A Grand Game of Chess: Department of State Working in North Korea, Iran, Iraq and with Russia

Second, though seemingly "bad", is Putin's visit to Iran. He made plenty of bald statements insisting that no Caucus nation should allow their land to be used to launch an attack on Iran. That put plenty of backs up, but was the "assurance" that Iran needed to play ball. Along with Russia seeming to give them cover at the UN. That also puts our backs up occasionally, but, if you're playing the game right, could be construed in our favor when the cards are all on the table. Mostly because, as this article noted in Pajama's media, Putin left without making any other real promises to Iran.

Russia is insisting that it is going to take a long time to build the Bushehr Nuclear facility. Putin re-affirmed that on his visit and noted that they would not deliver any fuel until the facility was 90% complete and ready to run. While his visits and remarks about attacks may seem like a "failure" of State diplomacy, the truth is between the lines. This entire time, Russia has been seeking to re-assure us that the facility at Bushehr was not intended to build nuclear weapons.

Yet, Russia's reluctance to "hurry the project along" isn't just a matter of lack of payment. The Iranian government may be right that, that is a "cover" for Russia's agreement with the west that nuclear Iran is not a good idea. Whether through their own interpretation of the seriousness of a nuclear Iran in their back yard, or, very likely, State's efforts to bring Putin around to that view may never be fully divulged. I think it is both. Putin is not an idiot, but he also runs a state that needs money and allies in the region. At the same time he gives Iran some security assurances, he told the Mullah regime that Russia has some trust issues with them.

Russia would be right to fear a nuclear Iran. They share borders in the oil and natural gas region of the Caspian Sea. One might also wonder how certain foreign Islamic fighters have been able to transverse the area into Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya without possibly, somewhere, crossing through Iranian territory on the way. I don't think they are all going through Turkey or Pakistan to the Caucus nations and out. Additionally, there is the issue of the Iranians supplying weapons to Taliban (Islamic radicals) and Shi'ite militia in Iraq. As once posited, only an idiot would imagine that many armaments were making their way out of Iranian armories or arms factories without the Iranian government being complicit.

Putin maybe a thuggish, ex-KGB, oligarch pining for the good old days of Russian dominance, but no one could peg him as stupid. Thus, Iran's behavior and the possible unrest it would cause, both in the Russian held "republics" as well as allied former "republics" in the Caucuses, have to be a major concern. Even if it is just the "bleed over" from Islamists in Afghanistan. Russia is stepping cautiously, applying sticks and carrots in the region in order to maintain what stability is there because Russia cannot afford unstable regions that would possibly break Russia apart even further and seriously damage their energy driven economy. The one thing that is going very right in Russia right now and keeping them afloat.

Finally, a collapsed Iranian regime with the possible, if not probable, chaotic, post collapse Iranian state, right on the Caspian Sea, close up to Caucus nations and routes for distributing said energy bounty and possibly fueling additional Islamist activities or straight out destruction of said remaining "republics" in the area, would be, in the words of the infamous Rumsfeld, unhelpful.

So, my best guess is that State worked some magic mojo, helped along significantly by military and national intelligence showing Iranian complicity, a healthy dose of American Saber Rattling and an equally healthy dose of American Economic Power wielded through major sanctions. This is where it all works together, as it should. And people call this administration "stupid", "lacking nuance" necessary to do international diplomacy right. Of course, this is where "State" is on the same bandwagon and works well with others. Where, in fact, State could be considered as having a "shining" moment.

Russia might have its own issues with Iran, but it has to have good cause to believe it needs to put the relationship on the line. Further, I don't believe that the few things we heard publicly from the participants was the be all and end all of the conversations.

What does that have to do with North Korea shutting down their reactor, promising to allow Americans in to inspect and probably ending major uranium enrichment? Everything if you recall that happened shortly after our Israeli allies made a quick dash, undetected, into Syrian territory to ostensibly destroy a nuclear facility being built and/or operated by the North Koreans. The destruction not only reminded Syria that the Israelis could smash them at leisure, but reminded the Iranians, for all their bravado, that, if our Israeli friends could do that to Syria with our last generation technology, imagine what we could do to Iran employing more advanced and stealthier weapons.

