*A term of art from the artillery. Harassment and Interdiction Fires.

Back in the day, when you could just kill people and break things without a note from a lawyer, they were pre-planned, but to the enemy, random, fires at known gathering points, road junctions, Main Supply Routes, assembly areas, etc - to keep the bad guy nervous that the world around him might start exploding at any minute.

*Not really relevant to today's operating environment, right? But, it *is*

The UAVs (oops, can't call 'em UAVs anymore - they're now Unmanned Aerial Systems... some Colonel got his Legion of Merit for that change...), er, um UAS's we fly over Afghanistan and Pakistan looking for targets of opportunity are a form of H&I fires, if you really want to parse it finely. We just have better sensors and fire control now.

I call the post that because it's random things posted by me and people I've given posting privileges to. It's also an open trackback, so if someone has a post they're proud of, but it really isn't either Castle kind of stuff, or topical to a particular post, I've basically given blanket permission to use that post for that purpose. Another term of art that might be appropriate is "Free Fire Zone"

Regarding the bands, back in my cadet days at Augusta the IG inspectors were treated to Three Blind Mice.

FBL - I checked your pic and my answer to the whatsis is...............looks like a place I could get a date, lol.

On the subject of Christmas decorations........I feel your pain! I was whining about that at my place last night. There were Christmas carols and decorations at Walmart. It was All Soul's Day!!!

I distinctly remember, and will swear to it before The Throne of God, that one of the bands in the second Clinton inauguration was playing "The Bride-Elect", by Sousa.

I thought at the time, that "Our Flirtations", also by Sousa, would have been more approriate.

Stop Band Music Abuse!

The brainiacs on post started putting up the Christmas decorations around about the 15th of October here too. I about lost my mind. Seriously, people. The only thing I can think of is, with another chunk of the division getting ready to head off before the holidays, maybe they put them up early here for that reason? I sure hope so. Otherwise, it's ridiculous!

As for the "Bee Movie" it was good for us too and I loved the NG ad. *I* almost up and walked out to see the recruiter (who, incidentally, is just down the way a bit in the town center).

"*I* almost up and walked out to see the recruiter (who, incidentally, is just down the way a bit in the town center)."

I'm guessing MacGyver thinks one blue star is sufficient per family, there, HFS.

There being literally zero blue stars in my family these days, including the extendeds down generation, I'd just be stepping back up to the plate to meet the obligation.

Nothing beats watching the Brigade Staff stepping out just as the band cranks out "Here Come the Clowns"...

[glances at org chart]

Hey!

*I'M* brigade staff here!

And no one can keep step to that dang song, anyway.

Anyone (civilian or military) who suffers a traumatic injury or experience is going to have significant emotional issues to deal with, issues that will affect his or her ability to do what is needed to recover. In the short term:

Real and symbolic damage in the form of injury, separation or death of significant others, loss of property, destruction of social networks etc., result in feelings of loss and damage to esteem and identity.

Now, stop and think about how many of the traumas, described in the quote above, an injured warfighter lying in a hospital stateside may have experienced:

1. Injury: from moderate (i.e. burns, broken bones) to severe (i.e. loss of a body part or its function).
2. Separation or death of significant others: including survivor's guilt, concerns about having reacted correctly in the fight, etc.
3. Destruction of social networks: before the injury, almost every aspect of life was centered around the warfighter's military unit; the bonds were probably unlike anything he'd ever experienced, but now he is stateside and his unit is still "over there."

Talk about a double (triple) whammy! The article goes on to discuss how these traumas can be coped with successfully:

Coping styles vary from action prone to reflective and analytical, from emotionally expressive to reticent. Clinically, response style is not as ultimately important as the degree to which coping efforts are successful as defined by the survivor's ability to:

--Continue task-oriented activity

--Regulate emotion

--Sustain positive self value

--Maintain and enjoy rewarding interpersonal contacts

Look carefully at that list above. If you are a survivor of a multi-traumatic event (severe injuries, battle, death/injury of fellow warfighters, separation from your brothers, etc.), lying in a hospital bed or stuck on-site in med hold, how could a computer help you cope successfully?

With access to a computer, you could:

1. Continue task-oriented activity. This could be anything from maintaining a blog (as MAJ Z does), to making sure your bills are paid, to planning that awesome vacation you're gonna have to celebrate your recovery.
2. Regulate emotion. Of course, a great deal of that is personality-related. But being able to find things to amuse and encourage yourself when you are upset or discouraged is much harder to do when you are confined to bed. But with a laptop you could lose yourself in a down-loadable book, laugh yourself silly on the South Park website, or reach out to the friend who always lifts your spirits.
3. Sustain positive self value. This is where the words like "independence" and "freedom" pop up. When you can do the kinds of things described in numbers 1 and 2 above, you are reclaiming a bit of the independence your injury tried to steal. You are taking care of yourself and your business. You have a least one corner of your life where you are in charge. That's huge.
4. Maintain and enjoy rewarding interpersonal contacts . This is the other huge one. Ask anyone who's been through terrible trauma; they'll invariably mention at least one person who "made all the difference." But what happens if that person (the buddy who saved your life or the sweetheart who can't afford to drop everything and come to you) is on the other side of the world? That's where the email, IM, and even voice chat come into play. It's your lifeline.

Then someone places a voice-controlled laptop in front of you and turns it on. Your entire world shifts. You have a powerful tool for your emotional and physical recovery now open to you.

Valour-IT: It's a whole lot more than just the "warm fuzzies."

I'll leave you with Rachel, an Australian paraplegic who knows what Valour-IT can do:

This project will make a massive difference to the lives of wounded soldiers. Giving them access to the outside world, as well as the independence that voice-activated computers will bring, is such an honourable way to thank them for the sacrifices they have made for our well-being. [bolding added]

[adapted from this post - FbL]

We go in the order we call in - Andrew Lubin must camp by his phone... he's usually first. At least while I've been traveling, I'm usually getting there last, and most of my questions have already been asked by other people. I have a greater understanding of reporter behavior at press conferences as a result of these roundtables!

Andrew asked the question I ask every time it's appropriate - because the best armies in the world have extremely capable non-commissioned officers, I ask about NCO quality and how we're facilitating development of a strong NCO corps (something that is many times not present, or even anathema in some of the nations we try to help build credible military forces). So, how does LTC Slaughenhaupt see the ANA NCO corps?.

He acknowledged that is one of the most significant shortcomings they are facing at the moment - he gave two reasons for this. One is time-distance - their training center is in Kabul, and it's hard to let the NCOs get to their training courses due to the pace of operations and the time spent in travel, plus the limited seats at their schools. The solution has been to create Afghan-led mobile training teams that go out to the units and conduct the training at regional locations.

The second problem with the NCO corps right now is that a lot of the officers are from the old DPRA, Democratic People's Republic of Afghanistan army, which used a modified Russian leadership model, so there is institutional resistance (as in Iraq and really, an awful lot of the rest of the world) to empowering the NCOs. LTC Slaughenhaupt's Sergeant Major mentor has been really working with the Afghan brigade Sergeant Major to reinforce the NCO corps, by implementing all those things we do to cement the NCO corps role and authority - in ways that run parallel to the officer chain. By that I mean the NCOs run the "soldier of the month" and promotion boards - and their choices are respected by the officers. And they engage in a lot of seminar training locally. He said that while they're slowly making progress, it still remains a big stumbling block. I suspect the Afghans will find what the Iraqis have found - the units with strong NCO corps will consistently out-perform those that don't. At which point it becomes a real officer leadership issue - with the officer corps in general being threatened by the fact that *they* have to become smarter and more capable in order to lead those units - not to mention they resent that if they don't, they look bad in comparison to the other units. In an Army where success is merit-based, they'll work through that. If they are patronage-based, they may well fail, in the end.

Andrew's follow-up asked if that situation wasn't cultural? Afghanistan (like Iraq) has had a top-down, do what you're told warlord-based society for over a thousand years. Andrew asked if perhaps they just needed better Lieutenants rather than Sergeants?

LTC Slaughenhaupt's response mirrors those of buddies of mine who've work with the more successful Iraqi units. I'll let LTC Slaughenhaupt speak for himself.

"The brigade commander, whose name is Brigadier General Abdul Rafik, he's an old mujaheddin guy. He fought against the Russians, he fought against the Taliban with the Northern Alliance, and he and I have talked about this a lot. He really gets it? He thinks about things a lot like we do. He's dedicated to adopting the same model that we use. He believes we're a success story. He sees how active my NCOs are and how much authority they have. And he's a believer, but that's a cultural thing that they've got to work over time. He's determined to do it, and I think that it will take some time.

I was an adviser to the Saudi army as well, and they have the same kind of attitude - that NCOs weren't that important, and most of them spent most of their time pouring tea, which is a similar situation here. But the leadership, the brigade commander specifically, believes that it's something to work towards, and so we're making some progress in that department."

There was more discussion, but in the interest of brevity I'm going to finish with one of Rich Lowry's questions. He asked "As with the war in Iraq and any real counterinsurgent war, it's winning the hearts and the minds of the people. How is the normal civilian population's attitude toward the Iraqi (sic; Afghan) National Army and the police and your presence nowadays?"

LTC Slaughenhaupt said that was a good question - He believes the Afghan National Army is highly respected as a legitimate arm of the central government. There is very little corruption, he knew of no instance where an ANA soldier had tried to shake down a local. He believes the, the Afghan soldiers, from the brigade commander down to privates, inherently understand the need to interact in a positive way with the locals. He said that when they do a MEDCAP/Humanitarian Assistance mission, the Afghan soldiers really enjoy doing that kind of thing. He gave another example. this time the brigade commander.

They were doing a cordon and search recently and they found nothing. Slaughenhaupt and BG Rafik talked to the locals, and the brigade commander had determined that this was a fairly friendly town, and there were no insurgents present. They were pretty much finished by 13:30, but BG Rafik said "You know, we should hang out here until about 4:00 or so." When Slaughenhaupt asked why, BG Rafik said, "Well, just so that the people can interact with my soldiers, and my soldiers can interact with them, and they can see what we're about, and they can have a better understanding, so we're not some -- you know, some group of people, of thugs, which is usually how the insurgents would characterize us and say that, hey, we're -- when we come into this town, we're going to do bad things. Well, we're coming into this town, and we're distributing humanitarian assistance items. My medics are treating the locals. And they're just interacting with them on a very friendly basis."

BG Rafik understands the importance of winning hearts and minds and his soldiers are following his example.get it and just do it naturally. LTC Slaughenhaupt believes the ANA troops he works with are well-led and good soldiers. They're honest. Their leadership is good. And the Afghan people are responding positively.

There was more, but was mostly just reinforcement of what I've just covered. The war is dropping off the MSM radar as the casualties decline and violence decreases - though they'll still happily report the bombings as they occur.

Which means, in some respects, it's more important than ever to get the story out. Like this.

Awesome accounting. Thanks!!!

*A term of art from the artillery. Harassment and Interdiction Fires.

Back in the day, when you could just kill people and break things without a note from a lawyer, they were pre-planned, but to the enemy, random, fires at known gathering points, road junctions, Main Supply Routes, assembly areas, etc - to keep the bad guy nervous that the world around him might start exploding at any minute.

*Not really relevant to today's operating environment, right? But, it *is*

The UAVs (oops, can't call 'em UAVs anymore - they're now Unmanned Aerial Systems... some Colonel got his Legion of Merit for that change...), er, um UAS's we fly over Afghanistan and Pakistan looking for targets of opportunity are a form of H&I fires, if you really want to parse it finely. We just have better sensors and fire control now.

I call the post that because it's random things posted by me and people I've given posting privileges to. It's also an open trackback, so if someone has a post they're proud of, but it really isn't either Castle kind of stuff, or topical to a particular post, I've basically given blanket permission to use that post for that purpose. Another term of art that might be appropriate is "Free Fire Zone"

"War costs could reach according to some sort of calculations by somebody."

Yeah, it's just some shmoe in my local barbershop. Oops, I mean it was the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office that made the calculations. And I am pretty sure that the reason Dems are not signing off on the blank check presented by the administration isn't the huge war costs but rather the desire to ensure that the bill doesn't have unnecessary and unrelated items attached to it. Might be something about trying to get our troops out of Iraq by the end of next year also. Little things.

Funny you should say that J. That part about the unnecessary things attached since I believe a major malfunction is the Dem Congress trying to attach other major spending bills that are likely to get the spending vetoed. In an effort to remove troops from a war that is just about over, no thanks to the Dems.

They aren't getting us out of Iraq and, if they are worried about spending, they should try the "less is more" approach and stop trying to make us pay for national health care and a ton of other unnecessary government intrusions.

Uh, actually I posted the spying story in the H&I* a while ago. That was the discussion that had John saying he'd be a character witness for me, after turning me in if I ever came into the possession of classified materials. And Unka Twitchy wondering how Sandy Berger got away with far worse intentioned actions with classified materials with a slap on the wrist.

I think the reservist got what he had coming to him. The road to hell is paved with good intentions. YOu don't play cowboy with this stuff. If it's wrong for some jackass to talk to the NYT because of the rules pertaining to restricted information it is still wrong for someone to leak it to LAPD. Sure, it's cheating in favor of the good guys, but it's still cheating.

And who let Sigger in? Man, now he's going to hear all the mean and nasty things we say behind his back.;) You should comment more often, dude. I'm about the only Castle Contrarian Corps member left.

You know J, it's still politiking with people's lives on the line. I don't like that much. If you want to end the war do so and pay the political price for it---doing what's right rarely comes cheap. Republicans are paying the price for going to war, which they thought at the time necessary. If they(dems) believe it they should simply act instead of playing this testing the waters thing repeatedly thing, which jeopardizes operations. That's just stupid and wrong. Either call the whole thing off or pay for it. Don't d$%^ around with soldier's lives like that like that is all I'm sayin'.

My question is: Who are the Dems going to appoint to tell the jihadists that the war is over? We've been at war with Jihadistan since 1979. The Dems (Edwards in particular) don't even want to acknowledge that 9/11 was an act of war, but rather a crime. So, after the jihadists follow us back from the ME, how many "crimes" are they going to have to commit before the Dems decide it is truly a war of survival?

"The Dems (Edwards in particular) don't even want to acknowledge that 9/11 was an act of war, but rather a crime. So, after the jihadists follow us back from the ME, how many "crimes" are they going to have to commit before the Dems decide it is truly a war of survival?

Hummmm, maybe when a few of them get their heads chopped off on video and stuck on a pole outside the US Capital, then yup I think they might, I say might change their minds.

Just to go off on a tangent, a bit; Have y'all noticed that Col. Tibbetts has left the planet? Reportedly, he requested burial in an undisclosed location, with no ceremony and no gravestone, to forestall annoying silly protests.

