An elaboration on the 'Why all Red on Blue vis China?' question from the 17th's H&I*.

By Ry on September 19, 2007 | | Comments (14)

Heh. Ask and thou shalt receive.

(Pass the raw steak we keep on hand for black eyes wouldja please, Armorer? Geez, I need to find an easier sparring partner.). Kat does her usual great job of providing a summary of the importance geographically and economically of the Taiwan island chain, and a decent summary of the politics. For which I’m right thankful for her doing if anyone else jumps in on this since she’s set the table for much of the particulars very nicely.


Though I think Kat-Mizzou misses what I’m asking. “Why is almost everything I can find about conflict with the PRC over Taiwanese independence take the form of a highly kinetic Red on Blue scenario?” I’m not talking about the argument of whether we should or shouldn’t go, or whether it is in anyone’s interests to a) make a move for Taiwan or b) attempt to defend something so far away and somewhat esoteric to the health of the US. Nope. I’m talking about the actual commission of forces to the job after the political decision to go has been made---but not what the method of ‘going’ has taken shape.

I do spend a lot of time thinking about this. Between ’02 and ’05 I worked under a guy named L. S. Trevethan who was doing a very detailed sim of the forceful crossing of the Formosa Strait by PRC forces and what ROC/US/Allies could do to stop it. When the project went from table top to computer, well, I don’t write code, though I still follow the situation as best I can. I’m not an expert, but this is something I work on. This isn’t just something that occurred out of a wild hair going where the sun doesn’t shine one night.

I also ask this being guided by these passages:
In the hidden fastness of his screening mountains, Lin Piao knew almost everything there was to know about the America fighting men. He did not despise American fighting power. He knew the strengths of the American Army, and Chinese officers read these in a pamphlet distributed to the ‘Chinese People’s Volunteer Army’:
---
In open battle, openly arrived at, an American army might have slaughtered them(Ed: Chinese). On the fields of Europe, or in the deserts of North Africa, they would have died under the machines and superior firepower of a mechanical host. But now, Pin Liao’s were not going to engage in open battle, openly arrived at, with the West.
They would fight, in their own way, in their own mountains, and they would inflict upon American arms the most decisive defeat they had suffered in the century.
Both come from ‘This Kind of War’.

So here’s the situation as the most generic of a forceful taking of ROC by PRC as I understand it:
(more below the fold)

---ry

1) Where and how is this going to take place? Is it going to happen well out to sea where the USN is the heirs to the British tradition of ruling the waves and in a meeting engagement style? Or is this type of engagement more akin to the ‘fighting in their mountains’ Fehrenbach makes a case for the most decisive defeat of US forces in the 20th century by the PLAN fighting in their preset plan from about as ‘prepared positions’ as possible not swinging at anchor in a defended harbor?

It’s as much their backyard as the mountains of Korea were back in the winter of 1950. They will be using tactics they’ve derived from studying us for years and updated from watching us in the last 4 years deployed to the Arabian Sea.

2) Somewhere in the vicinity of 1000, depending on whose numbers you use or believe it may be more or a lot more, ballistic missiles fall on the main Taiwanese island (the one with the capital of Taipei on it), Quemoy Island, and Matsu, attempting to take out air fields and other critical defense infrastructure.

3) An air battle of Battle of Britain importance will be fought. If the PLAN and PLAAF win the troop ships of the PLA/N (both services have landing craft and transports, oddly enough) can land and begin the pummeling of what survived repeated missile strikes and subsequent bombing raids. If, and it’s a big if given how much ROCAF stands to lose in such a pasting, ROCAF is able to hold the skies then PLAN is in danger of having the troop ships struck, and while many PLA vehicles are amphibious they aren’t designed for anything other than a short swim.

4) The hunting down and destroying of ROCN ships and submarines will be conducted most urgently.

5) Either airborne or amphib, maybe both, forces swamp the islands of Quemoy and Matsu since both sit astride the SLOC PLAN ships would have to traverse to land forces on the main island. Neutralization of threats from there must be eliminated. Then a possible airborne assault to secure ports on the western side of the main island may take place.


6) The US is in the un-enviable position the Brits had with the Falklands: having to traverse an entire ocean to prevent this. Summer Pulse ’04 showed how long it would take for the USN to get two carrier groups, other than the one centered on the USS Kitty Hawk, into place to be useful in a fight for Taiwan(more than two weeks if leaving from SD) while the PLAN only has a transit of the Strait itself which is on the order of 5-7 days. One carrier is not enough to guarantee victory, though Kitty Hawk will sell herself dearly.

7) The invasion and occupation could be over by the time enough US forces arrive in time to shift the balance, Chinese plans, those I’ve heard tell of and seen, call for an OP of duration between 14 and 21 days. Japan may or may not allow the US to use bases on their soil since PRC has stated as policy, essentially, ‘If you can attack us from there we can attack you there.’ And they have indicated that they mean that in a rather broad sense. Meaning we could have to fly missions from extreme distances for things other than carrier aviation in the vicinity. That also could leave us with the option of having to punt the PLA off the rock if we don’t get there in time. A very costly operation since we’re coming in from the eastern side of the island, the mountainous and rocky side with few good landing points. Time and distance are very much against the USN if the PRC decides to forcibly bring Taiwan into the fold.

8) Cannon counting, while not the sole decider of the issue does need to be done (and given a churn thru some routine to derive a ratio of combat power wouldn’t hurt). PLAN would have available to it:

a) in the neighborhood of 50 PTG(guided missile patrol craft)
b) in the neighborhood of 40 FFG(guided missile frigates)
c) “ of 20 DDG(guided missile destroyers)
d) 50 or so submarines(total of SSN and SSK)
e) I can do aircraft, but that’s much harder since it is so much easier to move one wing from another area than it is to move a destroyer squadron. Nor have I done the large number of minor combatants that the PLAN can press into the situation. Plus, there’s a lot more to add up and check against a map for location.