Iran was busy talking about their "new" weapons, preparing for guerrilla war and using the terrain to their advantage, but that was just about all talk. We were talking about how we would bomb the crud out of them, not "invade" them with boots on the ground. From our perspective, not withstanding the long pain of the Iraqi and Afghan wars, it would be unnecessary. Iran could be collapsed and left to its own devices without suffering an infantry casualty on Iranian soil.

That's not just hubris, that's a fact considering the current political and economic situation. Iran, still talking, tried to up the ante by insisting that they would let loose their terrorist, non-state dogs in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq to name a few places. Out of nowhere, and bizarre considering the entire 1983 Marine Barracks incident in Beirut, Hezbollah in Lebanon starts making threatening comments about what they would do if the US put bases in Lebanon. That came out of Lebanon, not here in the US.

Why would Hezbollah make such threatening statements if that was not an official communique or strategy? Hezbollah is not the Hezbollah of 1983. Previous discussions regarding the different military pressure that can be placed on a "state" as opposed to guerrillas without any real territory or collateral to threaten with absolute military force note that people in power with economic, land and political collateral to lose make nice fat targets . Hezbollah, by necessity and per the Mao doctrine on Guerrilla War, had to throw off their "guerrilla" operations and organization to become an organized military and governing force with notable rules, capable of administering an area in order to become the "government" of said area and eventually a state governing power.

While we might decry Hezbollah's extra-national state in southern Lebanon, they have made that long stride to Mao's step two in the process. They have territory, administration buildings, fairly recognizable armed forces and military, intelligence and political leaders along with some significant infrastructure that they now own and would have to risk on the say so of Iran. Iran being their major benefactor. Yet, even they have their own agenda that would be risked under such circumstances.

Most point to the short war last year between Israel and Hezbollah in South Lebanon as a sign that any war there is dangerous and politically damaging in the greater international sphere. Yet, if it heats up with Iran and they unleash their dogs in any greater activity in conjunction with some Iranian move, the war would be different. It would be all out war and Hezbollah would be in a serious fix. Even with nearby Syria trying to assist them and funneling Iranian Qods, money and weapons, they would not likely survive.

That, by the way, is the other message that was sent with the Israeli bombing run into Syria. Just a little reminder that they are playing a deep game, but its our rules and they do it at our leisure. And, because, we really don't want to have a big muck up over there we've played soft, but the bombing reminds Syria, Hezbollah and Iran that we are still those "crazy Americans" with equally "crazy Allies" who like to take big risks. It might have reminded the Syrians, who are also in an economically unstable period with internal unrest, that we are extremely tired of their assassination of Lebanese politicos which seems to have quieted down in the last month or so.

Finally, the bombing run reminded Syria, Iran and North Korea that "we know things". For all the hoopla about our failed intelligence on 9/11 and the alleged failure of intelligence on Iraq, the war in Iraq has given us great opportunities to put eyes on these nations. Our intelligence agencies can work very well with other nations and pool information. Thus, we know things about Syria, Iran and North Korea that would allow us to do exactly what we said we could do: bomb the facilities and infrastructure most likely to be "of interest" without risking many military lives or those of their civilian population. What we know was obviously a great bargaining chip with Kim Il-Jong's regime and, apparently, China.

What else did we get out of Putin's visit? Besides Putin acting as our "talk softly" diplomat while we carried "the big stick" of military and economic demise, a few weeks later we get this report from Sec. Def. Gates indicating that the Iranians have told Iraq that they will stop filtering weapons into Iraq to the Shi'ite insurgents. Gates, of course, is skeptical of Iranian efforts and motives. He indicates we aren't just taking their word for it, but we are stepping up activities on the Iran-Iraq border, intercepting people, arms and money. Not to mention several very public "captures" of Qods forces in Iraq.

This wasn't all in relationship to Putin's visit, possibly on our behalf, baring some whispered advice to stop while their ahead, nor was it totally dependent on the Syrian strike, the North Koreans capitulating over Pyongyang or the whisper to Hezbollah that we could put bases in Lebanon and mess up their good thing, nor even existing sanctions against Iran.

