Comments for Aw, Jeez...here we go again. We're the Military and Airpower Guys of Jonah Goldberg of National Review Online + a stray we found wandering around looking lost. All original material JHD, BHD, JR, WT, and KA 2003-2010 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html Sat, 24 Mar 2012 15:35:07 Z Movable Type 4.12 en Copyright 2012 http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification Aw, Jeez...here we go again. Jonah is goading me...it worked. My response follows to another potshot at an independent air force in The American Prospect... Abolish the Air Force What it does on its own -- strategic bombing -- isn't suited to modern warfare. What it does well -- its tactical support missions -- could be better managed by the Army and Navy. It's time to break up the Air Force ROBERT FARLEY | November 1, 2007 In August of this year, reports emerged that British Army officers in Afghanistan had requested an end to American airstrikes in Helmand Province because the strikes were killing... http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html Fri, 02 Nov 2007 09:53:18 -0600 Comment from John of Argghhh! on 2007-11-03 Benteen. Come on. Big village. Be quick, bring packs. W. W. Cooke. (P. S. Bring packs) Vice this one, written by a young sailor, Aviation Machinists Mate 1/c Donald F. Mason:
Sighted sub sank same.
]]> http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66126 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66126 Sat, 03 Nov 2007 08:35:39 -0600 Comment from MR. T's Haircut on 2007-11-03 It would have been very interesting to sit in the room back in the late 40's when the Air Force and Navy were fighting for the strategic soul of the Armed Forces. Bombers versus Carriers. Subs versus Missile Silo's. My guess is the Navy's new Maritime Strategy and the Marines new call for moving into Afghan theater of operations is a headstart over the Air Force and Army for the Budget after next. Navy and Marine Coprs is trying to get the empty seat at the table for the next administration. Air Force should take note, and show what the AF will do to "prevent war" through expeditionary engagement and humanitarian relief capabilities. just sayin... http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66121 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66121 Sat, 03 Nov 2007 01:38:54 -0600 Comment from Instapilot on 2007-11-02 John, Cease fire, cease fire, cease fire! KIO! KIO! KIO! Hint: Reductio ad absurdum has its uses... http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66116 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66116 Fri, 02 Nov 2007 22:56:18 -0600 Comment from Cornfed on 2007-11-02 http://csat.au.af.mil/2025/volume4/vol4ch01.pdf http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-2443934711053674980&q=pentagon%27s+new+map&total=32&start=0&num=10&so=0&type=search&plindex=2 http://csat.au.af.mil/2025/index.htm ]]> http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66112 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66112 Fri, 02 Nov 2007 20:57:22 -0600 Comment from John of Argghhh! on 2007-11-02 Giving all the Army’s helos (and their utility fixed-wing assets) to the USAF would probably increase their mission ready rates, improve crew training and offer a better advocate for equipment improvements, weapons development, etc., etc., etc. If only because I believe in the attack helo mission (though I know the Instapilot has some internal gas about AH *doctrine* that has merit) and I don't trust the Air Force not to sacrifice it as a more peripheral task when the budgets tighten up as they inevitably will (and, in fairness, should when the situation allows). I wonder if Bill will wander into this briar patch...]]> http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66111 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66111 Fri, 02 Nov 2007 20:52:52 -0600 Comment from James S. on 2007-11-02 very good at air to air and strategic bombing. So much so that, when the United States enters a confict, these guys tend to work themselves out of a job very quickly. Two weeks into the conflict, all the AF is getting is tactical air support missions because they have eliminated all the other threats. Two years in, this tends to lead to a "what have you done for me lately?" mentality with the other services. This is exacerbated by the Air Force's reputaion, largely of it's own making, of being less than cooperative with the other services. The best example I can give is a situation that arose recently with a detail sent to download Blackhawks at an airforce base. There apparently were a number of issues that caused problems but the one that sticks out in my mind is that the Army guys were not allowed to use the Air Force's latrines. That's just petty. It's the little stuff like that that makes the other services want to vote the AF out of the Pentagon. This would be short sighted. Just because we are fighting an insurgency now, doesn't mean there are not conventional threats on the horizon (China wants a high tech Air Force too). This being said, right now the Air Force's primary money maker is tactical air and logistics. While these are considered less than glamorous they are what's selling right now. If the Air Force doesn't want to see more articles like this, maybe they should try backing down on what they want to have and playing up what the other services need.]]