All of which can salvo off several ASCM per unit. Even the little PTG can launch at least 2 and can, conceivably, handle being in the Straight but not open waters. With the open water (blue water) being where the US is dominant while closer to shore is exactly what the PLAN is built around with all those little patrol craft and Sovremny and Luda destroyers. I.e. anyone thinking it’s a cake walk is doing a baseball card comparison of player stats and isn’t taking the threat or the situation very seriously, particularly since where the carriers would likely have to take up station is very predictable. The USN could still very well win, but given that an Aegis equipped destroyer only has what, 96 STANDARD SAM if loaded solely with them and nothing else like Tomahawks or Harpoon(depending on which flight we’re talking about)? What does the carrier group do when it starts losing its AAD screen? It isn’t as heavily stacked in our favor as many would like to believe, not when we’re talking about the inclusion of the tyranny of distance and Taiwan being in China’s backyard. And we haven’t even started looking at the threat subs and aircraft pose to the CSG yet.

Add to that their logistical lines are much shorter and those surface combatants can fire off at least 100 ASM every couple of days with many more than that being possible since their replenishment ships can return to port so much faster---not to mention the oft circulated idea that commercial shipping will be pressed into service as many companies are owned by the military to supplement replenishment and troop carrying ability? And that Chinese will be operating under air cover close to their airbases (increasing their operational tempo)? Yeah, we’re soooo going to roll over them, no problem. (Sorry for the snark. Just couldn’t resist. Bad ry. Bad.) A carrier can operate for what, three days of sustained combat before needing replenishment? AAD can be exhausted in a few hours given the number of ASM the USN forces could be facing----air attack on ships haven’t been looked at yet. How much do our replenishment ships carry versus the number of times PLAN can replenish so close to home? This is no cake walk. This is not easy. We are not going to walk away from this with only a few minor bumps and scratches.

9) Which leads to the question of what happens back here States Side when we have something like the HMS Sheffield, where a destroyer gets nailed with an anti-ship missile that beat the air defenses and we have casualties (nobody claims, STANDARD, evolved SEA SPARROW, or CWIS are perfect and invincible)? Or when we start losing aviators we are unable to recover? A month or so ago in one of the IPB I linked to a study showing that US ardor for war drops when the threat to the US is more indirect than overt or more than “two moves ahead”, to use a chess game analogy, and we start taking casualties. The threat to US and US interests is well more than two moves deep---if and only if the PRC goes down one particular pathway I should add--- and we will be taking casualties, guaranteed, if we proceed with a plan centered on destroying the PLAN. Casualty aversion must be a factor to consider when gauging the national will to see this thru and thereby which method we employ our forces to attain the goal of an independent-ish (dang ambiguous TRA) Taiwan sitting astride some very important sea lanes.

10) The most logical deployment of PLAN assets is on the north and south
openings of the Strait to fend off incursions by interloping surface and subsurface forces while a third force provides AAD and ASW for the troop ships and Ro-Ro, with minefields between their forces and open ocean, subs patrolling those minefields (with maybe a few set up and hiding in the area off the east coast everyone and their uncle’s monkey’s uncle knows US carrier groups are most likely to take up station in, or out hunting.), and with their Russian fighters supplying a nice long arm to prevent/attempt to prevent US air from getting into range to fire off a large number of HARPOON ASM at anything.

This is what they want, this is exactly the setup that the old Sov naval doctrine was designed for, and a pure red on blue mode of thinking is walking straight into it. There’s being brave and then there’s being, well, as Yoda would say, reckless. This is playing to their strengths as a coastal force using area entry denial strategies. I have no doubt that many a Sailor will laugh at my concerns.

Sure, the USN can win. The USN can send every Chinese mother’s son on the sea down to the briny depths. But not without a potentially significant lessening of USN power in the Pacific being the cost of said victory. When comparing the state of PRC ship building with US's that’s a situation that really favors them since they can rebuild much faster and cheaper. This type of force on force conflict, without even considering the nuclear implications, may not be best for US interests and standing.


Which leads me to ask, ‘Isn’t there another way of securing the strategic objective than battle of annihilation?’ Kat’s citation of a RAND study, in her Taiwan post, is what I’m going for. PRC’s main weak point is energy and economy. Why not seize the strategic initiative and simply seek to cut off as much as possible imports to China and ships leaving China, a far blockade if you wish? It may take longer, but it has the advantage of the Kosovo adventure of not putting vast sums of America’s Sons and Daughters directly in harms way, more like the blockade of Cuba during the Missile Crisis. It also puts us back in blue water where we’re dominant, forcing them to come to us where they’re not so good and sans a large amount of their airpower (and prey for carrier planes). Give them the option of having Taiwan and starving, with the overthrow of the CCP a possibility thereof since their survival depends on keeping the coastal cities happy with continued economic success, or coughing up Taiwan and having their energy and shipping returned to them, also risking overthrow because of the hard nationalism they've pushed and tied to bringing Taiwan back into the fold over the years. How did Liddel-Hart put it? Why pit your strength directly against his in a wrestling match if you can win some other way for much less? Something like that.

I don’t see a ‘better peace’ coming out of either strategy actually. If the PRC loses either way it’ll be fodder for hatred and desire for revenge for a very long time. Anyone around here checked out how pissed they still(italicize) are about the Boxer Rebellion and the ‘Spheres of Influence’ thing nearly a century ago? These are a proud people with a long memory that know how to hold a serious grudge.