I recall that when my Dad passed, there was a good memorial posted here about him. I think y'all should do at least as much for his fellow war criminal, over on Tinian.

I mean, if you want to, of course.

Tibbetts drove a Toyota. I prefer Mazdas. They're made in Hiroshima. Clean slate and all, yaknow.

All the best, Jt

I put up a notice in yesterday's H&I Fires as soon as I saw it come across the wire.

Keep up, baby.

Maggie, the Armorer and I have already corresponded on the subject, and he has informed me about your post.

I should have seen what you wrote, but Kat blinded and confused me with her erudition. Cross-eyed, she made me!

Kat, you and Jerry Pournelle... This is one of the reasons why I need to send some more money to Valour-IT, as soon as my lawyer will let me have some - I wanna be on the good side of The Legions when The Republic collapses. I would rather preserve the Republic, and try to vote so as to do so, but that seems more and more like the proverbial contraventile micturition.

I wish it were not so.

Well it wasn't a big write-up, just a notice really (with a remark to reveal my hardline, unyielding opinion on the matter). I just wanted to point out we didn't let it slip by unnoticed.

However, I liked the write-up on this blog, Amercan Power. I just wandered over there recently and haven't read much, but the Tibbets post was good.

Uniting Shia and Sunni... cat herding at it's finest. Or worst. I'm just not sure.

Sounds like a VERY interesting conversation to sit in on, John!

"Those who know, know"

You're talking to a man named Marty about your buckle.............I don't think I want to know.

I was shocked when I went to vote! But it's only an online poll; as you stated in your post there are more and better accolades attesting to the Castle's superiority. [my wording ;>]

Honestly John... I don't put faith in popularity contests. Never have. I like what I like, and that's the end of the story. I write what I want to, I read what I want to, and every once in a while... I swing from a chandelier and take a swig from the 'rita-matic. What could be better than that?

I'm not really shocked. Just a little wistful. I don't pimp this place like I should if I want that kind of exposure. Something I'll have to learn if I ever want to make any money at it.

Other bloggers send me emails with their posts and I'll link 'em if I like 'em.

But I don't often send mine out like that. Even though I don't resent getting those emails, I'm not really comfortable sending them out. And I know from experience, once you get to a certain level in blogging, you don't have the time to read everyone, even with a feed, like you did when you began. But I don't like to flog myself out like that - except as I do it in this space.

Keeping up your own content, especially when most of us have regular jobs, gets in the way and the family starts to get a little grumpy. SWWBO stops bringing me coffee in the morning - because it just facilitates me staying glued to the machine, Little Girl jumps on my bellyshelf and blocks the screen... the little signs you're spending too much time staring at the screen and typing away.

And then, you start getting to where you can actually get involved, peripherally, in policy venues and *that* eats up your time, because you have to keep current.

And still do your day job.

I'm not comfortable that I've got enough to offer readers and advertisers to make the risk of quitting my day job and trying to actually make a living at this... so, I'll go the safe route and opt for the steady check.

Which is why I'm not rich. The entrepreneurial spirit ebbs in me. ;^ )

Geez, here I thought *I* was the only one around who didn't know that

a. nominations were being taken and

b. voted on and

c. the nominees decided.

Of course, this place doesn't fit comfortably into any one category -- but I think we'd be a cinch in a runoff for "Most Esoterically Eclectic."

Doesn't get any niche-ier than *that*...

"Of course, this place doesn't fit comfortably into any one category -- but I think we'd be a cinch in a runoff for 'Most Esoterically Eclectic.'"

Thanks Bill now I have two new words to look up.

John, of course you have to "pimp" this blog if you want to be a "headliner." If I may ... you simply have the typical military problem .. that is you follow your beliefs. Too many times that doesn't sell.

There is also this ... the Rulz prevent hatchet fights. You know how it is .. if it bleeds it leads.

My degree is in journalism. I can tell you that journalists are "paid by the inch" of printed material.

To get their stories published they lie and embellish. You simply don't. It's called "ethics."

That will stand in your way as long as you live. Imagine how easy it would be to be some wacko Barking Moonbat blog.

The truth would not stand in the way of sensationalism and your echo chamber effect.

You are a man who I am proud to know. Sometimes that means ... you toil in the shadows.

Well, high praise, Jim - especially since I've thrown the Rulez flag on you once or twice...

8^ )

Marines, current or former, just can't resist a good fight...

John - the community may not 'sell', and the Rulez do keep the fur from flying, but the Castle is special, and I'm glad you're okay with that. I wouldn't want it to change, and popularity contests are momentary, impact and intelligent discussion will stand the test of time :-)

Gosh John - in nearly 4 years of blogging at 2 different sites I don't think I was nominated even once. I know I have said this to you before... very likely last year about this time :p

Somehow I think you have done all right for yourself.

John,
You need to run it like a company with a board. You can be big chief and run it like Pelosi runs the house.

Blackfive is in first place? *Blackfive*? My God, the man is an infantryman, and voluntarily lives in Chicago, and actually has been known to pay money so as to visit stinking naples, Florida!

Owhell, at least Michael Yon came second. He's really cool. Yah, I know, he's kind of infantry-like, too, but he doesn't live in Chicago.

Ah, but Cassie - this is the first year we've not made the cut.

Ego, thy skin is translucent pale, as insubstantial as gossamer fluff, floating on a zephyr...

8^ )

Ah, but Cassie - this is the first year we've not made the cut.

I know you are smart enough to work out what I just typed and erased, so I'll spare both of us. Let's just say there's a reason I never paid much attention to a lot of things people said to me over the years.

Heheheheheheheheheheheheh heh heh.

Heh.

8^ )