> http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66109 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66109 Fri, 02 Nov 2007 19:45:56 -0600 Comment from Instapilot on 2007-11-02 too deeply, i.e., at the ranges fixed-wing assets reach. Either that, and/or they are not directly associated with the immediate battle, or the enemy’s battle formations and thus, again, not legitimate. Because they are not directly associated with the enemy’s tactical combat formations, they do not lose their legitimacy as important targets to the military operational planner. Moreover, the nomenclature “targets of interest” seem to bother you as does the concept of increasing costs (the scare quotes give me that impression). Quite frankly, we're "interested" in a number of targets--their priority varies with the course and direction of the battle. As far as specific targets are concerned, there are many that affect the enemy’s ability to fight and their attrition is important to Joint planners. Command and control nodes are a good example, as are supply depots, troop assembly areas, etc. The Air Force spends a lot of time thinking how to go after these in an attempt to shape the fight in our favor when all our forces—land, sea, or air—close on the enemy. Insofar as increasing costs are concerned, life is a series of cost benefit analyses. Increasing cost is just another way of describing what happens when you make life so miserable for the bad guy that he quits. Simple, really. The Air Force “seeks to do these things” because they can. It contributes to success and to not do it would be irresponsible. But, you go off the rails when you assert we remain “wedded to the concept” that the Air Force “can win wars independently.” You offer no proof of that assertion because it does not exist in today’s air arm. As far as Kasserine is concerned, I guess you simply ignored my point that the experience convinced Army officers that airpower should be directed by airmen. I say again, that experience and subsequent similar ones, the rapidly advancing technology that demanded a whole new skill set, etc., convinced veteran combat commanders that the mission mandated a separate service. The “redundant bureaucracy” argument is an old one…one that few military professionals pay attention to anymore. Yeah, there are a few old heads out there who think the Air Force is the answer to everything, just like there are Army guys who think we should still have an Army Air Corps. Quite frankly, to do what you propose would not save much money and the loss of capability inherent in pounding a square peg into a round hole would do the nation a disservice. I know you can’t be convinced of that and I won’t try. It is curious, however, that you didn’t consider the converse: that ALL aircraft should be given to the service best suited to employing air power. Giving all the Army’s helos (and their utility fixed-wing assets) to the USAF would probably increase their mission ready rates, improve crew training and offer a better advocate for equipment improvements, weapons development, etc., etc., etc. Then there’s the US Marine Corps. Why should they have airplanes? In fact, why shouldn’t they be subsumed under the Army in toto? It’s a land combat force, yes? Ridiculous? Um, yes. But I'll let them fight that fight. ]]> http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66107 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66107 Fri, 02 Nov 2007 18:21:09 -0600 Comment from Oldloadr on 2007-11-02 Instapilot – Since they are ganging up on you, I’ll try to cover your 6. 1. As I have mentioned here before, in my time in Iraq (working for the Army) I was very unimpressed with the maintenance culture of Army Aviation and the supply culture that supported it. I had a CH-47 battalion commander tell me in 2004 that he was going to present a paper arguing to outsource most of the Army’s aviation maintenance due to continued mediocre performance. I’ve never heard an AF Squadron Commander complain about our maintenance efforts. In fact, I have heard it held up time and again that the professionalism of AF maintenance NCOs was one of the reasons for our standing as the premier AF in the world. In the early years of Viet Nam, both the AF and Army operated the C-123, the AF had a significantly higher MC rate. When all the C-123s were transferred to the AF; the AF’s average didn’t go down, the AF got those aircraft flying and in the fight as well. 2. Based on the above, I would argue that all current Army aviation assets be transferred to the AF rather than disbanding the AF. I believe that all of the joint duty assignments now being required of the officer corps of all services would make the previous concerns that ground commanders have expressed concerning responsiveness of the AF to their needs no longer valid. 3. In the all volunteer scenario all services now operate in; combining the Army and AF would have serious impact on recruiting unless the next “marriage” was kept as distinct as the Navy is from the USMC. 4. The culture required to provide mission capable aircraft to aircrews is the opposite of that to the culture of being a good rifleman. Whereas a good rifleman (E-4) needs to follow orders instantly without making a lot of decisions, a good maintainer (E-4) needs to be able to make a lot of decisions and troubleshooting analysis in order to quickly return an aircraft to the fight. http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66106 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66106 Fri, 02 Nov 2007 16:56:29 -0600 Comment from Instapilot on 2007-11-02 Bob, By your logic, why have a Navy? http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66105 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66105 Fri, 02 Nov 2007 16:40:06 -0600 Comment from Bob on 2007-11-02 I know--I have personally witnessed, in a combat zone, Army folks try to run an air campaign with disappointing results. Well, yes--the current Army doesn't have an Army Air Corps to direct an air campaign. An Army which had absorbed the current Air Force would have that expertise.