Costs.
1) Potential Failure. They don’t budge. The PRC uses the strains such a move would have on the world economy as political pressure to break the blockade; either by other nations convoying Chinese vessels with armed escorts or simple capitulation resulting on strains to our own from the loss of Chinese goods and an increased price of oil.
2) Potential Failure. They don’t budge. They attack whole heartedly whenever and wherever they can with us taking losses that don’t play well back at home and whoever is in office caves.
3) MAJOR hit to the US and World economies during this time.
4) A long period of time with USN assets deployed to the Far East. Very expensive and prevents us from keeping watch other places, replacing and updating, and simply puts a lot of wear and tear on the ships and planes involved.
5) The opportunity to do an attack on their navy and retake Taiwan by force at a much cheaper cost than when they’ve had the ability to consolidate for weeks to months.

My question should’ve been what’s with this obsession of crushing the opponent by direct military means in an attempt to secure goals when that isn’t always the most efficacious?
--ry

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14 Comments

By MR T's Haircut on September 19, 2007 7:01 AM
Add to that their logistical lines are much shorter and those surface combatants can fire off at least 100 ASM every couple of days with many more than that being possible since their replenishment ships can return to port so much faster---not to mention the oft circulated idea that commercial shipping will be pressed into service as many companies are owned by the military to supplement replenishment and troop carrying ability?
Well when Walmart runs of stock due to the lack of shipments from China, we will know the gig is up! (sort of like the beginning of a Tsunami when all the water leaves the beach) Question becomes what do we do about when we recognize the signs? AP headline - Chinese satellite explodes in orbit collaterally and accidently destroying several US and Euro satellites. Chinese Govt Apologizes. (Headlines for an hour until the public moves on to the next headline about O.J.) AP headline - Chinese issue national product standdown to ensure quality assurance of goods for the public good. (great opportunity to pull the ships from COSCO back to the mainland for the cross channel expedition without raising public alarm) Bottom line is the American public will be desensitized to the possibility of conflict. The public is war weary. The media not interested in truth and the public not willing to listen anymore. This is worse that the Falkland issue. We will face a moment of truth to maintain our national Honor and defend Taiwan. I am afraid we lack the resolve. After a series of UN resolutions and no real movement from anyone, we will be marginalized in world opinion. This will be a sign of further weakness. Do we act? Depends. Depends on who is living in the White House. It will be costly, and in an era where Aircraft Carriers cost Billions and up to 10 years to build and outfit (that is just the ship friends) I doubt we can go toe to toe with the chinese missile / sub threat. We really have very few options except to establish Air superiority and make the chinese blind on the battlefield. We will need to eliminate the sub threat and missile threat before we close with a Carrier Battle group. Carrier Battle Groups will arrive but will be forced to operate on the fringe until Air Picture is clear and the zones of ADC are up and running. The Chinese will take this beyond the site of the Eastern Shore. They will and probably already have figured out how and where we refuel. That is our achilles and they know it. They can do more and for longer by taking out that capability. They know the key to their sustainment will be the lack of our ability to sustain. It really does not matter the shape or the size of the force. This will take resolve. The battle must be worth it. Not just at home but in Tawian as well. Interested to see what the man on the street in Tawain feels about this. Does he care is important, because if he doesn't care why should Mom and Dad back in Ohio?
 
By Chuck Simmins on September 19, 2007 12:05 PM
I do not take Taiwanese resistance to an invasion as a given. When the heirs of Chang Kai Shek routinely visit Peking, all bets are off. Taiwan has a huge amount of investment on the mainland. Any hint of a "Hong Kong" solution would put a large number of businessmen into the surrender camp. A Chinese aquaintance recently suggested that, from her perspective, the independence supporters are largely native Taiwanese who refuse to recognize China's historical claim to the island. "How can they deny that they are Chinese?" There is a deadline, in effect, for the Chinese to resolve this matter. I postulate that China is on the edge of a collapse, caused by the lack of raw materials to feed and supply its economy and its huge reliance on the United States as the banker of last resort to fund its inflationary growth rate. The oligarchs in Peking realize that something is awry, they know that obtaining resources, physical and monetary, is all important and they tremble at the growing problems in the Third World countryside. Russia's Far East and wealthy, industrialized Taiwan beckon.
 
By kat-missouri on September 19, 2007 1:34 PM
First problem I see is that you believe that Japan would consider an invasion of Taiwan an internal matter with China or only a problem with the United States. Like wise, you dismiss any other allies' interest in the situation and never mention their response, availability of forces or the time frame they could have such resources online. There are more ships at see than the United States, even if these forces are not as great. There are also resources in the Mediterranean and Gulf that would more quickly be available and be pulled off to support the mission. Although, as noted it could be several days before they would be on station. I would say, frankly, that both Japan and Australia, just to name two, would consider an attack on Taiwan and the subsequent blocking of trade routes or interdiction of trade, as an Act of War, just as the United States would. Britain, I think, would be, too. I believe that this is why Japan has been building destroyers, frigates and light carriers (ostensibly for helicopter launching). I believe that Britain and Australia may have carrier groups in the area. Further, Japan, under those circumstances, would certainly allow American fighters, bombers and tankers to take off and use their air fields and would likely participate. Japan's "Defense" force has been training extensively with US forces for "invasion" largely. I believe that, while the Japanese constitution provides that the "defense force" is not expeditionary, but is for the defense of Japan, any act against Taiwan would certainly be considered a prelude to the invasion of Japan and Japanese claimed Islands in the area (island's currently in dispute with China). One other thing, I don't think that China would waste war on simply remanding Taiwan to the mainland. Japan wouldn't think so either. Then there is Guam, Diego Garcia, etc where fighter squadrons, stealth bombers and various other air assets in the region (ours and other nations) that would quickly respond to wipe out any invasion force. I believe you are not giving enough credit to our reconnaissance units, long range bombers or response capabilities. Neither to our submarine forces, recalling that we still have a significant presence in the pacific and china sea. Nor, finally, to the threat of such submarines and their tomahawk missiles, not just the PLAN, but to ports, cities and military installations. Finally, it may take us a few weeks to put together a force, but we would attempt to retake Taiwan. Taiwan's importance to global trade routes through the China Sea has serious complications for everyone. Thus, again, lets not pretend this is just the US v. China on this situation. Of course, this is totally disregarding MAD and continuing US strong support in defense of Taiwan which tells China that they would pay dearly for the attempt. And, we are totally disregarding the SCO which includes Russia and India, that an attack on one is an attack on all. Whether this includes the Taiwan situation is a good question, though, even the UN recognizes Taiwan as a part of China. However, I would agree that, if we were unable to respond timely and physically, we very likely do have contingency plans to blockade China. They would be totally dependent on support from Russia. They could survive through support from Russia and India over land, though, it would be tight. And, as I noted, I would agree that this would be a possibility. then again, I don't believe we would be willing to do that indefinitely or would leave Taiwan in their grasp. I do want to make one more point that Chuck alludes to above. that is that wars are usually fought for land and resources. The major wars on the European continent and both world wars were for land and resources. The invasion of China by imperial Japan was for the same. China's extensive economic growth is both good and bad. They see their power as mainly economic. However, the possibility that the lack of resources to continue this economic growth could cause a plateau, recession or worse a depression. Economic instability would be a major concern and I believe that it is this that would drive any Chinese expansion. Thus, resources would also be the best weapon. Still, I don't believe that would preclude blue on red force in the event of actual invasion. Taiwan and an open sea lane in the China Sea is life and death for many nations around the world.
 