In response, the Air Force has gone on the defensive. In September 2006, Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap Jr. published a long article in Armed Forces Journal denouncing "boots on the ground zealots," and insisting that airpower can solve the most important problems associated with counterinsurgency. The Air Force also recently published its own counterinsurgency manual elaborating on these claims. A recent op-ed by Maj. Gen. Dunlap called on the United States to "think creatively" about airpower and counterinsurgency -- and proposed striking Iranian oil facilities. Well, if you’re a general officer of one of the three main military services and you think there’s an effort afoot to marginalize your organization, you respond. The Army does it. The Navy does it. The Marine Corps (although technically a subset of the maritime service) has raised it to an art form. It’s what people do when they think they need to respond to a threat. It’s a kind of “policy wonk” behavior that all of us display, to one degree or another, in what is a constant tension among the Top Three generated by an environment where resources are scarce and the competition for them is fierce.
Surely, this is not the way the United States Air Force had planned to celebrate its 60th anniversary. On Sept. 18, 1947, Congress granted independence to the United States Army Air Force (USAAF), the branch of the U.S. Army that had coordinated the air campaigns against Germany and Japan. Point of order, professor. We didn’t “coordinate” the air campaigns…we developed and conducted them. How effective they were, especially the strategic bombing campaign, has been subject of much debate. However, there was no question the tactical employment of airpower in support of the overall campaign was crucial to success and in reducing friendly casualties by hastening the favorable outcome of the battles in which they were employed. Of extreme importance was a critical lesson learned in the early days of the war (Kesserine was a good example) that, to be truly decisive, air power had to be employed where it was most needed across the battle front. This could only be accomplished by central control that allowed limited assets to be employed across a large area where different ground commanders, had they controlled these assets piecemeal, would have attenuated their effectiveness.
But it's time to revisit the 1947 decision to separate the Air Force from the Army. While everyone agrees that the United States military requires air capability, it's less obvious that we need a bureaucratic entity called the United States Air Force. The independent Air Force privileges airpower to a degree unsupported by the historical record. I’m not sure what he means by “privileges” airpower. Land war is prosecuted by land war specialists—Soldiers. Maritime warfare is pursued by naval war specialists—Sailors and Marines. Air war is prosecuted by the people who have professionally grown up in an air war specialist cohort—Airmen. In fact, there is a lively debate going on right now as to whether or not a new Space Force should be formed…a discussion for another day. In any event, the good professor is about to erect his strawman: the dreaded “bureaucratic structure.” It’s not about bureaucracy, sir, it’s about experts in a medium of war concentrating their professional education, training and experience on that medium and thereby giving the Commander-in-Chief and the Legislature the best advice on what to buy, how to prepare and ultimately employ American military power in a three-dimensional medium. This bureaucratic structure has proven to be a continual problem in war fighting, in procurement, and in estimates of the costs of armed conflict. Indeed, it would be wrong to say that the USAF is an idea whose time has passed. Rather, it's a mistake that never should have been made.
Before 1947, aviation existed as a branch (if a large and privileged one) of the Army, alongside the infantry, artillery, and armor branches. To win autonomy, the Air Force needed to demonstrate that it could make a significant independent contribution to victory.
At the beginning of the U.S. involvement in World War II, Gen. Henry "Hap" Arnold, commander of the Army Air Force, decided that the Air Force would join Britain's Royal Air Force in the Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany. Over the next three years, American and British airmen would suffer appalling losses against German air defenses in a strategic bombing campaign designed to destroy German civilian morale and industrial capacity. The campaign expanded to Japan after Pacific bases became available. The USAAF also conducted a number of other missions, but its chiefs believed that strategic bombing would win the war for the Allies -- and independence for the Air Force.
This desire for independence drove the behavior of the USAAF during the war. The implication here is that the drive for independence was the sole driver of USAAF behavior during the Second World War. That does the Army Air Corps a disservice. Volumes have been written on the relative effectiveness—or ineffectiveness—of the strategic bombing campaigns in both major theaters. But the point is somewhat moot today. One must put how the architects of the WW II air campaigns conducted them in the context of the times. Air power thought was still in its relative infancy and the technology used to employ it was equally primitive. What they thought airpower could do and what it actually could do was still being worked out. To be fair, they worked out quite a bit (like Close Air Support as exercised by Generals Patton and Quesada—the ground and tactical fighter commanders, respectively, in the American sector in Germany. By late 1944, a submarine blockade had stymied Japanese war production. Because of the ineffectiveness of attacks on industry, and the flammability of Japanese cities, Gen. Curtis LeMay, mastermind of the strategic bombing campaign against Japan, decided that civilian areas would be the objective of his B-29s. Roughly 1 million Japanese civilians died from the fire-bombing of Japanese cities, though it was the incineration of so many square miles of Japanese city that the Army Air Force pointed to as it adduced clear, quantitative results in its fight for independence. LeMay would later head the Strategic Air Command, and serve as chief of staff of the Air Force during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which he argued for a full set of airstrikes against Cuban targets. And therefore…what? The most famous bomber guy of WW II wanted to drop bombs on the enemy. How gauche.
During World War II, the USAAF also engaged in tactical air support and anti-submarine warfare missions, but these involved tight integration with either the Army or the Navy, and thus couldn't justify an independent service; only strategic bombing could do that. To use a technical attack pilot term, this is utter BS. In fact, the success of centralized control under a for-all-intents-and-purposes independent air commander and decentralized execution by the fighter flight leads at the front line was recognized by both George Patton and Dwight Eisenhower as the best argument for an independence of that air in fact…something that happened, and was supported by Eisenhower himself in the late Forties. In the immediate postwar years, the USAAF fought bitter battles with the Army, the Navy, and the Royal Air Force over the evaluation of the strategic bombing campaign. The campaigns had plainly failed to destroy German or Japanese morale, so the arguments turned to an assessment of Axis industrial output. Although academic disputes continue, the historical consensus is that the campaign inflicted damage on the Axis powers, but not to the degree expected prior to the conflict. Nevertheless, by emphasizing its strategic bombing mission, the Army Air Force managed to win independence from the Army and become the third military service. Actually, no. It was part of the argument but the core point was, and I paraphrase, “Why not put airmen in charge of air warfighting.” Novel concept, I know, but it’s seemed to work pretty well over the years…and even the adults in the Army, admit that.
After 1947, the USAF believed that strategic airpower could decide wars, whether global or local. This was a natural outgrowth of the advent of nukes—the Holy Grail of war is a quick, decisive strike that decides the contest with minimum cost in blood and treasure. No military man likes fighting wars, especially long ones, any more than firemen like fighting 4-alarm fires. But when they do, they want it over quickly. Back then, nukes seemed like the answer, especially to guys who had just fought a long, bloody and hugely destructive global contest. Nukes were sexy back then and the only delivery vehicles we had at the time were long-range bombers. Destruction of enemy will and industrial capacity through conventional or nuclear means would result in victory. Control over nuclear weapons passed to the Air Force because of the connection of such weapons with the concept of strategic bombing.
Ground support also fell under the purview of the new Air Force. However, the Air Force did not take to this mission with the same enthusiasm it exhibited for strategic bombing. This is true—back then, the bomber guys were supreme. However, in the ensuing years, the fighter guys have risen to prominence and CAS has regained some of the importance it lost in the early days following WW II. I will say that I think the Marines still take CAS more seriously than many USAF guys, but if strategic bombing is so central to USAF thinking, why do we have so many F-15s, F-16s, A-10s, and F-22s? Ground support inherently involved collaboration with the Army and consequently subjection to Army aims. Autonomy and the glory of victory would go to the Army, rather than to the Air Force. This attitude makes me completely nuts. To this civilian, it’s all about zero-sum games. Granted, there are service partisans in every service who chafe at “doing the bidding” of another branch but they’re (thankfully) rare. Supporting an Army on the ground is hardly “subjection,” it’s contributing to the fight for an overall aim—victory. I’m an A-10 guy. I’m happiest when I’m talking to a guy on the ground and putting steel on target so he doesn’t have to. As the senior commander of all Tactical Air Control Parties in the European theater…and having participated in an air campaign as such, thankyouverymuch, I swear to God, my #1 objective was making sure my Service masters knew what the Army needed, where they needed it and when. I was NEVER EVER, EVER told to go pound sand. In fact, as the subsequent Director of Staff to the commander of Air Combat Command, I watched the senior four-star general in charge of educating, training, equipping all combat air forces—fighters and bombers (not to mention UAVs, and all the other toys employed against the enemy)—pump buckets of money into the TACP career field. I also saw one of my successors in the field be promoted to general officer rank in a direct acknowledgement of the importance of USAF personnel aggressively supporting US ground forces in the field. Still, the Air Force ensured that it would have a role in ground support operations through the 1947 Key West Agreement, which mandated that fixed-wing aircraft would remain under Air Force, rather than Army, control. Less sinister than you might think…the Air Force wanted its turf better defined (horror of horros!) and didn’t want monies sucked out of the USAF budget to build a mini Army Air Corps that would have been a step backward, given the lessons learned in WW II.
The assumptions undergirding strategic bombing have changed since 1947. The Air Force no longer advocates firebombing enemy cities. Its strategic focus has shifted away from attacking the enemy's civilian morale and toward attacking industrial capacity and infrastructure. Most recently, the Air Force has embraced "Effects Based Operations," or military operations designed to produce political consequences.
Unfortunately, the Air Force has had a poor strategic record. In the Korean War, heavy strategic attacks on North Korean cities failed to reduce Communist capabilities. Operation Rolling Thunder -- the campaign designed to destroy North Vietnamese will, transport capacity, and industry -- went on for three years and had little noticeable effect on the course of that war. This is a sleight of hand. At that point, the course of the war was determined by the US will to fight to achieve victory—something that went away under Lyndon Johnson (if in fact it ever even existed in the minds of American political leaders). Rolling Thunder had significant effect on enemy morale and compelled them to at least return to the peace talk table. Once we started relaxing the ROE (a little…not nearly enough) to go after their warmaking capacity and the ability to defend their city, their minds focused a little better and they started talking again. Quite frankly, if you want to get an Air Force guy REALLY spun up, just tell him air power wasn’t effective in North Viet Nam. Watch the veins pop out as he talks about what was probably the most irresponsible, restricted and stupid application of airpower since the invention of the hot air balloon. The strategic air component of Operation Desert Storm failed to topple Saddam Hussein or dislodge him from Kuwait. Oi. That wasn’t their job, sir. It never was. It was to prepare the battlefield and assist in the ground campaign. One funny aside—the Corps commanders were livid that Schwarzkopf wasn’t “dedicating enough air” to their impending attack. He was (trust me) but they couldn’t see it. Thus, B-52s conducted large and visually impressive bombing runs close enough to the friendlies to convince them we were out there kicking butt. It helped fight our own internal psychological war. Even the 2003 "Shock and Awe" campaign did not destroy the Hussein regime, or reduce its capacity to communicate internally or externally. Again, this is, well, just silly. Kinetic activity will have a shock and awe effect on the enemy (that’s good, professor) but I can assure you that Air Force planners didn’t for a second think that the initial air strikes would topple the regime. Moreover, I don’t know how you come up with no reduction in capacity to communicate internally or externally. I’ll have to look it up, but if I remember correctly, Saddam’s ability to communicate with his conventional formations was in fact affected.
Arguably, airpower did succeed on its own in bringing victory in the 1999 Kosovo War. For 78 days, the NATO alliance bombed Serbian military and infrastructure targets in order to force Serbia's withdrawal from the province of Kosovo. After increasingly serious threats of a ground invasion and the end of Russian support, Serbia succumbed to the NATO occupation of Kosovo. Even acknowledging the decisiveness of the airstrikes, however, the ability of a small country to stand against the world's most powerful military alliance for almost three months does not speak well of the coercive capacity of modern airpower. Gaaaaah! I was there! Nonsense! This was not an air war run by airmen for the purposes of defeating an enemy state as much as it was political theater. The targeting process was a nightmare of legal analysis and political calculation unencumbered by strategic or tactical considerations. I’m surprised the day-to-day air campaign commander didn’t die of a stroke he was so frustrated. The senior overall military commander was an Army guy (Wes Clark) who was so clueless he tried to give tutorials about coordinating simultaneous artillery and air strikes to airmen with thirty+ years of experience doing that. (It never happened. And, yes, we knew how to do it…they just never were able to roll the Army missile batteries into the fight as it didn’t make any sense for both accuracy and collateral damage reasons.) I especially liked the idea to drop food from B-52s—get supplies to the suffering Muslims while staying out of SAM/AAA range as losing a jet would be politically unacceptable to the Administration. As we patiently explained to THE ARMY GUY, dropping Meals Ready to Eat out of a BUFF up in the stratosphere would turn food into frozen projectiles. Of course, they’d have to cull all the pork patty dinners from the pallets and pallets of MREs, but that’s another story.
In response to such critiques, Air Force supporters have blamed the constraints placed on strategic air campaigns by U.S. civilian leadership. Despite the fact that the United States dropped over 850,000 tons of bombs on North Vietnam during Operation Rolling Thunder (some 350,000 more tons than were dropped on Japan in World War II), LeMay argued that the offensive failed because of inadequate use of force, and that the threat of an even more extensive strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam in 1965 would have won the war. This echoed similar complaints about limiting the use of airpower in the Korean War to targets on the Korean peninsula. The same arguments were trotted out again in refuting the allegations of uncertain performance of airpower in Kosovo. At least in the cases of Vietnam and Korea, historians have not tended to back these arguments. I’ll say this slowly, so you can follow: IT’S NOT ABOUT TONNAGE, IT’S ABOUT TARGETING. If I drop 6 billion tons of bombs off the coast of Iran, I don’t think it will affect their warmaking capacity or will to fight. I have to disrupt their ability to bring power to bear against our forces (interdiction), I have to disrupt and destroy their ability to control those forces and kill their leaders (strategic attack), I have to harass, interrupt, damage and/or destroy the forces they are employing against friendlies (CAS). The best way to do that, as Patton proved was through the centralized control and decentralized execution of an air arm by airmen who have coordinated their air campaign with their ground and maritime partners. And we haven’t even talked about defensive counterair—shooting down their fighters, their SAMS, their ground-to-ground missile force, etc., etc. The Army has enough to think about…let us handle the air battle.
On the other hand, the United States Air Force has made important tactical contributions to U.S. war efforts. In the first Gulf War, American and British airpower destroyed roughly a third of deployed Iraqi vehicles prior to the advance of U.S. ground forces. In Vietnam, Operations Linebacker I and II, directed primarily against North Vietnamese military forces, helped stop their advance into South Vietnam and bring the North back to the peace table. The Air Force also performed very well in support of the Northern Alliance during the war in Afghanistan, and helped destroy much Iraqi hardware in the opening stages of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.
This has created an odd situation. The Air Force is most effective when operating in support of the Army, and least effective when carrying out its own independent campaign. Another strawman. The Air Force is most effective when it’s allowed to employ its power by those who know how to employ it. Contradictory, too. Kosovo was purely an air campaign…it worked. Not well, but it worked. Would I want to do that again? Nope. I prefer joint operations where the experts in each medium put their heads together and come up with a plan that maximizes the effectiveness of each in pursuit of political goals. However, the Air Force dislikes ground support. So does the Navy. But the Marines don’t and neither do a lot of Air Force guys. Life is hard. But its harder of you’re stupid and the Air Force isn’t so stupid as to jettison CAS…if nothing else than to make sure it isn’t completely cocked up by well-meaning but experience-limited Army generals. Its antipathy to tactical missions, for instance, is at the root of its repeated efforts to shed itself of the A-10 Warthog. So I guess the new A-10C—completely rewired to employ our most modern munitions and guidance systems and projected to be fielded for at least another 20 years—is a figment of my imagination. BTW, I have a picture of one in my files, if you’d like one, professor. The A-10 is a slow attack aircraft, extremely effective against tactical enemy targets. The Army loves the A-10, but because the aircraft contributes neither to the air superiority mission that the Air Force favors nor to the strategic mission that provides its raison d'etre, the Air Force has always been lukewarm toward the aircraft. Sorry, can’t let this one pass. The strategic mission is not our “raison d'etre,” effectively employing air power, in all its missions, to achieve our military objectives is. I think this cuts to the heart of the professor’s argument—it’s based on a flawed premise—an opinion, really, by a man who has put very little effort into examining his preconceptions. Offers on the part of the Army to take over the A-10 have been rejected, however, as this would violate the Key West Agreement. Rejected…by the Army. Heh.
If strategic bombing won independence for the Air Force, yet strategic bombing cannot win wars, it's unclear why the Air Force should retain its independence. Um, because strategic bombing is only a fraction of why the Air Force exists today. To be sure, institutional inertia works in its favor. The efforts of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to force the services to compete against one another for procurement funds in the 1960s resulted, ironically, in a deep reluctance on the part of the services to question one another. One of McNamara’s most famous faux pas was his unsuccessful attempt to get the Navy to accept the F-111. This was a classic case of trying to leverage economies of scale by an automobile company accountant in charge of the world’s most effective military. The jet was totally inappropriate for carrier ops, but that didn’t stop Sideshow Bob. I love it when academics use McNamara as a “good” example of how to do things in the DoD. This interservice collusion persists to the present day, in spite of changes in the nature of the threats the U.S. faces. This has helped lead to such absurdities as the continued procurement of the F-22 Raptor, an aircraft whose sole purpose is the destruction of advanced enemy fighter planes, during the course of two counter-insurgency conflicts against low-tech enemies. I’m glad the professor is confident we will never face advanced enemy fighters in battle, ever again. Whew.
Moreover, the presence of the Air Force in the high councils of war and peace tends to provide presidents with predictions of quick and easy military victories. Advocates of airpower have been making such cases since the run-up to World War II. Though these prophecies have been proven false time and again, they nevertheless remain attractive to civilian leaders who fear public disillusionment with casualties, and who wish to go to war while resisting the dangers of full military involvement. Airpower advocates offer military power on the cheap; the wars they lay out entail few casualties and many spectacular successes. These advocates would continue to exist in the absence of the Air Force, of course, but situating them within organizations of broader strategic views would probably reduce the force of their arguments. This paragraph is delusional. This is a classic example of the cartoonish view assistant professors at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce have of military men. Air Force generals aren’t George C. Scott, no matter what they say at the Huffington Post or Daily Kos. This guy’s watched Dr. Strangelove one too many times.
He offers absolutely no proof and maligns people who have dedicated their lives to our national defense. Do they have a special love for airplanes and what they can do? Well, yeah. But do they consciously advocate for their own parochial prejudices, lie to their leaders and actively resist cooperating with their fellow professionals? Not the ones I’ve worked with. I am one of many Air Force officers who actually did sign up to lay down my life for my Army and Marine buddies. I wish I still could, but the bastards retired me.
Besides, having an independent Air Force requires using that independent Air Force, whether or not its mode of war-making fits the particular conflict. It does? So, a land battle 400 miles into Iraq’s interior requires the 7th Fleet, then. The existence of several separate services creates a competitive need to act during war. They may not be needed, but they are willing. That’s their job. Do they want the leadership to know what they can do to contribute to America’s success? Guilty as charged! Each service wishes to demonstrate that it can contribute, thus justifying future procurement. If something works…and works well, I’d like more of it. But I don’t make that decision…Congress does. Unfortunately, this produces a situation in which force is allocated to meet bureaucratic necessity rather than strategic need. Although we won't have a complete picture until full campaign histories are written, the need to produce work for the Air Force in Iraq and Afghanistan has probably led to overuse of airpower. Well, if I had your preconceived notions, I’d be certain it did. Bureaucratic necessity doesn't fully explain excessive airstrikes, but it is likely a contributing factor.
There's a better way to use American airpower. The Army and the Navy can accomplish the jobs that the Air Force does well within their current institutional structures. Tactical airpower should belong to the Army. Although the Army and the Air Force have worked out credible systems of cooperation, reunifying the two would likely result in tighter collaboration between air and ground forces. No it wouldn’t. It would repeat the mistakes so frequently and painfully learned before the Air Force became a separate Service. Scarce assets would be parceled out to individual commanders, diluting effectiveness and prolonging battles. The airmen would be professionally advanced based on their understanding of land warfare, not air campaigns, stifling their ability to think creatively about employing a unique force in a unique medium. I have seen Army guys try to run an air campaign. They don’t know squat about it, at least not like an Airman does. And don’t get me started on Army aviation. They’re great guys, brave and true patriots who I consider national treasures (like all our military men and wpmen) but I have personally witnessed absolute buffoonery when they try to figure out campaign-level employment of air assets. Fact is, that shouldn’t have to think about it. That’s my job and I’m happy to do it. Not because I want more procurement dollars, but because I want the battle to be short, I want it to be boring for the ground guys; I want to kill the enemy so the enemy won’t kill my Soldiers. Again, Eisenhower himself thought and independent air arm was a good idea and said so.
What the Hell, let’s take this argument to its logical conclusion. Let’s put everything under Army control, including the Navy. After all, all the Navy does is protect sea lines of communication so the supplies needed to fight the land campaign can continue to flow. I’m sure the Corps Commanders can effectively deploy all the Navy assets to support their campaign plan. After all, it’s just a supporting entity, right?
The tactical mission would also include air superiority, which is necessary to prevent enemy use of airspace and to allow freedom of action for U.S. forces. Similarly, some tactical elements of airpower would pass to the Marine Corps.
To the extent that the United States requires a capability to punish other states militarily for political purposes, the Navy can handle the job. The aircraft carriers of the Navy already represent the most powerful concentration of mobile military power in the world. Navy cruise missiles, launched from submarines and surface vessels, can strike most of the surface of the Earth within a couple of hours. Adding certain elements of the Air Force portfolio to the Navy would neither transform nor hinder the Navy's power projection mission. So I guess those bombing missions over Iraq from Whiteman AFB in Missouri were not power projection. Moreover, if this happens, your sailors will never see shore until their enlistments are up. And don’t think carriers can’t be sunk (ask Navy guys). Then there’s planning an air campaign. Navy guys are good at naval campaigns—defending the fleet, projecting power in limited areas, supporting littoral ops, etc. They do not practice melding three services’ assets to support theater objectives. They don’t have the time, the equipment or the expertise. I guess you could jam that 10 pounds of sand into that 5-pound bag, but you wouldn’t save any money, and you wouldn’t be reducing any workloads. In fact, you’d be increasing it. Navy guys end up doing a lot of other stuff on carriers besides flying airplanes…this would just make their already overtasked lives a living hell.
The strategic nuclear capability of the Air Force should also go to the Navy. The USN already operates its own strategic deterrent in the form of the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, armed with the Trident missile. The Navy could also operate the other two legs of the nuclear triangle (ICBMs and strategic bombers) without difficulty, especially since the latter would support the Navy's strategic mission. Wait! Wait! I thought strategic bombing was an anachronism? Then there’s this thing called the Triad. Um, that includes land-based ICBMs…another USAF mission. Sure, you could do that. But putting all your eggs in one basket increases strategic risk. It simplifies the enemy’s battle calculus.
We aren't likely to see the end of the United States Air Force anytime soon, however. The institutional structure of the Air Force would resist its absorption into the Army and the Navy; friends of the Air Force in Congress and the public would fight to prevent consolidation. Strong proponents of the "Air Force way of war" remain, and aren't convinced by "boots on the ground zealots." The Air Force would fight very hard to stay independent.
The consolidation of the services, of course, is no panacea for military difficulties. In spite of the formal unification of Israel's military forces, for instance, the Israel Defense Forces last summer embarked on a poorly planned strategic air campaign against Hezbollah and its Lebanese supporters. Israeli air attacks destroyed Lebanese infrastructure and killed Lebanese civilians without dealing serious damage to Hezbollah. That’s what you get when you put an air guy in charge of a ground war. Can you imagine what it would be like to put a ground guy in charge of an air campaign?
Nevertheless, the idea of an independent air force was not handed down on Mount Sinai. We have institutions because we've built them. Institutions are built for a reason. You may not believe this, professor, but sometimes they are built based on experience, not for procurement strategies. When these institutions outlive their usefulness or fail as experiments, we can take them apart. In a post–September 11 world, we live with threats quite different from those that the Soviet arsenal used to pose. We can and should devise uses and a bureaucratic structure for American airpower better suited to our current challenges than those set out in 1947.
Frankly, we have devised better uses for air power in only a few short years. Thanks to advancing guidance technology, traditional platforms—bombers—have already been very effectively employed in non-traditional roles—close air support. Unmanned aerial vehicles have come into their own as reconnaissance, communication and targeting platforms…even strikers themselves…in environments too hostile or politically off-limits for manned aircraft. These innovations were advanced and put into operation by airpower experts raised in an airpower culture. That can only be achieved by developing that culture in an independent and free service. A bomber pilot is still an airman, just like a fighter pilot or communications officer in the Air Force. A Soldier may be an armor officer or an artilleryman, but he’s still a Soldier and an expert in ground warfare because he’s a member of a land service. And I want him to be exactly that. In fact, I demand that he be exactly that. And I will never question his absolute dominance in a conversation about a land campaign. And if I am part of an American military campaign, my first and foremost mission is supporting the top commander—whether he be an Admiral, an Army/Marine general or an Air Force guy. I have one question in that fight: “How can I help?” And when he tells me what he needs, I’ll know exactly what I can do with my airplanes and my airmen because I’ve spent a lifetime thinking about it, preparing for it and practicing it as an independent service member. I firmly believe it’s served us much better than you think.