Let the airmen concentrate on airpower and the soldiers on land power.
In the end, airpower effects the ground, no? Soldiers already concentrate on all manner of technologies which affect the ground: guns; bazookas; rockets; artillery--why not also CAS?]]> http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66104 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66104 Fri, 02 Nov 2007 15:02:44 -0600 Comment from Rob on 2007-11-02 Instapilot, You're trying to pretend that I think that the airplanes ought not to be used to destroy tanks and hunt SAMs; this project is called "building a strawman" and it is clearly refuted in the text of the piece I wrote. Of course I want aircraft to kill tanks and to hunt SAMs; what I don't want is a service that is designed, foundation up, to pretend that wars can be won without the direct disarmament of the enemy. Hunting SAMs and killing tanks is a critical element of disarming the enemy, but attacking enemy infrastructure and "targets of interest" in the hopes of "increasing the costs" for the enemy are not; notably, it is most often the Air Force that seeks to do these things, in no small part because the Air Force, being born from the argument that air power could win wars independently, remains wedded to that concept. As for your point regarding Kesserine, I couldn't agree more, except to the extent that I don't see how it supports the idea of an independent bureaucratic organization called the United States Air Force... http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66102 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66102 Fri, 02 Nov 2007 13:07:41 -0600 Comment from Instapilot on 2007-11-02 To put it simply, it is in the DNA of the Air Force to seek to fight wars in a manner than runs counter to how war is actually won; to seek to "affect" the enemy rather than disarm him. Nonsense. That's semantics. When I kill a tank, I don't "affect" it. I kill it. The Airman understands that "affect" can have many meanings--catastophic destruction, damage, or just plain interference. Each can "affect" the enemy, but the ultimate objective is destroying either his ability or will to fight, or both. A classic example is the presence of a SAM hunter over the battlefield whose mere presence compels the battery to shut down to avoid detection. He has not touched the threat but he has affected it, allowing others to bring the fight to the enemy the SAM battery is trying to defend. Tell me how that differs from the other Services' use of similar phrases that refer to how actions change the behavior of a target group? Again, this is an illustration, to me, of how little exposure you've had to the armed forces. Each service has all kinds of words for what they do that don't include "kill" or "destroy." This genetic defect is not present in either the Army or the Navy, which is why they should take over Air Force assets. Your "genetic defect" analogy is an interesting one, by the way. Revealing. Your examples from World War II prove my point; the USAAF did a fantastic job at CAS (among other things) and a piss poor job at strategic warfare. It could have (and should have) continued to do a fantastic job at CAS, air superiority, and transport as part of the Army, not as its own independent organization. Well, I failed to make myself clear. The reason they did such a fantastic job at CAS was because, after Kesserine, the theater commander realized that parceling out air piecemeal to the division commanders was a mistake. Air is a scarcer resource than individual infantry formations BUT it brings tremendous power to the field and can distribute that power to where it's needed most more quickly than anything else. So from a practical and operational standpoint, centralizing that control under an airman made sense then and it still does--airmen know airplanes, and how to employ them. Learning that skill is best accomplished when you grow up in that world. I know--I have personally witnessed, in a combat zone, Army folks try to run an air campaign with disappointing results. What the DoD did after WW II simply formalized and put into practice what Eisenhower recommended at the end of the war. Let the airmen concentrate on airpower and the soldiers on land power. If you are concerned about lack of proficiency in coordinating operations, that happens between wars--and between branches within services between wars. We're even getting better at that, though. Also, if you think all would be peaches and cream if we just had an Army and a Navy, I think you would find a study of how those two got along between both World Wars interesting (hint: not well). Besides, ALL services have their institutional prejudices that are beat down or disappear over time. Remember the days when the ultimate symbol of national power was the dreadnought? One more time with feeling: the air force does best when it's allowed to operate independently. The Army saw that, the Navy saw that and the former helped make it happen.]]