By BillT on September 19, 2007 5:14 PM
Economic instability would be a major concern and I believe that it is this that would drive any Chinese expansion. That or the threat of an actual economic downturn due to resource access. Has anybody noticed an increase in PLAN activity in the Spratleys?
 
By Heartless Libertarian on September 19, 2007 5:24 PM
Kat-Mo got to some of the points I was thinking about. Can B-52s and B-1s carry Harpoons and/or Tomahawks set up for anti-ship? They can fly from Guam and launch missiles from beyond SAM range, kind of like the Russkies did to the US fleet in Tom Clancy's Red Sorm Rising. Subs can do this as well, esplecially those SSBNs that have been reconfigured to carry a buttload of Tomahawks. There are other options to squeeze the ChiComs economically other than a blockade. One involves banks-simply put out the word that any oil company that sells to China, and any banks that they use, will be denied access to the US banking system. Since the US bank system is the hub of the world system, this would mean they would have a very tough time doing business should they persist in selling to China. You could also simply halt all imports from China. If Congress won't play ball, POTUS can simply instruct Customs to conduct a detailed inspection of every single bit of cargo coming in from Red China. Oh, and if the ChiComs try to dump all those Treasury securities they hold onto the world market, just default on them.
 
By kat-missouri on September 19, 2007 6:07 PM
That or the threat of an actual economic downturn due to resource access. Has anybody noticed an increase in PLAN activity in the Spratleys?
yes, and there is the group of islands that Japan claims (the name escapes me now) that is in contest. As I noted in a previously linked piece I wrote, there are oil and natural gas deposits just outside of China's internationally recognized borders. If they obtained Taiwan, besides controlling trade routes and "securing" future oil and natural gas pipes that they intend to lay from Iran to China through these very waters, their international borders would be extended to control these resources and nationalize any current efforts to obtain them (though, where they are is somewhat difficult to get to, new technology is making that less so every day). Yes, World Wars start over expanding economies needing more land and resources to maintain or increase that expansion. That is the danger. How it is mitigated is by insuring a free flow of resources from established areas and improving/diversifying our own access. That is one reason why Greenspan's "war for oil" is not totally wrong in my book. We needed to defend those resources, insure they remain free and available on the open market. something that would not happen if extremists took control of any of these nations or if the region went "black" or anarchic. I once hypothesized that, what people in the Middle East should fear more than the American giant, it is the thirsty Red Dragon.
 
By ry on September 19, 2007 6:15 PM
(long reply to Kat still in the works) Briefly, yes Chief, people are aware of the Spratly incursions. And others like the messing around in PI territory. Also pay attention to them running a SSN thru Japanese territory and trailing a Carrier group. They're pretty active. Also pretty active in leaning on smaller trading partners to force them to acquiesce to crappy deals or face economic ruin(the Sov idea of economic warfare). HL, yes, you could do the Harpoon/Tomahawk thing from outside SAM threat to delivery platform(but keep in mind that someone/something has to give targeting data and that platform will be vulnerable, whether it be sub or airplane). But from which direction? The east edge of Taiwan is mountainous, some being really freakin' tall. It can be done. But is it enough? B-52 and B-1 can also air deploy nautical mines(we could launch air raids to mine the harbors of PRC before troopships are clear), and do a bunch of other nasty things. But is it enough? Also, Guam is how far away, limiting sorties to how many a day, and what's the radius of action of PLAAF/PLANAF fighters if they tanker or buddy store? Is that greater than the 150nm range of the most recent iteration of HARPOON(SLAM-ER)? What happens if you come more northerly or more southerly? Does that push you closer to fighter bases on the coasts? This is not me coughing up wild ideas I pulled outta my arse one night, nor am I saying it is hopeless so we shouldn't go. Just trying to give an honest assessment and ask if red on blue is the best way to go. Maybe it is, maybe it isn't. More importantly, thank God it isn't my decision. But, we have to look at all options to find the one that works best. I wouldn't deploy the Army without thinking about ways to minimize losses while attaining goals either.
 
By ry on September 19, 2007 6:20 PM
There's the Ryuku(at least parts of it) and the Senkaku Islands that are in contention. Not to mention one motherhuge natural gas pocket that sits astride the exclusive economic zones of both Japan and PRC.
 
