If there's one thing the general public has very little clue on, it's the corporate psychology, to say nothing of the internal mechanics, of the yearly budget process in the Pentagon.
Everybody concentrates on the $6 trillion dollar toilet seat (or whatever amount the NYT is ascribing to it this month) and, of course, the earmarking that has reached the level of low comedy.
In his recent post, John assumed the Army's sister services would not be happy with the new CJCS's comments about revitalizing the nation's Army. A few thoughts...
Historically, the three main services get roughly the same cut of the budgetary pie, about a third each, regardless of the impression left by the public sniping that occurs among our legislators, and the three dominant services, when the budget is being built. Most of our regular readers probably knew that...but most outsiders don't.
Occasionally, there's a bit of an adjustment, but the favoring of one Service over another doesn't skew the numbers that much. I think that happens for several reasons:
1) Congressional districts have an input
2) Everyone has a good reason to argue for money (just ask the tanker, cargo or bomber drivers flying 30, 40, 50 and almost 60 year-old airplanes...and the logisticians who have to keep them flying).
Now, that's not to say the air and naval arms won't complain, but that's kinda their jobs, dontcha think? That said, I don't believe you'll get people going to the mat over reconstituting the ground forces as much as you might believe. I could be wrong, but I hope not. But if we do, I wouldn't be totally shocked either...again, we're all driving/sailing/flying really old stuff. Oh, by the way, the navy should get some of that anyway, yes? (Hint: U-S-M-C)
I will say this...and I mean it in the best possible way: the Army could do a lot better in two areas:
1) Maintaining their equipment in the field, and;
2) Managing monetary accounts to lessen the impact on families.
The two go hand-in-hand.
Caveat: I'm sure in a lot of ways I'm the pot calling the kettle black, but I've lived with Army units long enough and close enough...AND asked senior Army general officers, "What up wi' 'dis, bro?!?" (I paraphrase), on why they have such problems with armored vehicle maintenance and complex aircraft maintenance and why their facilities are in such poor repair.
More caveat: My experience has been predominantly overseas, so maybe it's different in the States.
Still more caveat: My experience is dated, although I do cut myself some slack when I consider that the Army is more wedded to "tradition" when it comes to non-combat day-to-day ops and looking at other Service SOPs with a distinctly "not invented here" jaundiced eye. Like the rest of us don't do that either, heh.
Anyway, back to the two points above:
1) Maintenance...I know I can learn something from a Navy guy on designing life support equipment for air crews. We already have--the "horse collar" life preserver we wear that only opens when you hit sea water, for example. By the same token, I think the Army would do itself a great service if it explored how the Air Force maintains complex and heavy equipment. I'm not talking minute-by-minute stuff, but things like scheduling routine heavy MX (we call it "Phase" in the blue world), parts management, etc.
My MX officer knew instantly where every A-10 Inertial Nav Unit was in the world...and could order one from any bench stock account on the planet in seconds, from any point on the planet, as long as he had a phone line. We even gave squadron commanders FedEx (yessssss!) accounts to get stuff they eally needed even faster than we otherwise could back at the home 'drome. (Don't know if they still have to do that...)
Back to my life in V Corps...I was amazed at the down time on M1-A1s/A2s and how a lot of the machine was maintained. Sometimes they would just throw perfectly good stuff away. Sometimes they would ruin stuff just from abuse...and then there's losing things right and left.
Trust me...an Air Force crew chief losing a wrench is like a soldier losing his weapon. It is a Very Bad Thing for his immediate career prospects. Losing parts, not managing bench stocks, dicking up inspection schedules, etc., make life miserable for the managers, too. Of course, I'm generalizing, but my point is this: we (the USAF) took years to figure out how to take care of big, expensive and persnickety things in the field and at home and I would LOVE for the Army to at least send a couple of open-minded folks around the USAF to benefit--maybe--from all our growing pains...without having to go through it themselves...and thereby making current and future dollars go farther in the reconstitution (and, ultimately, the routine readiness) effort.
2) Managing the money pots...this blew my mind: unless things have changed, if an Army guy runs out of O&M money, he can raid the MWR pot. In the Air Force, that's a non-starter.
Talk about imposing discipline and motivating people to do things more effectively.
If the former is still true, and will remain the case, looking into Point 1 becomes even MORE imperative. The only thing that really chaps my a$$ when it comes to the "Army getting more" to fix itself is: spend it wisely, dammit. DON'T keep feeding the inefficiency/waste beast by doing things the "old" ways. If it were me, I'd tell the Staff,
"OK boys and girls, here's your one-time, big-a$$ budgetary plus-up. Spend it wisely because I'm not going to entertain robbing Peter to pay Paul...that will end up screwing our families back home even more...unless the reason is so dire AND THE CAUSE SO OUTSIDE OUR ARMY, that we can't avoid not to. I'll never say 'never,' but if you come to me for more dough, if your shite is not in one sock, I'll rip your lips off. Note the jar of lips on my desk." (Or words to that effect.)
Again, I love the Army. I respect the Army. My Army friends have lost children in this war. If the Army needs money, screw my annual IRS bill; I'll be happy to write a[nother] personal check. Just sayin'.
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