The US did what it was threatening to do: placed the IRGC and multiple political and military leaders on the "terrorist" list. Since the IRGC owns and operates half of the infrastructure and economy of Iran, that put a huge dent in the greater Iranian economy. It caused a giant ripple in their political situation back home. Once again, the powers that be reigned Ahmadenijad in and made it public by allowing a state run newspaper to publish the disagreement over Ahmadenijad's choice to dump Larinjani and his new selection for the chief nuclear negotiator. Someone that may not pass into permanence without approval from the greater Supreme Council.

The problems certainly allowed Ahmadenijad's opposition to make some hay. Ahmadenijad's opposition includes Rafsanjani and others like him who are also major businessmen, owning companies and financial institutions, who have a lot to lose if the the sanctions against Iran continue or get harsher. While the Iranians try to present a completely unified government, the internal fractures are wide enough to drive a giant economic stake between them. That economic stake has been the bain of Ahmadenijad's existence since he won the presidency in 2005.

There were diplomatic efforts in Iraq, too. Maliki met with Ahmadenijad a few months ago, probably at the urging of the US State Department to discuss their mutual issues. At the same time, the US, having crushed Al Qaeda in Iraq, turned their sites on the "rogue" Mahdi Militia, allegedly backed by Iran and operating outside of Sadr's jurisdiction or control. Sadr has been very quiet, all things considered, as his once grand militia is getting extraneously purged.

Sadr can't really say much about the purging without damaging himself even more politically. Particularly, after the shoot out in Karbala with the Badr that killed fifty people during a religious event. Sadr had to distance himself from that, poste-haste. He did so by claiming those involved were "rogue elements". This event allowed the US to pick up the information war against the militia while simultaneously giving Sadr an out. Now, the most dangerous, active and major portions of his militia were "rogue" elements under the control of the Iranians.

Of course, that is largely the truth. Sadr has had a hard time controlling all of the "Mahdi". All of their extraneous attacks have also been "unhelpful" in his political ambitions. Their thuggish behavior, once considered acceptable as a defense against a greater Sunni/al Qaeda threat, is now becoming a burden on the Shi'ite population. This population is also tired of the militias and have started to create anti-militia organizations like the "Concerned Citizens" of Diyala, representing both Sunni and Shi'ite tribes. They recently cooperated to counter a "rogue" Mahdi operation that had succeeded in kidnapping tribal leaders from their convoy after a meeting.

All of this leaves Sadr with few options. He certainly cannot be seen supporting any part of the militia that is "Iranian" after ranting about Iranian influence (along with US influence) in Iraq and painting SCIRI as Iranian puppets. His entire political facade would come crashing down. This may be the part where Sadr has finally painted himself in a corner.

Juan Cole once posited that Sadr was a "nationalist" who was unhappy about Iranian influence both within his own organization and that of his rival SCIRI. This, he insisted, was what was influencing Sadr's decision to make noise in Basrah with a mini-skirmish against the Badr Brigade and SCIRI as well as withdrawing from the Maliki government. Sadr may have bitten the hand that fed him. During the Najaf stand off in 2004, Sadr was financed and armed by the Iranians. His "council" included a number of Iranians. Some of who were issuing contradictory statements in his name.

It's unclear whether it was the Iranians making statements about "no surrender" or if it was Sadr's nationalist spokesmen during that stand off. In either case, Sistani saved him from any further destruction and martyrdom, riding in with a parade and riding out with Sadr and the Mahdi. This may have been the straw that broke the camels back and caused Sadr to become seriously anti-Iranian.

Its' probable that any relations with Iran went completely sour and the Iranians left Sadr to hang by his own rope until he was willing to cooperate. Then again, for an "anti-Iranian", nationalist, Sadr's militia had a lot of money, men and weapons from Iran. Not to mention his frequent visits there (though his spokes people tried to claim he was still in Iraq on those occasions, no one could apparently find him there).

Then SCIRI did something Sadr had been unwilling to do: they sent Al-Hakim to the Sunni in Anbar who had just kicked Al Qaeda in the head, possibly delivering a death blow.