By ry on September 19, 2007 6:43 PM
"Although, as noted it could be several days before they would be on station." Days? Kat, look at a map and do some math. Not days. WEEKS. I know it's hard to get results online of SP04, but it took several weeks for many of the lead elements to reach station(almost the entire month for some). Not days. Weeks. Get a ruler, look up the best speed possible for a CSG(use the destroyer's top speed, though a petroleum burning ship cannot maintain that speed all the way across the ocean for many reasons), look at the number of hours that pop out. That isn't days for most things. It's best measured in weeks. You're not giving the distances involved their proper due. How long does it take for a plane to fly from Diego Garcia and back? Turn around time? Basically, operating from Diego Garcia severly limits the number of times anything can fly out on a given day. Same for Guam. Okinawa and Kadena aren't ideal either considering how long pilots will be flying before they even engage----fatigue factors. The closer you are the more times you can sortie. Guam is closer, but it is still close to a week(between 3 and 7 depending on speed and directness of course) away for surface/subs and many hours for aircraft. And Kat, this was the bare bones, the basics. There's TONS of scenarios. One we worked on pushed the limits of Japan's Constitution. We had the very capable destroyer squadrons of the JSDFN acting as a forward guard for the Kitty Hawk group all the way down to the CADIZ line that crosses one of the islands in the Ryuku chian(a nice spot actually, since it has an airfield on it, a nice big one, and is a spot that allowed for multiple sorties per day). Heck, China doesn't even have to invade to get what the want. A blockade or mining of the Strait achieves the same thing for them. Taiwan's gotta trade to eat, and with Lloyd's of London raising insurance prices on ships headed there Taiwan starves as commercial captains and freight companies balk. Of course there's allies. Sure, the AUSies are likely to get mad about it and sally forth bravely---but how long does it take for their destroyers and really quiet Collins class SSK to get there? Japan has problems with their constitution, not to mention the public aversion to conflict, or the very REAL possibility that Japan could find themselves on the receiving end of ballistic missile strikes, non-nuclear, IF they allow is to fly out of places like Kadena and Okinawa. If an air raid were to occur it's even money that Abe would be finished and out of office. It's not that they would chalk it up as an internal matter, but that they'd have to consider the very real possibility of all out war with the PRC while the PRC sat on all their lifelines. Compare that to simply accepting PRC control of Taiwan and the increase in trade with the PRC? War or increased trade with a major trading partner(with strings attached)? What are they risking versus what are they would be having to put up with? Same goes for Singapore and other minor powers in the Pacific Rim. Again, this was basics as there's many scenarios possible ranging from everyone ganging up on PRC to everyone being CS and not even the US deciding to contest to it being over in a day. AUS does not have carriers. They have L-ships. Helo carriers. Their help is going to come, if it comes(no guarantees), in the form of frigates, destroyers, submarines, and, if a suitable airstrip (the one on that Ryuku island maybe?) can be found, F-18s. And will take more than a week for the bulk of it to arrive(yes, they are in and around Indonesia and the Micronesia region right now.). Britain only has three carriers, and a much reduced fleet. In all the sims I was part of they were left out. Time and politics. Look at their deployments. If it takes weeks to transit from the Arabian Sea they will not arrive in time nor will they if they have to move from the Eastern Atlantic. That goes for all of their assets, and not just their carriers. The tyranny of distance, if you excuse my French, is a biatch. Look at the goat---- that occurred over the capture of the RN personnel by Iran? Honestly, the only way we could concieve of such a move by the PRC being a threat to UK trade is if the UK moved against the PRC. And this wasn't just my assessment of the situation. Nope, it was made by people with 20+ years in service(Navy, Army, AF). Britain is a real stretch based on time and politics. Look at the number of casualties they've taken in Iraq and the pressure the gov't has been under to end their involvement(both Blair and the new guy). They're a question mark, at best. They can gain more by saying it is an internal matter than by sticking their nose in. "Further, Japan, under those circumstances, would certainly allow American fighters, bombers and tankers to take off and use their air fields and would likely participate." Possibly, not 'likely'. They have the same integrated economy with China issue that we do to consider----large amounts of Direct Foreign Investment there, imports, offshored industry. Then there's the issue of having their cities targets. That can't simply be sloughed off(even with PAC-3 sales and the joint ABMD research). It could be in their interests to simply accept PRC control of the Formosa Strait and cozy up. They stand to lose much if they go to war, that has to be considered. It is not a reflexive move for them, not by a long shot. Shinzo Abe and his predecessor have always been controversial and within a whisker of a no confidence vote because of their more 'normal military relations with the world' stances(Hell, they get plastered for visiting the War Shrine.). It is a possibility. Not a certainty. They may or