As soon as you made the point that Farley was projecting counterinsurgency-type conflicts into the future, you'd won the argument, IMO. However, the rest of the points are well made.

I might also point out that there are subtle, but significant, personality differences between the types who serve in the Army, Marines, Navy, and Air Force which leads to the branches having subtle, but again significant, cultural differences. These cultural differences between the services facilitate better performance by their members.

My dad never tired of telling the differnce between the Army Air Corps - in which he started out in WW II - and the USAF to which he was recalled for the Korean conflict. To be blunt, he liked the Air Force a whole lot better. Too bad he's not around to give Farley a piece of his mind... then again, it would be good for Farley: My dad could flake the paint off the walls when on a tirade.

Hey, Dusty: The question is, why do liberals hate the Air Force more than any other branch: Here's the key:

Gen. Curtis LeMay, mastermind of the strategic bombing campaign against Japan, decided that civilian areas would be the objective of his B-29s. Roughly 1 million Japanese civilians died from the fire-bombing of Japanese cities, though it was the incineration of so many square miles of Japanese city that the Army Air Force pointed to as it adduced clear, quantitative results in its fight for independence. LeMay would later head the Strategic Air Command, and serve as chief of staff of the Air Force during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which he argued for a full set of airstrikes against Cuban targets.

What it is really about? Hiroshima! Yes, this is another instance of narcissitic (and Soviet encouraged) liberal guilt, which I think explains most of the pacifistic cheese-eating that has gone on lo these last 60 years. Boomers of that ilk hid under their beds anticipating the end of the world. LeMay didn't encourage them to sleep better, so they especially hate him and the service that dropped the Bomb and had all those ICBMs. Everything that has happened since has been the bed-wetters trying to hand over the gun so they won't get shot, or going into "tomorrow we die so today we party" decadence mode (cf, the '60s and '70s.) Recently the Apocalypse has been shifted to global warming, but it's the same neurotic fear that drives them. In their eyes, the military, the country, and Western Civ itself was completely deligitimized and de-moral-ized on August 6, 1945.

.... and I don't. Specialists in surface warfare, submarine warfare, artillery, or armor also spend a career thinking about how they can help, and also have expertise in how their specialties can win wars. They don't deserve a separate service any more than airmen do.

Look, I can understand why you guys are paranoid. The Secretary of Defense seems to think that counter-insurgency is the next big thing, and Chuck Dunlap is terrified to his bones about that. He should be; it doesn't bode well for your service. But I think you're missing my larger point. I agree with Petraeus et al that the Air Force is a fifth wheel in counterinsurgency, but that isn't motivating this piece; I think that if China is to be considered the main threat, then the reasons for disposing of the Air Force as an independent bureaucratic entity are even more compelling. To put it simply, it is in the DNA of the Air Force to seek to fight wars in a manner than runs counter to how war is actually won; to seek to "affect" the enemy rather than disarm him. This genetic defect is not present in either the Army or the Navy, which is why they should take over Air Force assets. Your examples from World War II prove my point; the USAAF did a fantastic job at CAS (among other things) and a piss poor job at strategic warfare. It could have (and should have) continued to do a fantastic job at CAS, air superiority, and transport as part of the Army, not as its own independent organization.

Mike T.,

In fact I was referring to the firebombing of Tokyo, not Hiroshima; while a compelling case can be made that Hiroshima compelled the Japanese surrender, the incineration of a hundred thousand or so Japanese civilians in a couple of hours in March 1945 mattered not a whit to the end of the war; you're right that I hold Lemay responsible for that. I don't particularly hold a grudge against him for the ICBMs, in part because he didn't want them (fixated on bombing as he was) and in part because I like ICBMs; you might want to check out the discussion of the article at the Prospect, where I suggest that keeping the nuclear triad together is appropriate...

I could have sworn that several years ago the Air Force was trying to kill the A-10, or at least deemphasize it. I also thought I'd read that part of why the Army went so big into helicopters was because they wanted their own air power and weren't allowed to have stuff like A-10s.

Not that either of those questions takes away from the brilliant dismantling of that stupid article (#1 sign of its uselessness: taking that crappy Lancet propaganda piece seriously). Great work, Dusty.

To put it simply, it is in the DNA of the Air Force to seek to fight wars in a manner than runs counter to how war is actually won; to seek to "affect" the enemy rather than disarm him.
Nonsense. That's semantics. When I kill a tank, I don't "affect" it. I kill it. The Airman understands that "affect" can have many meanings--catastophic destruction, damage, or just plain interference. Each can "affect" the enemy, but the ultimate objective is destroying either his ability or will to fight, or both. A classic example is the presence of a SAM hunter over the battlefield whose mere presence compels the battery to shut down to avoid detection. He has not touched the threat but he has affected it, allowing others to bring the fight to the enemy the SAM battery is trying to defend. Tell me how that differs from the other Services' use of similar phrases that refer to how actions change the behavior of a target group?
Again, this is an illustration, to me, of how little exposure you've had to the armed forces. Each service has all kinds of words for what they do that don't include "kill" or "destroy."
This genetic defect is not present in either the Army or the Navy, which is why they should take over Air Force assets.
Your "genetic defect" analogy is an interesting one, by the way. Revealing.
Your examples from World War II prove my point; the USAAF did a fantastic job at CAS (among other things) and a piss poor job at strategic warfare. It could have (and should have) continued to do a fantastic job at CAS, air superiority, and transport as part of the Army, not as its own independent organization.
Well, I failed to make myself clear. The reason they did such a fantastic job at CAS was because, after Kesserine, the theater commander realized that parceling out air piecemeal to the division commanders was a mistake. Air is a scarcer resource than individual infantry formations BUT it brings tremendous power to the field and can distribute that power to where it's needed most more quickly than anything else. So from a practical and operational standpoint, centralizing that control under an airman made sense then and it still does--airmen know airplanes, and how to employ them. Learning that skill is best accomplished when you grow up in that world. I know--I have personally witnessed, in a combat zone, Army folks try to run an air campaign with disappointing results. What the DoD did after WW II simply formalized and put into practice what Eisenhower recommended at the end of the war. Let the airmen concentrate on airpower and the soldiers on land power. If you are concerned about lack of proficiency in coordinating operations, that happens between wars--and between branches within services between wars. We're even getting better at that, though. Also, if you think all would be peaches and cream if we just had an Army and a Navy, I think you would find a study of how those two got along between both World Wars interesting (hint: not well). Besides, ALL services have their institutional prejudices that are beat down or disappear over time. Remember the days when the ultimate symbol of national power was the dreadnought?
One more time with feeling: the air force does best when it's allowed to operate independently. The Army saw that, the Navy saw that and the former helped make it happen.

Instapilot,

You're trying to pretend that I think that the airplanes ought not to be used to destroy tanks and hunt SAMs; this project is called "building a strawman" and it is clearly refuted in the text of the piece I wrote. Of course I want aircraft to kill tanks and to hunt SAMs; what I don't want is a service that is designed, foundation up, to pretend that wars can be won without the direct disarmament of the enemy. Hunting SAMs and killing tanks is a critical element of disarming the enemy, but attacking enemy infrastructure and "targets of interest" in the hopes of "increasing the costs" for the enemy are not; notably, it is most often the Air Force that seeks to do these things, in no small part because the Air Force, being born from the argument that air power could win wars independently, remains wedded to that concept.

As for your point regarding Kesserine, I couldn't agree more, except to the extent that I don't see how it supports the idea of an independent bureaucratic organization called the United States Air Force...

I know--I have personally witnessed, in a combat zone, Army folks try to run an air campaign with disappointing results.

Well, yes--the current Army doesn't have an Army Air Corps to direct an air campaign. An Army which had absorbed the current Air Force would have that expertise.

Let the airmen concentrate on airpower and the soldiers on land power.

In the end, airpower effects the ground, no? Soldiers already concentrate on all manner of technologies which affect the ground: guns; bazookas; rockets; artillery--why not also CAS?

Bob,

By your logic, why have a Navy?

Instapilot – Since they are ganging up on you, I’ll try to cover your 6.

1. As I have mentioned here before, in my time in Iraq (working for the Army) I was very unimpressed with the maintenance culture of Army Aviation and the supply culture that supported it. I had a CH-47 battalion commander tell me in 2004 that he was going to present a paper arguing to outsource most of the Army’s aviation maintenance due to continued mediocre performance. I’ve never heard an AF Squadron Commander complain about our maintenance efforts. In fact, I have heard it held up time and again that the professionalism of AF maintenance NCOs was one of the reasons for our standing as the premier AF in the world. In the early years of Viet Nam, both the AF and Army operated the C-123, the AF had a significantly higher MC rate. When all the C-123s were transferred to the AF; the AF’s average didn’t go down, the AF got those aircraft flying and in the fight as well.

2. Based on the above, I would argue that all current Army aviation assets be transferred to the AF rather than disbanding the AF. I believe that all of the joint duty assignments now being required of the officer corps of all services would make the previous concerns that ground commanders have expressed concerning responsiveness of the AF to their needs no longer valid.

3. In the all volunteer scenario all services now operate in; combining the Army and AF would have serious impact on recruiting unless the next “marriage” was kept as distinct as the Navy is from the USMC.

4. The culture required to provide mission capable aircraft to aircrews is the opposite of that to the culture of being a good rifleman. Whereas a good rifleman (E-4) needs to follow orders instantly without making a lot of decisions, a good maintainer (E-4) needs to be able to make a lot of decisions and troubleshooting analysis in order to quickly return an aircraft to the fight.

Rob,

I’m not trying to pretend what you think. And I think you need to read my responses more carefully.

First, to think the Air Force “pretend[s] that wars can be won without the direct disarmament of the enemy” is, well, bizarre.

Alas, I think this exchange is going to go nowhere because you appear to be extremely unfamiliar with military doctrine and contemporary expression of common military concepts. To be fair, you may not be, but I can only go by your assertions about the various services and their roles in applying military power in their respective media of land, sea and air.

Each service pursues fairly similar objectives at the tactical, operational and indeed strategic levels. The tools they bring to bear often drive the focus of their operations to different levels—because it can extend its reach, the Air Force does spend a lot of time on deep strike operations. But that’s not to say they don’t execute tactical ops very well, much less ignore the needs of the tactical fight to strike deep because they think it better justifies their existence.

The US Army attacks the enemy’s infrastructure as a matter of course. Army artillery these days includes delivery systems that pass through the near-space environment enroute to very deep objectives. They are in every respect “infrastructure” assets—cantonment areas, bridges, lines of communication, critical supply points, etc.
Now, it would appear in your argument that the depth of the attack begins to lose its legitimacy if it occurs too deeply, i.e., at the ranges fixed-wing assets reach. Either that, and/or they are not directly associated with the immediate battle, or the enemy’s battle formations and thus, again, not legitimate.

Because they are not directly associated with the enemy’s tactical combat formations, they do not lose their legitimacy as important targets to the military operational planner.

Moreover, the nomenclature “targets of interest” seem to bother you as does the concept of increasing costs (the scare quotes give me that impression). Quite frankly, we're "interested" in a number of targets--their priority varies with the course and direction of the battle.

As far as specific targets are concerned, there are many that affect the enemy’s ability to fight and their attrition is important to Joint planners. Command and control nodes are a good example, as are supply depots, troop assembly areas, etc. The Air Force spends a lot of time thinking how to go after these in an attempt to shape the fight in our favor when all our forces—land, sea, or air—close on the enemy. Insofar as increasing costs are concerned, life is a series of cost benefit analyses. Increasing cost is just another way of describing what happens when you make life so miserable for the bad guy that he quits. Simple, really. The Air Force “seeks to do these things” because they can. It contributes to success and to not do it would be irresponsible.

But, you go off the rails when you assert we remain “wedded to the concept” that the Air Force “can win wars independently.” You offer no proof of that assertion because it does not exist in today’s air arm.

As far as Kasserine is concerned, I guess you simply ignored my point that the experience convinced Army officers that airpower should be directed by airmen. I say again, that experience and subsequent similar ones, the rapidly advancing technology that demanded a whole new skill set, etc., convinced veteran combat commanders that the mission mandated a separate service.

The “redundant bureaucracy” argument is an old one…one that few military professionals pay attention to anymore. Yeah, there are a few old heads out there who think the Air Force is the answer to everything, just like there are Army guys who think we should still have an Army Air Corps.

Quite frankly, to do what you propose would not save much money and the loss of capability inherent in pounding a square peg into a round hole would do the nation a disservice. I know you can’t be convinced of that and I won’t try.

It is curious, however, that you didn’t consider the converse: that ALL aircraft should be given to the service best suited to employing air power. Giving all the Army’s helos (and their utility fixed-wing assets) to the USAF would probably increase their mission ready rates, improve crew training and offer a better advocate for equipment improvements, weapons development, etc., etc., etc.

Then there’s the US Marine Corps. Why should they have airplanes? In fact, why shouldn’t they be subsumed under the Army in toto? It’s a land combat force, yes?

Ridiculous? Um, yes. But I'll let them fight that fight.