The new Sunni political convergence, along with counter arming of the once insurgents and their new found financial importance, made them very attractive. While Sadr was talking about trying to get a gig up with the Sunni Accord Front to take a big chunk of votes in Parliament, Al Hakim had recognized that the SAF were going to be bit players in the game compared to the emerging "Awakening" in Anbar. Grass root politics in a post war province was going to change parliament. SCIRI obviously figured out who the real players were going to be before Sadr.

That political mistake, along with his unruly, barely controllable "militia" and its current dismemberment, may have placed enough pressure on Sadr to force him to take a step he would rather not: sign a deal with Al-Hakim and SCIRI. As this report notes, it's an uneasy deal that doesn't necessarily mean all is well, Sadr's given up his nationalist movement or that Iraq will be one happy, liberal, American style democracy.

Then again, if anyone was expecting that, they were not paying attention the last four years nor learned the lesson of Iraq. That being that, in a time of terrible tyranny, when people suffer horribly, they are unlikely to become "liberal" in their ideas and beliefs, but more likely to become "conservative", cling more tightly to their faith and largely see their affliction as brought on by a lack of unity and faith within the community. That is even more likely in poor and/or rural populations where a majority of Shi'ites and Sunnis in Iraq.

That report also notes that the unification of the Sadr/SCIRI movement was likely urged by both Tehran and Sistani in Najaf in order to present a better united Shia front. The Sunni in Anbar are now becoming well armed and well trained militia. The AK-47 is becoming the equalizer of the Iraqi wild west and, as once noted by the founders of the United States, the government, in this case Shi'ite, is much more responsive to an armed and able population that is willing to knock it off or defend itself against any additional tyranny, having already experienced it in the forms of Saddam, al Qaeda and Shi'ite militias. They have nothing to lose.

The Shi'ites, who want to rule Iraq, even if its only possible with "pluralistic" government of Shi'ites and Kurds or other small factions, must be able to recognize they need all of their resources to do so and must also recognize that an unstable and constantly warring population would not allow them to do so in any significant way. In fact, would cause them to lose and possibly be knocked out of power.

But, the one thing that the Jamestown report failed to note, and so have we, is that the Shi'ite situation is not just a proxy war against the US. It has been a proxy war between Najaf and Qom as well as a proxy war between the Ahmadenijad conservatives and the Rafsanjani " "pragmatists" in Iran.

SCIRI has been in the pocket of Qom, Iranian mullahs for years. It was where they took refuge after leaving Iraq after the failed Shi'ite uprising and their traditional sanctuary. Qom is the traditional center of Iranian Islamic thinking and the place where the the revolution was born under Khomeini. It is where the mullahs on the Grand Council are educated. Plutocrats like Rafsanjani want a little more accommodation with the west, a little less unrest and talk of war. They don't see it as helpful in their efforts to join the rest of the world at the big table. They believe that Iran's economic growth is the way to make that happen, not open threats of war.

Though, they are not opposed to Iranian nuclear ambitions. Far from it. Rafsanjani can be rightly seen as the president who ushered in their nuclear ambitions and hoped to do it quietly, drawing as little attention and presenting a little a threat as possible. At least until they were ready to go public with all the ducks lined up including economy, energy and military (ie, nuclear) power. They believe that Ahmadenijad's loud threat's and lack of nuance seriously damaged that plan and may have put them in danger of losing it all together.

SCIRI is most likely being funded and provided political guidance by this group. SCIRI was also the organization that was invited back by the United States for post invasion political stabilization of the south (one of the reasons Sadr hated both the US and SCIRI). They owe both Iran and the US, particularly as the US allowed them free rein in the South to create their own political power house region with little interference by the Coalition. Most see the efforts in the south as a "British" failure, but it is likely it was part of the original plan post invasion. The British, having some relationship with Iran, were unlikely to cause a problem for the Iranian backed SCIRI and didn't.

It's this group is the group in Iraq that will act as a pressure point as well as a conduit between Iran and the US. Under the Rafasanjani faction political guidance, it will be most likely to make some "real politic" decisions in the Iraqi political arena that may translate to a functionary between the less "hard line" Theocrats in Iran.