may not allow us to use those bases, and that changes things greatly. Many deals can be struck, with equal likeliness as involvement, to keep the JSDF out of the conflict. Including recognition of ownership of some land by Japan. It's a much safer deal for Japan, it's better business. "Of course, this is totally disregarding MAD and continuing US strong support in defense of Taiwan which tells China that they would pay dearly for the attempt." MAD doesn't even come into this. China has a no first use policy, the warheads aren't kept with the missiles but instead in a complex that the CCP, not the military, controls. Kids who love to start flame wars invoke the 'we'll nuke you!' thing, but no serious Chinese thinker has brought up the use of them except in retaliation. Attacking the mainland on the other hand, well, that's a can of worms that's dangerous to open up now ain't it? Do we keep this a limited war for limited objectives, or do we bring out the whole arsenal thereby forcing China to think they're fighting for their very survival? THis is not simple by any means Kat. Not. At. All. Do we launch a LACM strike at the Three Gorges Dam to force China to back off since hitting that essentially dooms a significant fraction to be without power and future starvation? You can kiss LA goodbye if you do that, that I do guarantee. since it is equivalent to a WMD strike in terms of death and destruction. "And, we are totally disregarding the SCO which includes Russia and India, that an attack on one is an attack on all." India is an odd fish. They joined SCO for the trade benefits. But they've got a long running feud with PRC, PRC invaded Indian territory in the Himalayas way back when. They're military acquisitions are essentially to counter the PRC, and the fact that the PRC is so cozy with Pakistan(India's most bitter rival) doesn't sit well either. Whether they play the French role in the NATO-esque SCO remains to be seen. But to simply assume they will side with China, well, that isn't looking at the nations as individuals and all factors in play. India would love to supplant China as the worlds leading exporter. Hindustan(aka India) has almost as large and as growing an economy as that of China. They also tend to claim the entire Indian Ocean as theirs. So transit from the Med and Arabian Seas becomes a little more complicated if they honor their SCO commitments. Complicated. You're on the right track with Russia, I think. I provided a very generic, basic package. Russia might, though unlikely, come in physically. Which does what to Japan? Does the PM of Japan want to find his nation fighting on two fronts, risking economic and industrial ruin of his nation? This is very complicated. The deck ranges from simply stacked against us to very stacked against us numbers wise. Kat, you have to really watch PRC to get this one. Wars may often be fought over land and resources(economic theory of war), but sometimes they're simply fought over PRIDE. These people will fight for pride over economics, at least the leadership of the PLA/N/AF will(Hu Jintao is another story, we'll have to see if his clique remains in power or is swept aside). You have to look at the very severe nationalism being pushed there. Never met a mainlander who didn't think that Taiwan should be brought back into the fold, and, if they didn't do so voluntarily, brought in at the barrel of a gun. That CCP has pushed the ending the rebelliousness of the 'renegade province' as a fairly sizeable plank of their platform for a long time, letting Taiwan go will cause major calamity and maybe the collapse of the CCP. The Chinese can be considered to be an embarrassed people who are angry that they have to put up with outsiders telling them what to do about internal matters---One China, Two Systems deal. Not to mention that Taiwan is the new Japan(a stationary aircraft carrier from which the Imperialist Americans can launch attacks at the Motherland.) as you alluded to earlier. Economics uber alles is not how the world always works. Kagan's 'On the Origins of War' is a good book because it documents that wars get fought over many things, not just economics. And you're totally ignoring that CHina is the world leader in starting nuclear power plants. They have energy problems, but they'll not always be subject to needing petroleum. I think you're assuming people will do the moral thing instead of the what's best for them thing. Not a solid assumption imo, at least for the last 30 years it hasn't been. chuck, "Taiwan has a huge amount of investment on the mainland. Any hint of a "Hong Kong" solution would put a large number of businessmen into the surrender camp." Absolutely, and this is how many analysts see it going down already. China and Taiwan are Siamese twins economically. Already many businessmen are against talk of pushing for full independence. "When the heirs of Chang Kai Shek routinely visit Peking, all bets are off." Yeah, the KMT are being proper bastards on that one ain't they? Since they control, ideologically, most of the service academies, and therefor the officer corps, the decision to fight is not a given. Nor are we constrained to go, legally, by anything. TRA is ambiguous enough to provide cover either way. Not to mention this could be over the first day. Massive plastering by arty and missiles. Airborne assault, and a wobbly KMT causing major confusion if not a stand down of the ROC Army? That's a real possibility. And then major advantages shift to China by having the main island with multiple airstrips that can launch bombers, that are somewhat shielded by the high mountains to their east. Apologies to Al. True, real men don't fisk. But, I'm a lazy punk today. ;)
 