I largely agree with you. However, a couple of things I think need to be pointed out. First, the USAF is very good at air to air and strategic bombing. So much so that, when the United States enters a confict, these guys tend to work themselves out of a job very quickly. Two weeks into the conflict, all the AF is getting is tactical air support missions because they have eliminated all the other threats. Two years in, this tends to lead to a "what have you done for me lately?" mentality with the other services. This is exacerbated by the Air Force's reputaion, largely of it's own making, of being less than cooperative with the other services. The best example I can give is a situation that arose recently with a detail sent to download Blackhawks at an airforce base. There apparently were a number of issues that caused problems but the one that sticks out in my mind is that the Army guys were not allowed to use the Air Force's latrines. That's just petty. It's the little stuff like that that makes the other services want to vote the AF out of the Pentagon. This would be short sighted. Just because we are fighting an insurgency now, doesn't mean there are not conventional threats on the horizon (China wants a high tech Air Force too). This being said, right now the Air Force's primary money maker is tactical air and logistics. While these are considered less than glamorous they are what's selling right now. If the Air Force doesn't want to see more articles like this, maybe they should try backing down on what they want to have and playing up what the other services need.

Having been a joint targeteer from the Army side, I'm with the Instapilot most of the way down his rebuttal.

I part company with him and Oldloadr at this point:

Giving all the Army’s helos (and their utility fixed-wing assets) to the USAF would probably increase their mission ready rates, improve crew training and offer a better advocate for equipment improvements, weapons development, etc., etc., etc.

If only because I believe in the attack helo mission (though I know the Instapilot has some internal gas about AH *doctrine* that has merit) and I don't trust the Air Force not to sacrifice it as a more peripheral task when the budgets tighten up as they inevitably will (and, in fairness, should when the situation allows).

I wonder if Bill will wander into this briar patch...

Some thoughts to ponder:

http://csat.au.af.mil/2025/volume4/vol4ch01.pdf

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-2443934711053674980&q=pentagon%27s+new+map&total=32&start=0&num=10&so=0&type=search&plindex=2

http://csat.au.af.mil/2025/index.htm

John,

Cease fire, cease fire, cease fire! KIO! KIO! KIO!

Hint: Reductio ad absurdum has its uses...

It would have been very interesting to sit in the room back in the late 40's when the Air Force and Navy were fighting for the strategic soul of the Armed Forces. Bombers versus Carriers. Subs versus Missile Silo's.

My guess is the Navy's new Maritime Strategy and the Marines new call for moving into Afghan theater of operations is a headstart over the Air Force and Army for the Budget after next. Navy and Marine Coprs is trying to get the empty seat at the table for the next administration. Air Force should take note, and show what the AF will do to "prevent war" through expeditionary engagement and humanitarian relief capabilities.

just sayin...

Ah, Dusty - for Reductio ad Absurdum to work, it has to be recognized as such by the target.

Remember the axiom that rests at the core of military comms (and is a basis for much military failure) - any message that *can* be misunderstood, *will* be misunderstood.

This one, written by Lieutenant Cooke, Custer's Adjutant, comes to mind:

Benteen. Come on. Big village. Be quick, bring packs. W. W. Cooke. (P. S. Bring packs)

Vice this one, written by a young sailor, Aviation Machinists Mate 1/c Donald F. Mason:

Sighted sub sank same.

Hmmmm. I may have cause to regret giving a squid a login...

Come on John, thought you wanted some "jointness" around here...

Yeah, but on my terms. All rounds are outgoing, not incoming!

hehehe,

I play fair. I think Sam is a hottie!

Newbies!
I did a recruiting presentation to a kindergarden class once, (although we weren't looking for FSCC members). Then crossed the hall to visit a freshmen class of 6-year-olds.

Cheers

I just wanted you great military folks to know that I knew Sheldon Rutherford. He was my best friend here in Denver, CO. Sheldon was well known for selling hotdogs throughout our city. He was a great friend, a funny man and always spoke highly of the men and women he served with throughout his military and law enforcement career. Sheldon was helping another when he suddenly felt discomfort in his chest. He laid down to rest and G-d reached down and took him. Many still miss him very much and I just wanted you all to know what a great friend Sheldon was to us all and especially me. Sheldon built hundreds of military aircraft models, he had every Playboy ever published and was loved by more women than anyone can imagine. May He Rest In Peace...

Second, though seemingly "bad", is Putin's visit to Iran. He made plenty of bald statements insisting that no Caucus nation should allow their land to be used to launch an attack on Iran. That put plenty of backs up, but was the "assurance" that Iran needed to play ball. Along with Russia seeming to give them cover at the UN. That also puts our backs up occasionally, but, if you're playing the game right, could be construed in our favor when the cards are all on the table. Mostly because, as this article noted in Pajama's media, Putin left without making any other real promises to Iran.

Russia is insisting that it is going to take a long time to build the Bushehr Nuclear facility. Putin re-affirmed that on his visit and noted that they would not deliver any fuel until the facility was 90% complete and ready to run. While his visits and remarks about attacks may seem like a "failure" of State diplomacy, the truth is between the lines. This entire time, Russia has been seeking to re-assure us that the facility at Bushehr was not intended to build nuclear weapons.

Yet, Russia's reluctance to "hurry the project along" isn't just a matter of lack of payment. The Iranian government may be right that, that is a "cover" for Russia's agreement with the west that nuclear Iran is not a good idea. Whether through their own interpretation of the seriousness of a nuclear Iran in their back yard, or, very likely, State's efforts to bring Putin around to that view may never be fully divulged. I think it is both. Putin is not an idiot, but he also runs a state that needs money and allies in the region. At the same time he gives Iran some security assurances, he told the Mullah regime that Russia has some trust issues with them.

Russia would be right to fear a nuclear Iran. They share borders in the oil and natural gas region of the Caspian Sea. One might also wonder how certain foreign Islamic fighters have been able to transverse the area into Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya without possibly, somewhere, crossing through Iranian territory on the way. I don't think they are all going through Turkey or Pakistan to the Caucus nations and out. Additionally, there is the issue of the Iranians supplying weapons to Taliban (Islamic radicals) and Shi'ite militia in Iraq. As once posited, only an idiot would imagine that many armaments were making their way out of Iranian armories or arms factories without the Iranian government being complicit.

Putin maybe a thuggish, ex-KGB, oligarch pining for the good old days of Russian dominance, but no one could peg him as stupid. Thus, Iran's behavior and the possible unrest it would cause, both in the Russian held "republics" as well as allied former "republics" in the Caucuses, have to be a major concern. Even if it is just the "bleed over" from Islamists in Afghanistan. Russia is stepping cautiously, applying sticks and carrots in the region in order to maintain what stability is there because Russia cannot afford unstable regions that would possibly break Russia apart even further and seriously damage their energy driven economy. The one thing that is going very right in Russia right now and keeping them afloat.

Finally, a collapsed Iranian regime with the possible, if not probable, chaotic, post collapse Iranian state, right on the Caspian Sea, close up to Caucus nations and routes for distributing said energy bounty and possibly fueling additional Islamist activities or straight out destruction of said remaining "republics" in the area, would be, in the words of the infamous Rumsfeld, unhelpful.

So, my best guess is that State worked some magic mojo, helped along significantly by military and national intelligence showing Iranian complicity, a healthy dose of American Saber Rattling and an equally healthy dose of American Economic Power wielded through major sanctions. This is where it all works together, as it should. And people call this administration "stupid", "lacking nuance" necessary to do international diplomacy right. Of course, this is where "State" is on the same bandwagon and works well with others. Where, in fact, State could be considered as having a "shining" moment.

Russia might have its own issues with Iran, but it has to have good cause to believe it needs to put the relationship on the line. Further, I don't believe that the few things we heard publicly from the participants was the be all and end all of the conversations.

What does that have to do with North Korea shutting down their reactor, promising to allow Americans in to inspect and probably ending major uranium enrichment? Everything if you recall that happened shortly after our Israeli allies made a quick dash, undetected, into Syrian territory to ostensibly destroy a nuclear facility being built and/or operated by the North Koreans. The destruction not only reminded Syria that the Israelis could smash them at leisure, but reminded the Iranians, for all their bravado, that, if our Israeli friends could do that to Syria with our last generation technology, imagine what we could do to Iran employing more advanced and stealthier weapons.

Iran was busy talking about their "new" weapons, preparing for guerrilla war and using the terrain to their advantage, but that was just about all talk. We were talking about how we would bomb the crud out of them, not "invade" them with boots on the ground. From our perspective, not withstanding the long pain of the Iraqi and Afghan wars, it would be unnecessary. Iran could be collapsed and left to its own devices without suffering an infantry casualty on Iranian soil.

That's not just hubris, that's a fact considering the current political and economic situation. Iran, still talking, tried to up the ante by insisting that they would let loose their terrorist, non-state dogs in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq to name a few places. Out of nowhere, and bizarre considering the entire 1983 Marine Barracks incident in Beirut, Hezbollah in Lebanon starts making threatening comments about what they would do if the US put bases in Lebanon. That came out of Lebanon, not here in the US.

Why would Hezbollah make such threatening statements if that was not an official communique or strategy? Hezbollah is not the Hezbollah of 1983. Previous discussions regarding the different military pressure that can be placed on a "state" as opposed to guerrillas without any real territory or collateral to threaten with absolute military force note that people in power with economic, land and political collateral to lose make nice fat targets . Hezbollah, by necessity and per the Mao doctrine on Guerrilla War, had to throw off their "guerrilla" operations and organization to become an organized military and governing force with notable rules, capable of administering an area in order to become the "government" of said area and eventually a state governing power.

While we might decry Hezbollah's extra-national state in southern Lebanon, they have made that long stride to Mao's step two in the process. They have territory, administration buildings, fairly recognizable armed forces and military, intelligence and political leaders along with some significant infrastructure that they now own and would have to risk on the say so of Iran. Iran being their major benefactor. Yet, even they have their own agenda that would be risked under such circumstances.

Most point to the short war last year between Israel and Hezbollah in South Lebanon as a sign that any war there is dangerous and politically damaging in the greater international sphere. Yet, if it heats up with Iran and they unleash their dogs in any greater activity in conjunction with some Iranian move, the war would be different. It would be all out war and Hezbollah would be in a serious fix. Even with nearby Syria trying to assist them and funneling Iranian Qods, money and weapons, they would not likely survive.

That, by the way, is the other message that was sent with the Israeli bombing run into Syria. Just a little reminder that they are playing a deep game, but its our rules and they do it at our leisure. And, because, we really don't want to have a big muck up over there we've played soft, but the bombing reminds Syria, Hezbollah and Iran that we are still those "crazy Americans" with equally "crazy Allies" who like to take big risks. It might have reminded the Syrians, who are also in an economically unstable period with internal unrest, that we are extremely tired of their assassination of Lebanese politicos which seems to have quieted down in the last month or so.

Finally, the bombing run reminded Syria, Iran and North Korea that "we know things". For all the hoopla about our failed intelligence on 9/11 and the alleged failure of intelligence on Iraq, the war in Iraq has given us great opportunities to put eyes on these nations. Our intelligence agencies can work very well with other nations and pool information. Thus, we know things about Syria, Iran and North Korea that would allow us to do exactly what we said we could do: bomb the facilities and infrastructure most likely to be "of interest" without risking many military lives or those of their civilian population. What we know was obviously a great bargaining chip with Kim Il-Jong's regime and, apparently, China.

What else did we get out of Putin's visit? Besides Putin acting as our "talk softly" diplomat while we carried "the big stick" of military and economic demise, a few weeks later we get this report from Sec. Def. Gates indicating that the Iranians have told Iraq that they will stop filtering weapons into Iraq to the Shi'ite insurgents. Gates, of course, is skeptical of Iranian efforts and motives. He indicates we aren't just taking their word for it, but we are stepping up activities on the Iran-Iraq border, intercepting people, arms and money. Not to mention several very public "captures" of Qods forces in Iraq.

This wasn't all in relationship to Putin's visit, possibly on our behalf, baring some whispered advice to stop while their ahead, nor was it totally dependent on the Syrian strike, the North Koreans capitulating over Pyongyang or the whisper to Hezbollah that we could put bases in Lebanon and mess up their good thing, nor even existing sanctions against Iran.

The US did what it was threatening to do: placed the IRGC and multiple political and military leaders on the "terrorist" list. Since the IRGC owns and operates half of the infrastructure and economy of Iran, that put a huge dent in the greater Iranian economy. It caused a giant ripple in their political situation back home. Once again, the powers that be reigned Ahmadenijad in and made it public by allowing a state run newspaper to publish the disagreement over Ahmadenijad's choice to dump Larinjani and his new selection for the chief nuclear negotiator. Someone that may not pass into permanence without approval from the greater Supreme Council.

The problems certainly allowed Ahmadenijad's opposition to make some hay. Ahmadenijad's opposition includes Rafsanjani and others like him who are also major businessmen, owning companies and financial institutions, who have a lot to lose if the the sanctions against Iran continue or get harsher. While the Iranians try to present a completely unified government, the internal fractures are wide enough to drive a giant economic stake between them. That economic stake has been the bain of Ahmadenijad's existence since he won the presidency in 2005.

There were diplomatic efforts in Iraq, too. Maliki met with Ahmadenijad a few months ago, probably at the urging of the US State Department to discuss their mutual issues. At the same time, the US, having crushed Al Qaeda in Iraq, turned their sites on the "rogue" Mahdi Militia, allegedly backed by Iran and operating outside of Sadr's jurisdiction or control. Sadr has been very quiet, all things considered, as his once grand militia is getting extraneously purged.

Sadr can't really say much about the purging without damaging himself even more politically. Particularly, after the shoot out in Karbala with the Badr that killed fifty people during a religious event. Sadr had to distance himself from that, poste-haste. He did so by claiming those involved were "rogue elements". This event allowed the US to pick up the information war against the militia while simultaneously giving Sadr an out. Now, the most dangerous, active and major portions of his militia were "rogue" elements under the control of the Iranians.

Of course, that is largely the truth. Sadr has had a hard time controlling all of the "Mahdi". All of their extraneous attacks have also been "unhelpful" in his political ambitions. Their thuggish behavior, once considered acceptable as a defense against a greater Sunni/al Qaeda threat, is now becoming a burden on the Shi'ite population. This population is also tired of the militias and have started to create anti-militia organizations like the "Concerned Citizens" of Diyala, representing both Sunni and Shi'ite tribes. They recently cooperated to counter a "rogue" Mahdi operation that had succeeded in kidnapping tribal leaders from their convoy after a meeting.

All of this leaves Sadr with few options. He certainly cannot be seen supporting any part of the militia that is "Iranian" after ranting about Iranian influence (along with US influence) in Iraq and painting SCIRI as Iranian puppets. His entire political facade would come crashing down. This may be the part where Sadr has finally painted himself in a corner.

Juan Cole once posited that Sadr was a "nationalist" who was unhappy about Iranian influence both within his own organization and that of his rival SCIRI. This, he insisted, was what was influencing Sadr's decision to make noise in Basrah with a mini-skirmish against the Badr Brigade and SCIRI as well as withdrawing from the Maliki government. Sadr may have bitten the hand that fed him. During the Najaf stand off in 2004, Sadr was financed and armed by the Iranians. His "council" included a number of Iranians. Some of who were issuing contradictory statements in his name.