Sadr, on the other hand, was most likely getting most of his money, men and supplies from the IRGC. The IRGC not only controls fifty percent of the "legitimate" businesses in Iran along with significant armories and armament manufacturers, but it also controls most of the smuggling along the Iraq-Iran border. That is the way that the "Mahdi Militia" was getting its arms, money and men. The IRGC and Sadr have a few things in common. While the IRGC was created to be the defenders of the Islamic revolution, they are, in the main, Shi'ite, Islamic ultra nationalists along the lines of Ahmadenijad.

Sadr is also a Shi'ite, Islamic ultra-nationalist. It is likely that his association with the IRGC included assurances that, once the US had left Iraq, the Iraqi Shi'ite ultra-nationalists would be left to govern on their own with little interference from Iran. Sadr was likely looking at, what he thought, was going to be nothing more than an agreement between the IRGC controlled Iran and Nationalist Shi'ite Iraq for mutual economic, political and military association without direct interference from Tehran.

Whether that was really going to happen is an interesting question. What is apparent, as noted earlier, is that Sadr's organization was going to the Iranian backed hardliners. Something that must have given him pause and made him question their agreement. This group seems intent on making war and forcing the US out of Iraq physically. Even if it meant the destruction of Iraqi Shi'ite unity and Sadr's once vaunted militia. Leading up to Sadr's pronouncement of "rogue" elements in cahoots with the Iranians and his quiet acceptance of the American led "Iranian" purge on this "rogue" Mahdi Militia.

The IRGC is most closely associated with Ahmadenijad's hard liners. It's where Ahmadenijad came from, where he was "educated", where his cabinet members and close associates come from and from where he gets most of his political and economic backing and power. Even the Basij civil militia that organized his election in Iranian cities, through stuffed ballots or marginalizing the opposition through physical intimidation, is the civilian counterpart of the IRGC. Many retired IRGC and the "non-military" family members of the IRGC are part of this organization.

This is why Juan Cole's assessment of Sadr as nothing but an ultra-nationalist Iraqi who eschewed Iranian interference in Iraq is somewhat one dimensional along with the insistence that we should have made accommodations with him all along. Possibly at the beginning, but not once his Iranian association had won out. Further, Sadr was not in any mood or even position to make such a compromise.

What is apparent is that the IRGC/Sadr connection is broken and that the SCIRI/Plutocratic Mullahcracy has taken the day in Iraq. While the Jamestown report is pessimistic about the probability of Iranian influence in Iraq now that Sadr is being reeled in by SCIRI and Sistani, the fact is, the Iranians were going to have some sort of influence. The question was whether this influence was the "pragmatic" Rafsanjani plutocrat faction or the ultra-nationalist, Islamist IRGC warmongers ready to pick an open fight with the entire west and any Sunni nation in the region to obtain instant hegemony?

SCIRI and the pragmatists appear to be taking the day in Iraq. Something that is not all together a bad thing and may point to the resurgence of the pragmatists in Iran. That would give the west and Russia something to work with in regards to Iranian nuclear ambitions without war and its possible chaotic outcome in the region. Attacks on US forces and the impending Iraqi civil war is dying down as political discourse comes to the fore.

As much as this is part and parcel of the internal Iraqi political situation and probable power struggle in Iran, it is also an example of when the DoD and DoS work together. Obviously, the military laid the ground work with the Sunni in Anbar and now with the Shia/Sunni in Basrah having assisted in kicking Al Qaeda to the curb and working on the Mahdi. Security in Iraq gave State the ability to maintain Maliki's government through the crisis, help separate him from the Sadr/IRGC factions and allowed him (if not urged him) to get SCIRI to start grass roots accommodations on behalf of the Iraqi government with the Sunni in Anbar, if they didn't figure it out themselves.

The truth is it was likely pushed forward by Ambassador Crocker through Maliki who made the perfect counterpart for Gen. Petraeus during the September report before congress. The commanders in Anbar had been asking for the Iraqi government to start working with the Sunni in Anbar to show they could trust the Shi'ite led government and insure that there was no back sliding to insurgency and Al Qaeda. Even Gen. Petraeus and all the military power in Iraq couldn't do that. We definitely have little if no military forces in the southern Shi'ite enclave. It had to be State working the channels with their military counterparts.

Thus, showing that State can and does actually play a significant, effective and important part in the battle for Iraq and the war on Islamic radicalism as a whole.