By John of Argghhh! on September 19, 2007 8:31 PM
Goodness, we're wordy today!
 
By kat-missouri on September 19, 2007 10:14 PM
Days? Kat, look at a map and do some math. Not days. WEEKS. I know it's hard to get results online of SP04, but it took several weeks for many of the lead elements to reach station
Most of them were leaving port state side. I doubt seriously that we would not pull certain forces off station in the gulf to immediately respond. Most of them need food and hardly use any of their weapons stores in Iraq and afghanistan these days. Fuel can be achieved on the fly. The weeks were also because we were planning a huge invasion force with subsequent support, not a rapid reply to immediate aggression. We were planning to keep these forces on station for long term when they got there using an established relief pattern. That was the "days" I was talking about. You understand we are talking about two different scenarios here? A planned invasion vs. interdiction. And, if necessary, in an emergent situation, we can push carriers and ships out to sea and on station much faster than we did for these other events? If necessary and if we didn't envision something bigger. We wouldn't let our forces or allies already out there stay hanging.
The closer you are the more times you can sortie. Guam is closer, but it is still close to a week(between 3 and 7 depending on speed and directness of course) away for surface/subs and many hours for aircraft.
I was talking about subs patrolling the area. The others would be additions or relief. As for the hours for flights, we're talking about first strike or overflight for Taiwan forces, our forces n station or even targets in China proper. Dude, we had B-52s flying out of whiteman here to Baghdad.
MAD doesn't even come into this. China has a no first use policy, the warheads aren't kept with the missiles but instead in a complex that the CCP, not the military, controls. Kids who love to start flame wars invoke the 'we'll nuke you!' thing, but no serious Chinese thinker has brought up the use of them except in retaliation.
Apparently you missed the "nuance" there since my point was nuclear MAD (along with economic MAD) makes our discussion a little moot for the immediate future. Get your knickers out of a twist and pull them out of butt crack.
You have to look at the very severe nationalism being pushed there. Never met a mainlander who didn't think that Taiwan should be brought back into the fold, and, if they didn't do so voluntarily, brought in at the barrel of a gun. That CCP has pushed the ending the rebelliousness of the 'renegade province' as a fairly sizeable plank of their platform for a long time, letting Taiwan go will cause major calamity and maybe the collapse of the CCP
yes, wars have been started and fought over the stupidest things. However, "nationalism" is the stick that governments use to stir the masses to war in support of their agendas. National governments, particularly in a MAD world, don't start potential wars of annihilation and "survival" for pride. They have very specific agendas and the benefits better outway the risk. Certainly, for all the CCPs rhetoric and potential loss of face, it would be much more damaging to them politically if they started a war for "face" where huge portions of their military, economy and administrative abilities (not to mention potential loss of civilian life) ended up ugly. when I talk about it like this, I am imagining China as a "big kid" who plays on the political and international field with us, not some fit throwing punk that is going to start it for "pride". Let me tell you about Kagan's theories. I think they are bunk if it doesn't end up with economics. In the end, a nations ability to start and sustain war revolves around their ability to defend and obtain resources. No oil? No war. No iron ore for ships, weapons, etc? No war. you show me a war, even one between ideologies or started because of an insult and I'll show you the economic (land and resources) benefits for either nation that is either set to be gained or lost that, in the end either means survival or destruction. (of course, when you are on the defense, you're fighting for land that you require to exist as a nation; without land with borders to set the parameters of your population, government AND economics, you don't exist).
And you're totally ignoring that CHina is the world leader in starting nuclear power plants. They have energy problems, but they'll not always be subject to needing petroleum. I think you're assuming people will do the moral thing instead of the what's best for them thing.
Number one, who was talking about the "moral" thing to do? Secondly, nuclear power plants don't drive cars and obviously can't power everything or China wouldn't be a net importer of oil and natural gas, making noises over contested Islands and resources in the China Sea or Taiwan. As for Japan, mutual investment is a deterrence, just like ours, that makes little difference when the over all economy can be threatened by trade interdiction (you know, Japan sucks up a lot of steal and oil that comes through there) or fears of invasion after the fall of Taiwan. I doubt Japan would sit this out for fear of their economy when the fear of their economic destruction would be exactly what spurs them to join. I might give you the India one since the thought had crossed my mind.
Look at the goat---- that occurred over the capture of the RN personnel by Iran?
That is not a good comparison. We're talking about the difference between three naval personnel, a country they essentially have diplomatic concurrence with and a situation where they are constrained, not just by their own desire not to escalate the regional war, but their coalition partners. If their trade and long term survival were at risk or any member of their commonwealth, that changes the dynamics totally. Not to mention the lead and involvement of the United States.
They can gain more by saying it is an internal matter than by sticking their nose in.
They? As in Britain? And Australia is left dangling in the wind? I know they were running Sims, but that sounds like the worst case scenario for lack of allies. While you're on about their casualties in Iraq and the general populace's responses, remember their general complaints were about Saddam not having invaded anyone or hurt anyone that was an ally of Britain or significantly threatened their immediate survival in the eyes of the British public. China going chuck norris on Taiwan, threatening Japan, Singapore and Australia's economic survival might have a different national response. Someday, Taiwan might actually decide to join the mainland, like I said previously, if the situation was right and autonomy was guaranteed. Will China take them physically? Who knows. We're war gaming here based on something I think is less likely to happen than India and Pakistan going head to head over Kashmir.
 
By Trias on September 20, 2007 7:12 AM
i think i was lost after red and blue. I'm not even sure what red and blue conflict is. Let's throw in my completely uninformed two cents. IMO Australia and NZ would be very interested in Taiwan but there's no real ability to do anything about it. We may join a defence but not even think about doing it alone. UK interests here are historical. It could be enough to sway the UK through the commonwealth and popular support but I wouldn't bank on it at all. Nor would I ignore China's influence here economically and politically, it's stronger than it may appear. Even worse everything I see of the UK is about military cutbacks and the population is definitely not pro war.
 