It's unclear whether it was the Iranians making statements about "no surrender" or if it was Sadr's nationalist spokesmen during that stand off. In either case, Sistani saved him from any further destruction and martyrdom, riding in with a parade and riding out with Sadr and the Mahdi. This may have been the straw that broke the camels back and caused Sadr to become seriously anti-Iranian.

Its' probable that any relations with Iran went completely sour and the Iranians left Sadr to hang by his own rope until he was willing to cooperate. Then again, for an "anti-Iranian", nationalist, Sadr's militia had a lot of money, men and weapons from Iran. Not to mention his frequent visits there (though his spokes people tried to claim he was still in Iraq on those occasions, no one could apparently find him there).

Then SCIRI did something Sadr had been unwilling to do: they sent Al-Hakim to the Sunni in Anbar who had just kicked Al Qaeda in the head, possibly delivering a death blow.

The new Sunni political convergence, along with counter arming of the once insurgents and their new found financial importance, made them very attractive. While Sadr was talking about trying to get a gig up with the Sunni Accord Front to take a big chunk of votes in Parliament, Al Hakim had recognized that the SAF were going to be bit players in the game compared to the emerging "Awakening" in Anbar. Grass root politics in a post war province was going to change parliament. SCIRI obviously figured out who the real players were going to be before Sadr.

That political mistake, along with his unruly, barely controllable "militia" and its current dismemberment, may have placed enough pressure on Sadr to force him to take a step he would rather not: sign a deal with Al-Hakim and SCIRI. As this report notes, it's an uneasy deal that doesn't necessarily mean all is well, Sadr's given up his nationalist movement or that Iraq will be one happy, liberal, American style democracy.

Then again, if anyone was expecting that, they were not paying attention the last four years nor learned the lesson of Iraq. That being that, in a time of terrible tyranny, when people suffer horribly, they are unlikely to become "liberal" in their ideas and beliefs, but more likely to become "conservative", cling more tightly to their faith and largely see their affliction as brought on by a lack of unity and faith within the community. That is even more likely in poor and/or rural populations where a majority of Shi'ites and Sunnis in Iraq.

That report also notes that the unification of the Sadr/SCIRI movement was likely urged by both Tehran and Sistani in Najaf in order to present a better united Shia front. The Sunni in Anbar are now becoming well armed and well trained militia. The AK-47 is becoming the equalizer of the Iraqi wild west and, as once noted by the founders of the United States, the government, in this case Shi'ite, is much more responsive to an armed and able population that is willing to knock it off or defend itself against any additional tyranny, having already experienced it in the forms of Saddam, al Qaeda and Shi'ite militias. They have nothing to lose.

The Shi'ites, who want to rule Iraq, even if its only possible with "pluralistic" government of Shi'ites and Kurds or other small factions, must be able to recognize they need all of their resources to do so and must also recognize that an unstable and constantly warring population would not allow them to do so in any significant way. In fact, would cause them to lose and possibly be knocked out of power.

But, the one thing that the Jamestown report failed to note, and so have we, is that the Shi'ite situation is not just a proxy war against the US. It has been a proxy war between Najaf and Qom as well as a proxy war between the Ahmadenijad conservatives and the Rafsanjani " "pragmatists" in Iran.

SCIRI has been in the pocket of Qom, Iranian mullahs for years. It was where they took refuge after leaving Iraq after the failed Shi'ite uprising and their traditional sanctuary. Qom is the traditional center of Iranian Islamic thinking and the place where the the revolution was born under Khomeini. It is where the mullahs on the Grand Council are educated. Plutocrats like Rafsanjani want a little more accommodation with the west, a little less unrest and talk of war. They don't see it as helpful in their efforts to join the rest of the world at the big table. They believe that Iran's economic growth is the way to make that happen, not open threats of war.

Though, they are not opposed to Iranian nuclear ambitions. Far from it. Rafsanjani can be rightly seen as the president who ushered in their nuclear ambitions and hoped to do it quietly, drawing as little attention and presenting a little a threat as possible. At least until they were ready to go public with all the ducks lined up including economy, energy and military (ie, nuclear) power. They believe that Ahmadenijad's loud threat's and lack of nuance seriously damaged that plan and may have put them in danger of losing it all together.

SCIRI is most likely being funded and provided political guidance by this group. SCIRI was also the organization that was invited back by the United States for post invasion political stabilization of the south (one of the reasons Sadr hated both the US and SCIRI). They owe both Iran and the US, particularly as the US allowed them free rein in the South to create their own political power house region with little interference by the Coalition. Most see the efforts in the south as a "British" failure, but it is likely it was part of the original plan post invasion. The British, having some relationship with Iran, were unlikely to cause a problem for the Iranian backed SCIRI and didn't.

It's this group is the group in Iraq that will act as a pressure point as well as a conduit between Iran and the US. Under the Rafasanjani faction political guidance, it will be most likely to make some "real politic" decisions in the Iraqi political arena that may translate to a functionary between the less "hard line" Theocrats in Iran.

Sadr, on the other hand, was most likely getting most of his money, men and supplies from the IRGC. The IRGC not only controls fifty percent of the "legitimate" businesses in Iran along with significant armories and armament manufacturers, but it also controls most of the smuggling along the Iraq-Iran border. That is the way that the "Mahdi Militia" was getting its arms, money and men. The IRGC and Sadr have a few things in common. While the IRGC was created to be the defenders of the Islamic revolution, they are, in the main, Shi'ite, Islamic ultra nationalists along the lines of Ahmadenijad.

Sadr is also a Shi'ite, Islamic ultra-nationalist. It is likely that his association with the IRGC included assurances that, once the US had left Iraq, the Iraqi Shi'ite ultra-nationalists would be left to govern on their own with little interference from Iran. Sadr was likely looking at, what he thought, was going to be nothing more than an agreement between the IRGC controlled Iran and Nationalist Shi'ite Iraq for mutual economic, political and military association without direct interference from Tehran.

Whether that was really going to happen is an interesting question. What is apparent, as noted earlier, is that Sadr's organization was going to the Iranian backed hardliners. Something that must have given him pause and made him question their agreement. This group seems intent on making war and forcing the US out of Iraq physically. Even if it meant the destruction of Iraqi Shi'ite unity and Sadr's once vaunted militia. Leading up to Sadr's pronouncement of "rogue" elements in cahoots with the Iranians and his quiet acceptance of the American led "Iranian" purge on this "rogue" Mahdi Militia.

The IRGC is most closely associated with Ahmadenijad's hard liners. It's where Ahmadenijad came from, where he was "educated", where his cabinet members and close associates come from and from where he gets most of his political and economic backing and power. Even the Basij civil militia that organized his election in Iranian cities, through stuffed ballots or marginalizing the opposition through physical intimidation, is the civilian counterpart of the IRGC. Many retired IRGC and the "non-military" family members of the IRGC are part of this organization.

This is why Juan Cole's assessment of Sadr as nothing but an ultra-nationalist Iraqi who eschewed Iranian interference in Iraq is somewhat one dimensional along with the insistence that we should have made accommodations with him all along. Possibly at the beginning, but not once his Iranian association had won out. Further, Sadr was not in any mood or even position to make such a compromise.

What is apparent is that the IRGC/Sadr connection is broken and that the SCIRI/Plutocratic Mullahcracy has taken the day in Iraq. While the Jamestown report is pessimistic about the probability of Iranian influence in Iraq now that Sadr is being reeled in by SCIRI and Sistani, the fact is, the Iranians were going to have some sort of influence. The question was whether this influence was the "pragmatic" Rafsanjani plutocrat faction or the ultra-nationalist, Islamist IRGC warmongers ready to pick an open fight with the entire west and any Sunni nation in the region to obtain instant hegemony?

SCIRI and the pragmatists appear to be taking the day in Iraq. Something that is not all together a bad thing and may point to the resurgence of the pragmatists in Iran. That would give the west and Russia something to work with in regards to Iranian nuclear ambitions without war and its possible chaotic outcome in the region. Attacks on US forces and the impending Iraqi civil war is dying down as political discourse comes to the fore.

As much as this is part and parcel of the internal Iraqi political situation and probable power struggle in Iran, it is also an example of when the DoD and DoS work together. Obviously, the military laid the ground work with the Sunni in Anbar and now with the Shia/Sunni in Basrah having assisted in kicking Al Qaeda to the curb and working on the Mahdi. Security in Iraq gave State the ability to maintain Maliki's government through the crisis, help separate him from the Sadr/IRGC factions and allowed him (if not urged him) to get SCIRI to start grass roots accommodations on behalf of the Iraqi government with the Sunni in Anbar, if they didn't figure it out themselves.

The truth is it was likely pushed forward by Ambassador Crocker through Maliki who made the perfect counterpart for Gen. Petraeus during the September report before congress. The commanders in Anbar had been asking for the Iraqi government to start working with the Sunni in Anbar to show they could trust the Shi'ite led government and insure that there was no back sliding to insurgency and Al Qaeda. Even Gen. Petraeus and all the military power in Iraq couldn't do that. We definitely have little if no military forces in the southern Shi'ite enclave. It had to be State working the channels with their military counterparts.

Thus, showing that State can and does actually play a significant, effective and important part in the battle for Iraq and the war on Islamic radicalism as a whole.

We missed our chance with Iraq to have a Marshall Moment like we did in Germany and western Europe after WWII.

I am really tired of the whining GS's and SES's from State. One even called the forced assignments to Iraq as "death sentence". (reminds me of the Leslie Sloate character from Herman Wouks War and Rembemberence Novel)

Fire those that won't or can't comply. They would do more damage then good.

In the words of the former Secretary of State "what good is a State Department, if you don't use it?"

I'd say State is a mixed bag. I wanted to give them some due while recognizing there is a problem with some of their legions.

Yesterday, I didn't specify well enough some of the "failures" and "obstructions" as well as a few that went "Stockholm" from my perspective. I could point them out, but I think they were getting banged pretty well yesterday.

Still, you know the Maliki/Hakim/Sunni Awakening thing is a product of State with the DoD so we can't count them out. Crocker is not a bad guy. Maybe even the right guy at the right time.

don't know about his support in the lower ranks, though. Hopefully, he's smart enough to use what he's got and motivate people some more.

As for our "Marshall" moment, I think that is coming up. The last four years are more like 41-44. no Marshall moments there either, just total destruction.

Marshall moments come in peace.

What we really needed were Arabic speakers with some decent knowledge of tribal, Arab, and Muslim affairs that could have given us a lot more push in the right direction, worked with the locals and got the political process underway some time ago.

Then again, maybe they were trying and the past commanders, prior to Petraeus, didn't recognize or want to use the DoS as it should have been. Nor appreciate their concerns over killing significant parts of the population and stirring more "unrest" among the neutrals.

All of which changed under Petraeus' new strategy.

So, I'll give them the benefit of the doubt on that.

*A term of art from the artillery. Harassment and Interdiction Fires.

Back in the day, when you could just kill people and break things without a note from a lawyer, they were pre-planned, but to the enemy, random, fires at known gathering points, road junctions, Main Supply Routes, assembly areas, etc - to keep the bad guy nervous that the world around him might start exploding at any minute.

*Not really relevant to today's operating environment, right? But, it *is*

The UAVs (oops, can't call 'em UAVs anymore - they're now Unmanned Aerial Systems... some Colonel got his Legion of Merit for that change...), er, um UAS's we fly over Afghanistan and Pakistan looking for targets of opportunity are a form of H&I fires, if you really want to parse it finely. We just have better sensors and fire control now.

I call the post that because it's random things posted by me and people I've given posting privileges to. It's also an open trackback, so if someone has a post they're proud of, but it really isn't either Castle kind of stuff, or topical to a particular post, I've basically given blanket permission to use that post for that purpose. Another term of art that might be appropriate is "Free Fire Zone"

Phred Felps has been sued and a jury awarded a huge verdict. Of course, in the process of Not Understanding How Links Work on this blog, I lost the story.

Cricket - Here's a link to the story. It took me a while to figure out the link thingy, too...

Don't worry about the "leaked report" from "Labour's favourite Think Tank" that Christmas is going to be abolished in the UK.

For a start it's the Institute for Public Policy Research - not any government organization. The IPPR likes to be WAY, WAY, WAY beyond public opinion (I suspect that they use this technique to discover what TRUE public opinion actually is).

Secondly, if it's in the Daily mail - and it refers to rumours about anything that might be even vaguely linked to Labour Party policy - it's guaranteed to be an exaggeration. The Daily Mail is notorious for their dislike of the Labour government and their love of apocalyptic headlines (in US terms, think of them as a less cheerful equivalent of Glen Beck)

For future reference, every paper in the UK has a known and fully-understood agenda. Except possibly for the Independent, which is often considered boring as a result.

The best summary was presented in the old sitcom "Yes Prime Minister"

Hacker: Don't tell me about the press. I know exactly who reads the papers: The Daily Mirror is read by people who think they run the country; The Guardian is read by people who think they ought to run the country; The Times is read by people who actually do run the country; the Daily Mail is read by the wives of the people who run the country; the Financial Times is read by people who own the country; the Morning Star is read by people who think the country ought to be run by another country; and the The Daily Telegraph is read by people who think it is.

Sir Humphrey: Prime Minister, what about the people who read The Sun?

Bernard: Sun readers don't care who runs the country, as long as she's got big tits.

I read the Sun (internet version) almost every day; of course it's purely for the relatively conservative views expressed... ;)

[Yeah, it wouldn't have anything to do with Page 3...-the Armorer]

1. Does anybody besides me see the irony of Phred picketing military funerals because the USA is becomeing the New Sodom yet many liberal bastions of learning have kicked ROTC out because of Don't Ask, Don't Tell? Talk about the poor GI being stuck in the middle again...
2. Maybe Phred & Co. harrass the families of people who died so that they (Phred & Co,) could be jerks in public, because they don't have the huevos to picket at San Fransisco city hall...

Oh, Page 3? Yeah I noticed that a time or two...

{Snerk. -the Armorer]

Shutting down the Chinese Merchant fleet. Hmmm. If we can't get them sushi eating surrender ninjas to pump our gas for OEF, maybe Japan's MSDF could start drilling for the Big Blockade?

Which is why I asked if REd v. Blue was the only way to go w/ a CHinese attack on Taiwan not too long ago. Can we go another way. My thinking was along the lines of naval blockade. Why play the game they've spent years and years studying and planning on how to beat us if we don't have to?

AND - did anyone happen to notice MSDF waited until Paul W. Tibbits Jr. died before they pulled their freight from the OEF support mission? Still afraid of him after all these years. A great American has passed.

