Case in point. Sanchez's speech on the Democrat weekly address stirred up a conversation at Small Wars. Most commentors thought that Sanchez was basically trying to shun responsibility for the failure to identify and properly fight the insurgency. Two defended him. One basically stating that Sanchez was simply following orders of the infamous Rumsfeld and would have been fired if he tried to do counter-insurgency which he would have implemented "if only". Another claiming that the discontent with his statements was politically motivated.

(continued in flash traffic)

2) Attempts to absolve Sanchez of responsibility seem to damn with feint praise. He is seen at once as some sort of weak willed victim and a total butt-kisser as either unable to or unwilling to stand up to Rummy, Bush and Halib...er Rove, Cheney consortium. A complete political operative in fact. Which makes his Democrat address all that much more suspect if we believe this to be true rather than number one: he simply wasn't prepared to fight, by philosophy or strategy, a counter-insurgency. Neither was Abizaid, apparently.

In regards to the schizophrenic nature of the war, I am always interested in the idea that such generals have little or no authority or power to influence or control their area of operations. Or, that any of these generals were were not sending information up the chain of command that was being used in any decision making or public information besides information and orders flowing down.

In this war, while continuously stating that the war would only end with a political solution in Iraq, the domestic politics of the United States has succeeded in taking the blame off of any military commanders. Giving them full immunity and allowing them to return as political partisans.

Is it possible that, insurgencies being as they are and intelligence being the name of the game, we simply weren't in the right place or well organized to obtain and ascertain the nature of the insurgency? Or, were we gathering plenty of information, but weren't willing or able to decipher its true value and act on it based on either doctrine or political will?

The entire situation seems rather partisan. Not just politically, but doctrinally. The doctrine which seems to have split the military leadership into two camps: conventional war and counter-insurgency. With Petraeus being called back to help select the next round of BGs, it may be at least a nod to, if not "counter-insurgency", at least "un-conventional".

Will the military be able to take the promotion of "un-conventional" officers who might promote Petraeus' "unconventional" selection of leaders regardless of rank and not fall into disarray? Or, will it make officers sit up and stop relying on "the way things are" to get a promotion? Will this actually make the military more "flexible" or simply entrench the old guard who will hope this entire "unfortunate" period of transformation will pass away sooner or later and they can get back to planning a war with China or Russia?

And, wow, imagine with purchasing and procurement are going to look like while these two camps go to logger heads.