> http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66097 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66097 Fri, 02 Nov 2007 12:43:02 -0600 Comment from Brent Michael Krupp on 2007-11-02 I could have sworn that several years ago the Air Force was trying to kill the A-10, or at least deemphasize it. I also thought I'd read that part of why the Army went so big into helicopters was because they wanted their own air power and weren't allowed to have stuff like A-10s. Not that either of those questions takes away from the brilliant dismantling of that stupid article (#1 sign of its uselessness: taking that crappy Lancet propaganda piece seriously). Great work, Dusty. http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66095 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66095 Fri, 02 Nov 2007 12:14:10 -0600 Comment from Rob on 2007-11-02 Mike T., In fact I was referring to the firebombing of Tokyo, not Hiroshima; while a compelling case can be made that Hiroshima compelled the Japanese surrender, the incineration of a hundred thousand or so Japanese civilians in a couple of hours in March 1945 mattered not a whit to the end of the war; you're right that I hold Lemay responsible for that. I don't particularly hold a grudge against him for the ICBMs, in part because he didn't want them (fixated on bombing as he was) and in part because I like ICBMs; you might want to check out the discussion of the article at the Prospect, where I suggest that keeping the nuclear triad together is appropriate... http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66094 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66094 Fri, 02 Nov 2007 12:02:48 -0600 Comment from Rob on 2007-11-02 .... and I don't. Specialists in surface warfare, submarine warfare, artillery, or armor also spend a career thinking about how they can help, and also have expertise in how their specialties can win wars. They don't deserve a separate service any more than airmen do. Look, I can understand why you guys are paranoid. The Secretary of Defense seems to think that counter-insurgency is the next big thing, and Chuck Dunlap is terrified to his bones about that. He should be; it doesn't bode well for your service. But I think you're missing my larger point. I agree with Petraeus et al that the Air Force is a fifth wheel in counterinsurgency, but that isn't motivating this piece; I think that if China is to be considered the main threat, then the reasons for disposing of the Air Force as an independent bureaucratic entity are even more compelling. To put it simply, it is in the DNA of the Air Force to seek to fight wars in a manner than runs counter to how war is actually won; to seek to "affect" the enemy rather than disarm him. This genetic defect is not present in either the Army or the Navy, which is why they should take over Air Force assets. Your examples from World War II prove my point; the USAAF did a fantastic job at CAS (among other things) and a piss poor job at strategic warfare. It could have (and should have) continued to do a fantastic job at CAS, air superiority, and transport as part of the Army, not as its own independent organization. http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66093 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66093 Fri, 02 Nov 2007 11:57:45 -0600 Comment from Mike T. on 2007-11-02 Gen. Curtis LeMay, mastermind of the strategic bombing campaign against Japan, decided that civilian areas would be the objective of his B-29s. Roughly 1 million Japanese civilians died from the fire-bombing of Japanese cities, though it was the incineration of so many square miles of Japanese city that the Army Air Force pointed to as it adduced clear, quantitative results in its fight for independence. LeMay would later head the Strategic Air Command, and serve as chief of staff of the Air Force during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which he argued for a full set of airstrikes against Cuban targets. What it is really about? Hiroshima! Yes, this is another instance of narcissitic (and Soviet encouraged) liberal guilt, which I think explains most of the pacifistic cheese-eating that has gone on lo these last 60 years. Boomers of that ilk hid under their beds anticipating the end of the world. LeMay didn't encourage them to sleep better, so they especially hate him and the service that dropped the Bomb and had all those ICBMs. Everything that has happened since has been the bed-wetters trying to hand over the gun so they won't get shot, or going into "tomorrow we die so today we party" decadence mode (cf, the '60s and '70s.) Recently the Apocalypse has been shifted to global warming, but it's the same neurotic fear that drives them. In their eyes, the military, the country, and Western Civ itself was completely deligitimized and de-moral-ized on August 6, 1945.]]> http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66091 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66091 Fri, 02 Nov 2007 11:48:22 -0600 Comment from Air Force Brat on 2007-11-02 As soon as you made the point that Farley was projecting counterinsurgency-type conflicts into the future, you'd won the argument, IMO. However, the rest of the points are well made. I might also point out that there are subtle, but significant, personality differences between the types who serve in the Army, Marines, Navy, and Air Force which leads to the branches having subtle, but again significant, cultural differences. These cultural differences between the services facilitate better performance by their members. My dad never tired of telling the differnce between the Army Air Corps - in which he started out in WW II - and the USAF to which he was recalled for the Korean conflict. To be blunt, he liked the Air Force a whole lot better. Too bad he's not around to give Farley a piece of his mind... then again, it would be good for Farley: My dad could flake the paint off the walls when on a tirade. http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66089 http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/11/aw_jeezhere_we.html#comment-66089 Fri, 02 Nov 2007 11:39:40 -0600