LOL Maggie is dead right,

COL Tibbets should rest in peace. He should be buried in Arlington. Let them protest...

It isn't torture because sometimes the 'victim' survives. Well, don't victims of torture sometimes survive? I am not trying to be flippant here, but uh...I am just flabbergasted over this.

Not only that, their whining about the West forcing our liberal ideology on them...uh would that be opposed to jihad?

disappearing tanks? we'll see how many of the projectors and lenses survive the first road march and out to Range 301.

"LOL Maggie is dead right"

MMMMMMMMM, ahhhhhhh, I love the sound of that.

Thanks baby!

Of course all religions should be allowed in the public square, even atheism. No government should push any one above others, particularly atheism. They should all be out in the open.

The critical difference between this very American opinion - which is admirable in many regards - and the British case is that Britain has an established church, that being the Church of England, and a monarch whose majesty extends to being the head not only of the state but of the state church. Such is the British constitution, unwritten as it is.

There may be people who wish to change this situation including the regrettable figure currently set to inherit the throne. Until such a time, however, the notion that Christian festivals - and specifically Anglican celebrations of Christian festivals - should have less of a place in the public square is to misunderstand the public square.

The Queen of England is also the Queen of Canada and I would argue the same situation applies here for all that we have a written constitution that is of a bit of two minds on the subject.

A small but important correction. Britain has no established church. There are, rather, churches of England, Scotland, Ireland, etc.

Lesson One at Canuck basic training: when the opportunity presents itself, always take a nap. You never know when your next one will be...

Aww, now THAT is camping! Not so good for hunting your own food, though...

Oh, I dunno, NinjaFluff - the canister round from an M1 will also skin, clean, and debone your prey.

best rack position on the M60 series was front left fender, followed closely by an asbestos hammock to an eye bolt in the top of the breach.

best rack position on the M1 series will always be the driver's hole.

... and any tanker rack position beats any infantry rack position.

The technical name for the activity is "drinking wine, eating cheese and catching some rays... sir".

Heh. In US military argot, Murray, "eating cheese" is *not* a good thing.

But it is something I would expect from a tanker...

Sounds like a great unit motto: Go anywhere, fight anywhere, sleep anywhere.

Now we just need the Latin version.

The Canadians still have better combat uniforms then the us Sailors! Hell I have to borrow some from the Army!

You "duff" your hat?

You filled your hat with pudding???

You are a strange and perplexing people.

Asturian Marzipan actually. That buttery almond nougat does wonders on my flowing locks.

A coupla Mozart truffles do wonders for the complexion.

A Side Note: The Eldest CLU is starting to give me a Run For My Money in the edible comestibles.
He still can't grill meat worth a darn, so I may have him there...

Tomorrow's breakfast is to be an Experiment. Rice
'grits.' Brown cracked rice cereal cooked, left
to solidify in a loaf pan, then fried and served with maple or barley syrup.

It is so...vegan and healthy I can feel my teeth
glowing.

Boq, I can only speak from our shared experience of 9-11. What I saw from the comfort of my home was horrific, and yet did not affect me as much as it would had I been there in NYC and witnessed it first hand. That day I cried...for the loss,
the people who I knew God had taken before their bodies were crushed, burned or broken. The ones left to rebuild..and us, who owe it to them to never let it happen again and who will not let
some jihadist speak for us.

We need to be reminded...Spain is a lovely country with magnificent people. She will wake...and when she does, I feel sorry for those
who trifle with her. I mourn with you in your loss.

My words fail me. I still can't see the pictures of the bombings in Madrid and London without crying.

But I still hope.

We need Spain to have a Thermopylae moment and stop the islamic hordes as the leave North Africa.

Okay, reality, Spain is doomed like the rest of Europe. Not able to compete with decline of birth rates for legal Europeans and the large birth rate of illegal immigration. how Ironic? Maybe Spain should import Mexicans?

Mr. T...I think you hit the nail on the head as it were. Too bad there is a big ocean between them.

maybe a "liberia" moment in their future when people of Spanish decent try to return to the home land?

That is Diabolical! Don't sink the ship Fools!

Too bad John, we have great damage control teams and can right this vessel. Hell you know what? Go ahead and sink her, she was paid off long ago and was serving as a homeless shelter in Hawaii anyways!

I wouldn't worry too much about Team Navy. Keep your eyes open for a Navy press release featuring MEGEN and a very big ship. :D

Thank you for your support of Project Valour-IT from a Soldier's Angel! It is amazing what a collaborative effort can do for these deserving Heroes. God Bless You!

The second problem, as I see it, is that Mr. Croddy's statements and follow on applause by "300" (nice number, heh?) State employees could make you believe that the long held beliefs of certain conservatives about "Foggy Bottom" are true. Namely, like Cardinal Richelieu, they have their own agenda on US Foreign policy. Obviously, not held by or ordered by the SoS and probably not organized, but definitely culturally ingrained and subconsciously, if not consciously, pursued.

Then again, it could just be a bunch of pampered government employees who think they shouldn't have to risk anything for their jobs. Which makes you wonder if everyone is stationed in France, Germany and Italy? Maybe that's why we've had such a tough time in these small, nasty back countries? Doesn't anyone have to work their way up the ladder anymore? Or has the "Foreign Services Association" (ie, "union") made that moot?

Maybe the only poor schmuck's who serve in places like Ethiopia, Tajikistan and various other unstable, war torn, disease infested back waters are the inexperienced, wet behind the ears, just got their union cards, college grads and long time employees who screwed up or ticked someone off? Is that our problem?

I know, Mr. Croddy spoke "truth to power", but I felt little sympathy for his cry of "who will raise our children?" Is someone from the State department volunteering to raise the couple thousand motherless and fatherless military children? Maybe State Department children are better than military children because their parents listened to John Kerry and went to college so they wouldn't end up in Iraq? Apparently, diplomacy only occurs in nice, quiet countries or over the phone from a cubicle in DC.

Really, I tried to have some sympathy for Mr. Croddy and his friends at State, I did. But, I think Mr. Croddy and his co-horts over played their hands with the "signing our death warrants" act. Was he standing on a chair, hand raised in the air like every over the top Shakespearean orator? According to stats, three State employees have died there in the last four years out of over 1,200 who have served there.

One could ask Mr. Croddy, how many "death warrants" of our military men and women, other US civilians and Iraqis were "signed" because the prima dona's over at state wouldn't serve and help pursue the diplomatic efforts needed to win a counter-insurgency?

Whose raising their children?

There were a lot of other comments that seemed, well, inappropriate and bizarre coming from a significant government department when the war against Islamic Radicals is a war of ideas. Those ideas are conveyed most often and officially by our State Department. These employees sounded like they were ready to commit their own radical revolution. Not to fight for a new, grand idea, but to maintain their own moribund state.

They took a poll and 88% said they hated Condi Rice. I have issues with some things she says and does, but, from a top management and "radical change agent" position, I can sympathize because no one loves the person that comes in, kicks their cages, tells them they are doing something wrong and proceeds to make big changes in a place where everyone likes it just the way it is even if they are riding the gravy train into the ground.

Apparently, working at State is no longer about serving the country, but about a "State of Being".

Much of the State Department seems to be a Quisling fifth column working against the core interests of the United States, and in direct opposition to our elected President and his team.

Every DOS POS who refuses orders to deploy should be summarily fired and any retirement benefits withheld.

There are at least 100,000 people in uniform who have served in country (often with great hesitation, fear, or hardship to families). I doubt if any of them have the least empathy for the DOS wusses who probably will do little other than undermine the progress our troops have made.

DOS attitude is that they only do "diplomacy" writing letters and attending conferences, regardless of how futile or foolish, and seek to retard progress by delaying tactics, if it fits their personal agendas, regardless of the needs of our country at war.

Too many at DOS fail to grasp that we are in a long term war, not of our choosing, against an enemy who does not conduct "diplomacy" or even adhere to the laws of war. Their contributions in the current scenario are as useless as a discussion of chess rules while attacked by a pack of wolves.

Jihadis are laughing every day at the near-treasonous actions of the DOS types who are doing more for AQ than the seem to be doing for the U.S.

Maybe we can trade the whole lot of them for a bunch of French Diplomats, who could do no worse.

My, John. Tell us how you really feel. Don't hold back!

@Kat,
Everybody’s read the articles based on the same AP article by Matthew Lee.

What should have been news every day since the Iraq War started was that all the Foreign Service jobs had been filled by volunteers. More than 2,000 of them, out of a total corps of 6,500. Not one directed assignment in the lot, for a period of years, during wartime.

When a “Town Hall” meeting is called, anybody at the Harry S Truman building (i.e., “Main State”, a.ka. “Foggy Bottom”) can attend.

Thousands of federal employees, including civil service, foreign service officers, foreign service specialists, and contractors, can attend.

Most people stay at their desks and get on with their work.

Only those disgruntled enough to leave their offices attend these things in the first place.

Some numbers: there are reports that around 300 people attended the meeting. To put that in perspective, there around 11,500 people in the Foreign Service. That includes 6,500 Foreign Service officers, also known as “generalists,” and another 5,000 Foreign Service specialists (such as couriers, security agents, nurses, office managers, &tc.). Roughly a little more than two-thirds of the Foreign Service is serving overseas at any given time, so perhaps 2,000 or so FS generalists were in the U.S. at the time of the meeting. Which starts to put that audience of 300 into perspective, nicht wahr?

There are about 252 FS generalist vacancies that have to be filled in Baghdad and on the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). All but 48 of the Iraq vacancies have already been filled with qualified FS volunteers.

There’s no way to tell how many of the 300 present at the Town Hall meeting were actually FS generalists, although one of those quoted is identified as being a “senior foreign service officer.” So that’s one.

State’s personnel assignment process is too complicated to go into in a short comment here. However I can safely say that “directed assignments” haven’t been used generally since the Vietnam War (there were some made in the 80’s and 90’s in West Africa and elsewhere, but it’s very exceptional).

Also note that the Foreign Service is shrinking. New hiring is falling behind natural (retirements, &tc.) attrition. So new positions, new requirements, are coming out of hide, not out of any surplus embassy staffs being held in readiness at bases in the U.S. It’s a completely different force paradigm from the military, the majority of whose overseas military assignments are indeed in places like Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.K. Only a relative handful of Foreign Service assignments are at the dozen or so posts (out of 267 total) in countries like that.

@Kat,
Everybody’s read the articles based on the same AP article by Matthew Lee.

What should have been news every day since the Iraq War started was that all the Foreign Service jobs had been filled by volunteers. More than 2,000 of them, out of a total corps of 6,500. Not one directed assignment in the lot, for a period of years, during wartime.

When a “Town Hall” meeting is called, anybody at the Harry S Truman building (i.e., “Main State”, a.ka. “Foggy Bottom”) can attend.

Thousands of federal employees, including civil service, foreign service officers, foreign service specialists, and contractors, can attend.

Most people stay at their desks and get on with their work.

Only those disgruntled enough to leave their offices attend these things in the first place.

Some numbers: there are reports that around 300 people attended the meeting. To put that in perspective, there around 11,500 people in the Foreign Service. That includes 6,500 Foreign Service officers, also known as “generalists,” and another 5,000 Foreign Service specialists (such as couriers, security agents, nurses, office managers, &tc.). Roughly a little more than two-thirds of the Foreign Service is serving overseas at any given time, so perhaps 2,000 or so FS generalists were in the U.S. at the time of the meeting. Which starts to put that audience of 300 into perspective, nicht wahr?

There are about 252 FS generalist vacancies that have to be filled in Baghdad and on the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). All but 48 of the Iraq vacancies have already been filled with qualified FS volunteers.

There’s no way to tell how many of the 300 present at the Town Hall meeting were actually FS generalists, although one of those quoted is identified as being a “senior foreign service officer.” So that’s one.

State’s personnel assignment process is too complicated to go into in a short comment here. However I can safely say that “directed assignments” haven’t been used generally since the Vietnam War (there were some made in the 80’s and 90’s in West Africa and elsewhere, but it’s very exceptional).

Also note that the Foreign Service is shrinking. New hiring is falling behind natural (retirements, &tc.) attrition. So new positions, new requirements, are coming out of hide, not out of any surplus embassy staffs being held in readiness at bases in the U.S. It’s a completely different force paradigm from the military, the majority of whose overseas military assignments are indeed in places like Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.K. Only a relative handful of Foreign Service assignments are at the dozen or so posts (out of 267 total) in countries like that.

@Kat,
Everybody’s read the articles based on the same AP article by Matthew Lee.

What should have been news every day since the Iraq War started was that all the Foreign Service jobs had been filled by volunteers. More than 2,000 of them, out of a total corps of 6,500. Not one directed assignment in the lot, for a period of years, during wartime.

When a “Town Hall” meeting is called, anybody at the Harry S Truman building (i.e., “Main State”, a.ka. “Foggy Bottom”) can attend.

Thousands of federal employees, including civil service, foreign service officers, foreign service specialists, and contractors, can attend.

Most people stay at their desks and get on with their work.

Only those disgruntled enough to leave their offices attend these things in the first place.

Some numbers: there are reports that around 300 people attended the meeting. To put that in perspective, there around 11,500 people in the Foreign Service. That includes 6,500 Foreign Service officers, also known as “generalists,” and another 5,000 Foreign Service specialists (such as couriers, security agents, nurses, office managers, &tc.). Roughly a little more than two-thirds of the Foreign Service is serving overseas at any given time, so perhaps 2,000 or so FS generalists were in the U.S. at the time of the meeting. Which starts to put that audience of 300 into perspective, nicht wahr?

There are about 252 FS generalist vacancies that have to be filled in Baghdad and on the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). All but 48 of the Iraq vacancies have already been filled with qualified FS volunteers.

There’s no way to tell how many of the 300 present at the Town Hall meeting were actually FS generalists, although one of those quoted is identified as being a “senior foreign service officer.” So that’s one.

State’s personnel assignment process is too complicated to go into in a short comment here. However I can safely say that “directed assignments” haven’t been used generally since the Vietnam War (there were some made in the 80’s and 90’s in West Africa and elsewhere, but it’s very exceptional).

Also note that the Foreign Service is shrinking. New hiring is falling behind natural (retirements, &tc.) attrition. So new positions, new requirements, are coming out of hide, not out of any surplus embassy staffs being held in readiness at bases in the U.S. It’s a completely different force paradigm from the military, the majority of whose overseas military assignments are indeed in places like Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.K. Only a relative handful of Foreign Service assignments are at the dozen or so posts (out of 267 total) in countries like that.

@Kat,
Everybody’s read the articles based on the same AP article by Matthew Lee.

What should have been news every day since the Iraq War started was that all the Foreign Service jobs had been filled by volunteers. More than 2,000 of them, out of a total corps of 6,500. Not one directed assignment in the lot, for a period of years, during wartime.

