Cyber Warfare: David and Goliath

(Kat-Denizen Opinion; hopefully the Armorer doesn't think I am invading the castle via the port door with all my posts)

In light of the Armorer's post below, I thought I would bring this to our attention:

Analyzing Al Qaida's Media Arm

I believe both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz warned against over estimating your enemy. Bryan Preston from Hot Air goes head to head with the "experts" over their analysis of AQ's As-Sahab (The Cloud) capabilities. The long and short of it is, the "experts" believe that AQ's As Sahab "Institute" is a large group (in Bryan's words, "an army") of media and PR savvy men. They believe this because the group puts out a video every three days and the type of video is in different codes.

Bryan says, "not so much." That, in fact, it is likely one to four men with a bank of four or so computers, most likely laptops for mobility. They are PR and media savvy, but that, using a single computer, he and Michelle Malkin could write a script, film and produce a rather slick video every day last year using his laptop and some basic equipment that fits in a bedroom and he can breakdown and transport in a mini-van.

He goes on to say that the software they are using is available to anyone and his probably pirated since such software is often available for download on certain sites even before it is available to the public. He says that the most labor intensive portions of making the video are actually sped up by this software, like adding backgrounds.

I can attest to that. I am not as competent as Bryan or these internet terrorists, but I can take video, pictures, music and even backgrounds and voice overs and whip together a fairly decent video in less than three hours using a cheap software program that came with my cheap little camera and upload it in ten minutes to a free platform (like YouTube). A little more money, a little better equipment, we would have some nice vlogging at the Castle and the Middle Ground.

The translation and addition of the sub-titles are also "labor intensive", but only so far as it requires time to edit the script with time codes before emailing it to the only "army" the institute has, ideological followers who live in or come from many nations and are natural speakers of the language. Those don't even have to be in close proximity or know anything else about the media arm besides translating the script in an hour and returning it via email.

In short, I concur with Bryan that this is not necessarily the work of fifty takfiri, mufsidoon hiding out in a warehouse decked out like WNN (Waziristan Network News). With their disseminated network, they don't have to control distribution. Real and wannabe takfiri around the globe take care of that.

I believe this over estimation of their strength and abilities is a product of what the Armorer called "traditionalists" whose experience in creating video for consumption on network news leads them to imagine something much bigger and ponderous.

Also, I believe that the military IOs are failing to counter this ability because they do not take advantage of the same strengths within the internet community and they have routinely attempted to control the distribution of this message to the degree that it limits their counter-information war.

It's improved, as noted, with milblogger video conferences, but even this is limited by not improving the number of attendees or providing additional materials on a regular basis that could be added as visual aids or even developed into videos. Some Milbloggers have taken an end run at this problem, such as Uncle Jimbo at Blackfive with his occasional interviews with deployed military via skype where he has added images above the audio. Then there is Matt Sanchez, Michael Yon and even JD Johannes who have added video to their websites over the last year or so.

However, they have to do all the work or most of the work and the distribution of their information is sometimes limited because the people who are willing to distribute their work also recognize it as intellectual property. Something that working in a non-criminal, though free-wheeling environment creates the drawback.

A few bombers and a few internet jockeys can out pace a huge, organized and well funded military. In other words, a huge, ponderous, easy target that is felled by a guy with a laptop literally living in someone's basement.

David and Goliath.

What the Cyber War folks need is the equivalent of Special Ops. Small, flexible and relatively autonomous that takes advantage of the terrain, develops relationships with the inhabitants and uses both to their advantage. One of the advantages that the takfiri have is their contact lists and access to many websites. Centcom attempted to do something of the reverse by noting those who were linking to their stories and website and requesting a link back. While this is somewhat effective, it is certainly not routinely distributing updates or email alerts, though the MNF weekly newsletter also improves on this theory, it is a bit cumbersome, not as timely and does not always reflect the "market's" demands.

Let's call this first operation, Prometheus - bringing fire to the primitives. .

[Update: State Department Does Digital Jihad]

Walid Jawad was tired of all the chatter on Middle Eastern blogs and Internet forums in praise of gory attacks carried out by the “noble resistance” in Iraq.

So Mr. Jawad, one of two Arabic-speaking members of what the State Department called its Digital Outreach Team, posted his own question: Why was it that many in the Arab world quickly condemned civilian Palestinian deaths but were mute about the endless killing of women and children by suicide bombers in Iraq? [snip]

Some analysts question whether the blog team will survive beyond the tenure of Karen P. Hughes, the confidante of President Bush who runs public diplomacy. The department expects to add seven more team members within the next month — four more in Arabic, two in Farsi and one in Urdu, the official language of Pakistan.

The team concentrates on about a dozen mainstream Web sites such as chat rooms set up by the BBC and Al Jazeera or charismatic Muslim figures like Amr Khaled, as well as Arab news sites like Elaph.com. They choose them based on high traffic and a focus on United States policy, and they always identify themselves as being from the State Department.

They avoid radical sites, although team members said that jihadis scoured everywhere.

Is State outstripping the DoD IOs? Maybe this will stir the competition.

Thoughts on Prometheus in Flash Traffic