faced resistance from his immediate superior, GEN Franks, at CENTCOM. Good question, but I think we are talking about Sanchez at CENTCOM. Franks was gone. What did Sanchez do with his year?

And while smaller, regional conflicts will probably be the new norm, we must also still plan for larger, more massive campaigns against potential adversaries like Russia and China

I'd agree, but it seems that, at least from the outside, there is still a serious struggle within the DoD and the military over whether they should plan for both or have to do both at all. And, it goes up and down the ranks. After reading several books this weekend on the war, you can see the split. There are officers who do both shooting and fixing, but there are a large number of officers who appear to be "name takers and a55-kickers". and that is all they want to be. maybe because their MOS is typically that, but MOS didn't matter in Iraq. They were all nation builders.]]> http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/schizophrenic_w_1.html#comment-67053 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/schizophrenic_w_1.html#comment-67053 Mon, 26 Nov 2007 12:00:09 -0600 Comment from fdcol63 on 2007-11-26 Doctrine ... Conventional or counter-insurgency? In the aftermath of our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and when we consider whether or not Rumsfeldian "transformation" should be further pursued, I think we need to keep a few things in perspective: 1) Instead of a military focused on a large-scale European-style conflict, we do indeed need a more mobile, rapidly deployable force capable of being projected to whereever we need it, with whatever organizational elements necessary to be self-sustaining. The reorg to a brigade and RCT based force, as opposed to a division-centric force, is a good start - along with continued integration of SOCOM and joint operations. 2) However, we've learned that we still need a force large enough to adequately hold the ground we seize, without allowing the enemy a chance to come in behind us and establish an insurgency. Funding and recruitment will remain a challenge, and we must not fall into the Rumsfeldian trap of believing that "technology" without adequate manpower will be a panacea. We've found the same to be true for intelligence gathering and analysis, also. And while smaller, regional conflicts will probably be the new norm, we must also still plan for larger, more massive campaigns against potential adversaries like Russia and China. 3) While we sought to rebuild Iraq in this case, this may not be true in other situations. While we may on occasion find it necessary to follow Powell's "Pottery Barn" rule, there may be scenarios where we are not obligated or feel it strategically necessary to rebuild the civil infrastructure or other institutions and security systems of our vanquished enemy. In Iraq, we sought to change the dynamics of the Muslim world in a key, strategic center, from which we hoped a pro-democracy movement would spread as we saw in the early days in Lebanon and elsewhere, thereby hoping to encourage the Iranians to overthrow the mullahs and avoid a larger, messier war there. If we must move into Iran, we may hope to do so with as few civilian casualties and collateral damage as possible, but in any case, the Iranian people will most likely turn against us. In this scenario, I'm not sure we will find it necessary to fix what we broke, except to the extent necessary to prevent Iran from becoming a Talibanesque haven for terrorists and other Islamist enemies. So, while we sent Public & Civil Affairs teams into Iraq, will this always be necesssary, and would we need to incorporate these elements and efforts into whatever "standard" doctrine ensues? Conventional OR counter-insurgency? No. We must plan for BOTH as much as funding and personnel capabilities permit. http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/schizophrenic_w_1.html#comment-67050 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/schizophrenic_w_1.html#comment-67050 Mon, 26 Nov 2007 10:12:27 -0600 Comment from Heartless Libertarian on 2007-11-26 Even if Sanchez had pushed for a COIN strategy early on, and the troops to implement it, he would have faced resistance from his immediate superior, GEN Franks, at CENTCOM. Or does nobody else remember Franks quashing the ground commanders' requests (under guidance from Rumsfeld) for more forces for ANACONDA in Afghanistan the year before? This after Rumsfeld quashed Shinseki's request for an invasion force of 250k troops. http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/schizophrenic_w_1.html#comment-67047 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/schizophrenic_w_1.html#comment-67047 Mon, 26 Nov 2007 09:30:09 -0600