When a “Town Hall” meeting is called, anybody at the Harry S Truman building (i.e., “Main State”, a.ka. “Foggy Bottom”) can attend.

Thousands of federal employees, including civil service, foreign service officers, foreign service specialists, and contractors, can attend.

Most people stay at their desks and get on with their work.

Only those disgruntled enough to leave their offices attend these things in the first place.

Some numbers: there are reports that around 300 people attended the meeting. To put that in perspective, there around 11,500 people in the Foreign Service. That includes 6,500 Foreign Service officers, also known as “generalists,” and another 5,000 Foreign Service specialists (such as couriers, security agents, nurses, office managers, &tc.). Roughly a little more than two-thirds of the Foreign Service is serving overseas at any given time, so perhaps 2,000 or so FS generalists were in the U.S. at the time of the meeting. Which starts to put that audience of 300 into perspective, nicht wahr?

There are about 252 FS generalist vacancies that have to be filled in Baghdad and on the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). All but 48 of the Iraq vacancies have already been filled with qualified FS volunteers.

There’s no way to tell how many of the 300 present at the Town Hall meeting were actually FS generalists, although one of those quoted is identified as being a “senior foreign service officer.” So that’s one.

State’s personnel assignment process is too complicated to go into in a short comment here. However I can safely say that “directed assignments” haven’t been used generally since the Vietnam War (there were some made in the 80’s and 90’s in West Africa and elsewhere, but it’s very exceptional).

Also note that the Foreign Service is shrinking. New hiring is falling behind natural (retirements, &tc.) attrition. So new positions, new requirements, are coming out of hide, not out of any surplus embassy staffs being held in readiness at bases in the U.S. It’s a completely different force paradigm from the military, the majority of whose overseas military assignments are indeed in places like Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.K. Only a relative handful of Foreign Service assignments are at the dozen or so posts (out of 267 total) in countries like that.

Oops. The Castle Echo is especially vicious today!

Which is why I asked the questions that I did. I still have problems with Mr. Croddy's comments and wonder if it reflects a larger view.

Second, my comment on whether service is always in France, Germany and Italy was sarcastic. Note I also referenced who was in these other countries, countries that aren't all that stable and present certain risks that are probably as commiserate with Iraq as you can get.

Thus, Mr. Croddy's remarks and these 300 employees applause regarding Iraq seem ideologically driven. And still tends to put it in light of a revolt of long standing.

@John of A.,
Yeah, bad echo. Actually, just sucky local Third World internet connection all week; couldn't see that post had "stuck" so re-sent. My bad.

@Kat,
Sorry, but your sarcasm looks a lot like what's being passed off as sober commentary on this topic by people who think they know what State does based on some movies they may have seen. Military folks who can spot poorly-portrayed military situations and personalities but can't seem to grasp how the same pop culture treatment might be done to U.S. diplomats as well.

Mr. Croddy, a "senior foreign service officer" seems to be one of those post-Vietnam FSOs who grew up in his career during relative "peace." Well, at least the war was (mostly) "Cold" then. He just doesn't get why he should be involved in this whole war thing, is afraid of it personally, and is letting that drive his mouth in front of a reporter. Senior FSOs should know better than that.

I'm embarrassed by this behavior.

Yeah, I admit it, I tarred and feathered the whole branch over Mr. Croddy's statements. Unfortunately, I think some of the past things that have come out of State along with post commentary from retirees have made me rather jaded about who, why and what State does (not like we don't get that "post retirement commentary" out of military folks either, but at least we jump their cases about it).

I did recall that this was the AP with its own biases and need to create a "stir", but, again, sometimes I am totally at a loss about the things that STate does or doesn't do.

Some of their official publications that are aimed at other nationals, our VOA (which I assume comes under State?) and a few other individual endeavors seem all together...excuse me for saying so...lame, out of touch and, as I noted, moribund in some, as you put it, Cold War concept of "information warfare" or the idea that, yeah, we're not at war at all with any ideology.

I've got to say that, even their blog, which I was interested in, gave me pause when they called it "dipnote". That may be an internal name given to certain communications, but it seems like a bad idea to refer to communications out in the greater internet world "dip", all things considered.

I guess, the major point here is that they are resisting change and we need to change. Old ideas, concepts and work habits can be killers, literally.

Did anyone catch the segment/plug on Hugh Hewitt today?? TOO. COOL!

Thanks for promoting the gals' appearance on tonight's program. We are all looking forward to having them on. Also, check out the neat post our show producer THIRDWAVEDAVE has at his site today promoting the show.

THIRDWAVEDAVE.BLOGSPOT.COM

Oh, and by the way -- GO AIR FORCE!!!!

LOL

Andrea

Nuts. And here I sit, stuck with a dialup radio set...

I hope some you will call in and keep us company.

It was a good show this morning. I will be checking in this evening with my "hard hitting questions".

Like...is it true that Angels like the air force better. ;)

Well, it might disturb people if I do it - what with the machine-gun fire, screaming and yelling, and all that TOC-talk going on...

Uh-oh. Busted.

Thanks for providing the AF link, John. Very convenient... (LOL)

It's all about the money, Loadr. With the money we help the troops.

Besides, I'm not too worried about the AF catching us up.

Well, I dunno. Judging from the pics, the new basement is entirely too well-lit and orderly for me to snaffle a weapon, and then crawl under the bench with it and improve it. I would like to explore advanced primer ignition with the AR-15 platform by use of adhesives in the firing-pin channel...

JTG - don't make me resurrect the "Shoot On Sight" order...

I wonder if BCR will still let me thinOWWWW! Sorry, Ma'am, I got my mind right now.

oh, that's classic.... best use of hotlinks I've ever seen.

JTG, did you even bother to try out the virtual realities I set up in your backup brain? (Access by cracking your knuckles, then pull your left earlobe three times. A menu will show up on your retina). There's one where you have unfettered access to all kinds of gizmos, guns, and devices, and a toolbox the size of a Buick.

Ry/Gollum, are you sure you are only taking the *stale* Cheetos? Those look rather fresh to me. Nice hat, though.

BCR, there seems to be some kind of network problem...

Wait, I have the solution! My kitty is in my lap, and has been in my lap, for quite some time!

It has only just now occurred to me, that this is important.

This is much more important than cheating about semi-vs. full-auto weapons.

When yer kitty lays his paw upon you, and looks you in the face, that's right important!

Update: The kitty has decided that I have drunk too much alcohol, and had me open the door and let him out.

On consideration, I think the kitty is right. I'll sign off, now.

Nighty nite!

*A term of art from the artillery. Harassment and Interdiction Fires.

Back in the day, when you could just kill people and break things without a note from a lawyer, they were pre-planned, but to the enemy, random, fires at known gathering points, road junctions, Main Supply Routes, assembly areas, etc - to keep the bad guy nervous that the world around him might start exploding at any minute.

*Not really relevant to today's operating environment, right? But, it *is*

The UAVs (oops, can't call 'em UAVs anymore - they're now Unmanned Aerial Systems... some Colonel got his Legion of Merit for that change...), er, um UAS's we fly over Afghanistan and Pakistan looking for targets of opportunity are a form of H&I fires, if you really want to parse it finely. We just have better sensors and fire control now.

I call the post that because it's random things posted by me and people I've given posting privileges to. It's also an open trackback, so if someone has a post they're proud of, but it really isn't either Castle kind of stuff, or topical to a particular post, I've basically given blanket permission to use that post for that purpose. Another term of art that might be appropriate is "Free Fire Zone"

In a "clarification" broadcast at 5:44 PM yesterday by the VA Media folks it is now 'acceptable" for God to be mentioned in ceremonies at National Cemetaries.

BUT.......the family has to ask for it.

They steped in a big pile of dog doo on this one, as evidenced by the firestorm that erupted.

I've met that Rees Loyd from California, mentioned in the article. He's a former ACLU attourney, now heading up the Legion's fights with the ALCU. Dude doesn't cary a briefcase.....just a pair of saddlebags thrown over his shoulder. What a character!!

You beat me to posting it, Bill -- wonderful news. The total award, with punitive damages, is almost $11M. Not that the extra matters. It's more that enough to bankrupt them. And I'm not holding my breath on it being paid.

I'm just glad for the Snyder family to have the verdict in hand. And maybe it will keep the Westboro idjits from picketing elsewhere. That being the point, of course.

Ah, the Phelp's Whelps are all lawyers. Look for an appeal on 1st Amendment grounds.

I'm guessing, however, that the Supremes won't take it if it were to get that far.

But I could be wrong.

I almost wish the Supremes would take it, as I have no doubt the Phelps' will go that far. If the Supremes take it, and write a decision which correctly (IMHO) calls this out as being outside of the 1st amendment. (Because they have the right to say what they want, just not where they want.)
If the Supreme Court rules, it will be the law of the country, not just the state of PA, where this suit was brought and won. That's my 2 cents worth, ennywho.

G'Day John,

I visit your blog probably not as often as I should, but reasonably often.

Sadly, there have been a couple of quite recent Aussie casualties in Afghanistan.

Yes, there is a price tag on freedom.

Lest We Forget.

I didn't look away, Bill. It's the least I can do to honor the men who died.
Thanks to Doc E for putting that together. It's a perfect reminder of the importance of Project Valour-IT.

The caveat was for the kids who wander in, Barb. Castlekin have tougher psyches.

Thanks! You say the sweetest things :-)

Well, the Doc is striking a noble Napoleonic pose there. What I wanna know, is the name of the guy in the silly conical hat, showing his tummy.

Bill?

P.s. I can't see Youtube vids on this ancient system. Are the images of which you write available as stills someplace?

...the name of the guy in the silly conical hat

JTG -- That'd be WO1 Leroy Dike, is my guess (the pic was taken after I left). The 55-gallon drum structure is our above-ground bunker (the water table was nine inches below the surface), which would withstand direct hits from 81mm mortars, but not from 122mm rockets. The background hootch looks like one of the wooden barracks they built after yours truly had departed for the Land of the Big PX.

She is a Hottie. Nice lines.

Ahhhh, Mr. T's Haircut? Pardon me, but I must point out...........she is not Navy.

BTW, what are you putting on the table?

You're just jealous you didn't think of it first! *grin* And all is fair in this contest. Navy needs a helping hand cuz they don't have as many bloggers!!

Mags,

I am a afraid I don't know what you mean.

put on what table for what?

She is still a Hottie for a toon!

Wow, the Navy must be off their collective rocker. The stereotypes, the rumors, etc. and the picture plays into all to them.

Mr. T's Haircut - Play innocent, go ahead. It looks good on you.

JimC - The cartoon is the Army. I don't know what rumors you are talking about. As far as stereotypes.......I am not any type........I am one of a kind baby!

I deny ALL rumors, ALL innuendo, and I DID NOT HAVE SEX WITH THAT WOMAN!

It worked for Clinton, it can work for me. That's all I'm sayin'....

LL and Maggie, I'll match whatever highest donation you get if I get to take pictures of you two in a 'Happy Ending'......

Really, Jim - that cartoon *is* Army.

From the first fund-raiser.

1SGT Keith, I don't do girls. Everyone knows that. LOL

Find me a manly man. :D

Seriously, I love my readers and if they are willing to donate to such a worthy cause and if they're willing to let me take the winner out to dinner and maybe I'll even let him/her ride b*tch on my bike, it's a win-win situation. No Happy Endings. Just some good clean fun. ;)

LOL...
LL, I think that's why he made the bet- he knew it was a safe bet.
HAH

Keith - Get your mind out of the gutter!

I actually think this is a great idea. Look at it like meeting your favorite author (or in my case, some crazy woman from Boston). I am offering dinner and a little tour of Boston.

You can't actually imagine that "the Empress of La Moata, she who has no equal, Princesa Malhumorada, Maggie” needs to use the web to solicit companionship......do you?

Mags,

I know she may look like Army, but she is a Sailor at heart. =!-)

p.s.

I had an old 83 GMC van with shag carpet until Face's Mustache sold it to a Mexican from Ensenada. That would have looked good on the table.

Oh yes Ma'am - Sam I AM.

*A term of art from the artillery. Harassment and Interdiction Fires.

Back in the day, when you could just kill people and break things without a note from a lawyer, they were pre-planned, but to the enemy, random, fires at known gathering points, road junctions, Main Supply Routes, assembly areas, etc - to keep the bad guy nervous that the world around him might start exploding at any minute.

*Not really relevant to today's operating environment, right? But, it *is*

The UAVs (oops, can't call 'em UAVs anymore - they're now Unmanned Aerial Systems... some Colonel got his Legion of Merit for that change...), er, um UAS's we fly over Afghanistan and Pakistan looking for targets of opportunity are a form of H&I fires, if you really want to parse it finely. We just have better sensors and fire control now.

I call the post that because it's random things posted by me and people I've given posting privileges to. It's also an open trackback, so if someone has a post they're proud of, but it really isn't either Castle kind of stuff, or topical to a particular post, I've basically given blanket permission to use that post for that purpose. Another term of art that might be appropriate is "Free Fire Zone"

interesting article regarding the African-American soldiers who rioted regarding the conditions under which the Italian EPW were being held/treated, and vindication many many years later.

Um. The MeCHA story was debunked a couple of days back. (Note the misspelling in the domain name... which now seems to have gone dark.)
In reality, the fires were started by Japanese battlemechs, which some SciFi-impaired reporter misinterpreted as Mexican racists.
One of the above statements is true; you pick the one.

Whether false or not is irrelevant. It's a moment to put all of the worry about them to rest. Be uber-helpful to the police and whoever is investigating it. Show that they're as red blooded American as the rest of us, even if they choose to hyphenate.

As to whether it's a hoax or not: 1) note, I said 'if true', that means I'm not sure if it is true and the accused are innocent until proven guilty(did you even look at what I said about their history?) 2) got a link to support the hoax call? I got this from via a friend who still lives in OC.

Hoax report @ Patterico, with links.
I'm no fan of MeCHA, but this particular claim was unmasked as spurious almost immediately.

Martin Mercator. That is a comment on the Army P2V thread, which got it's commentabability turned off about a day and a half after the Owner started it. WTF?

Dammit, I meant "its", not "it's." Decided to leave "commentabability" because I thought it was funny.

John, Beth, please quit messing with the site, it sorta worked OK last year, leave it alone. Mmmkay?

That is positive news. I bet those EFP with the copper plates were Iranian.

Too bad you did not hear what Richard asked or the CG’s answer.

Thanks for the update John. I am glad that the Army is recognizing the value of the grass roots blogosphere and is using it to counter the MSM.

Good job.

MTH

It is indeed positive news and it's not overbearingly good like some of the gloom other media have been presenting is overbearingly bad. I find it more believable for that alone.

JTG - the comments turn off automatically after 5 days so that I don't have to spend my life cleaning up comment spam.

The spammers target old posts, for them, it's all about Google.