By ry on September 21, 2007 12:09 AM
1) what was the purpose of SP04 in the Pacific? That was rapid deployment for interdiction, not invasion(invasion of what? DPRK?). The point, considering where the ships all met up, was to show in the PAC that we could surge to Taiwan in a month. End of story. Not to invade, but in an interdiction role And let's not sugar coat this: for SP04 they had thirty days warning prior. So all the maintenance was done before they had to surge. 2) the geography still isn't getting proper due. Pull up a map and look at the distances. Even for an at sea asset we're talking a very long time to get there. In may cases weeks. Ships will not be straight line sailing, that's an invitation for someone to saunter up and wax your @55. You can't steam at full speed for very long. Chit breaks when you do that, your a long ways away from the yard to fix stuff that's busted, not to mention you go thru fuel way too fast(supply ships do not carry an unlimited supply of fuel). At a speed of 28 knots it is on the order of 36 hours to get to the edge of the battlezone. That's assuming that a) the CSG will maintain a constant speed of 28 knots(which it can't) b) a straight course(which it won't do because that's basically begging for some PLAN sub or aircraft to be waiting for them with a nasty surprise when they come of this run) and c)glass like sea conditions from Guam. A day and a half. At 20 knots this increases to 50 hours. at 15 knots this increases to 70 hours. Somewhere between 15 and 20knots is the most likely speed. Why? Because you've got to bloody well be able to fight the ship when you bloody well get where you're going, and you can't do that if chit's busted or your real low on fuel. Then there's the zig zag so the enemy can't just do a simple bit of geometry to have a nice welcoming party for you that kills you dead, even a zig zag that conforms on a single vector, while adding not much in time, offers very little protection when steaming across the ocean against someone you know is going to be hostile at the end of it. And that's just from Guam, and you can take the 1000miles and consider that distance as a radius of action. (numbers are ballpark, used one sigfig, and measured short of Taiwan itself for a shorter distance to achieve least times.). And you think coming from the Arabian Sea is going to be under two to three weeks fast? The Med? Ai carumba. Hey, guys who did REFORGER trips how long did it take you bobbing up and down in the Atlantic to reach Europe? Was it two days, or closer to a week(or more)? 'Oh, but subs run under the water and being nucs can run at 30+knots, ry.' Why yes, yes they do. And the PLAN is going to have their subs out hunting for ours. Just coasting along all quiet like while a pellmell surge as you're talking about has ours deaf and dumb(sonar efficiency is inversely proportional to speed of ship it is on---ask Bubblehead, or any of the other sub bloggers.). They've got the numbers such that they can put out pickets to simply listen, detect, trail, and then report so that something more capable comes in to chase the sub off or kill it. Like Kilo class SSK which are damn quiet and can take hand offs from older, less capable and noisier things like the Romeo, Song, and their older(noisier) nucs like the Han and Xia class boomer(which has never sailed a deterent patrol, they don't have a deployable sub launched missile, so it's not like they're doing anything else with her and would have a reason NOT to press her into service like this, or the PLAN version of SURTASS), or all those destroyers and frigates I listed(along with the ASW Helos they carry). Nor does this take into account the gauntlet of P-3 like aircraft that the PLA/N/AF have that will definitely discourage barreling in, particularly since noise is directly proportional to speed. So the old addage, "Speed kills, peaches."? It takes on a whole new meaning. "But the ROCN has subs that'll have to be neutralized." True, but being SSK their initial positions are a lot easier to either estimate or actually know which aids in hunting them down. These subs have a restricted patrolling area, which helps in finding and killing them. These ROCN subs are major targets which PLAN keeps tabs on all the damn time. When they're gone, in short order since there are so few(between 4 and ten depending on what they are eventually able to buy or keep running), it then frees up subs to go range out, on the offensive because a sub in a strategic defensive role is a waste, and find stuff as it comes barreling in. Again, speed kills. That's from a starting point of Guam or anything in an equal radius away from the battlespace. (Of course it's a trade off. And, without looking at the numbers(from these stupid ol' sims) one wouldn't have a clue as to where to begin in looking for where to begin in such a tradeoff.) Still think I'm nuts? Fine. Read this very lauditory piece about Sea Basing(http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/jun_04_10.php) by the Navy League that lays out time lines for entrance. They cite 17 days with the old plan and 10-14, from Guam and Saipan, with the new? Yup, I'm talking pure bull. Sea Strike, Sea Basing, yeah it all adds up to having stuff at sea so it can get there quickly. But what constitutes quick depends on where you are and what the ship is carrying in terms of consumables. Just because a nuc carrier or sub can race at high speed doesn't mean it should or is smart depending on what condition the escorts are in, how much JP the carrier still has on board, and how much stuff got broke during the deployment(and is or isn't fixable at sea). Quickly, based on distances, tends to be on the order of weeks. Not bloody days for Naval assets. Air can get there in under a day, given it has somewhere to actually stage from when it gets to whatever there is. Given that these assets can actually be flown often enough to matter vice simply being targets for PLAAF and PLANAF fighters and SAM(you know, you have to help out the fight for Air Superiority too, the PLA has airborne troops it can simply drop and then back up with air to stomp on things, not to mention bombers that will be able to sortie very often(more than thrice a day) during which they will be pounding whatever ROC forces are still active on the island.) too. Don't forget, if enough damage gets done with the initial missile and bombing strikes this can be over in a day if they capitulate. Something has to be done about fighting the air battle over Taiwan as well as threatening the troopships. 3) How long does it take to do a single sortie? It isn't only whether you can fly it, it's how often, and how much damage do you do per sortie. Who cares if BUFFs can fly from anywhere in the US in under 16 hours to strike, once, since it isn't going to send the threat with that single strike.(Not to mention whether or not the AF has the weaps at every base they can or want to fly B-52 or B-1 from in a sea strike mission, or trained for it in 20 years). That's distance dependant. So who cares if you can fly from MIssouri if it takes you a full day to fly strike, once. Which won't sink everything---as they've got significant AD too---or even most of it) return and re-arm when you do so? These are factors that don't seem to be getting thru here. How often can you contest for air superiority so you can attack? Distance, time, and logistics are incredible factors in this; and they don't disappear with hueristic hand waves or apples and oranges comparisons(since attacking a non-moving land target you have tons of targeting data far and a moving ocean borne target for which you have close to jack chit on are not anywhere close the same thing). Going down the rabbit hole, what about scenarios where PRC air assaults airfields, turns around and uses them to go long out over the ocean hunting for bombers as they come in and are guided by AEW flying over the island since they've taken out all air threats? Hmmm? What bloody good does flying a CONUS stationed bomber, once a day, when they're sitting there waiting for you before you even get to salvo off? If the logic you're pushing held we wouldn't have needed to stage fighters and bombers in Western Europe during the Cold War. They could simply fly over there as needed to achieve their mission. But time, distance, and how often you need to strike the enemy to reduce him sufficiently are massive factors in this that simply don't disappear because you can fly a B-52 from Missouri anywhere in the world if you tanker often enough to have the range. Time. Distance. Repetition of damage. These are the factors for deciding a sortie. Not whether you can simply fly outta someplace. The number of times you can hit to damage is dependent upon how many times you can put a plane up, and that's dependent upon distance. The further you are away the fewer number of times you can go up and take it to the enemy. The Battle of Britain was mentioned preciously to highlight this element, not just 'cause it sounded like a neato thing to drop in the conversation. 4) And it appears that the assumption of a decision to get involved is 1) assured(when it isn't) 2) is arrived at quickly(which it may or may not be, most likely not) 3) everything is ready to go when the word is given(which isn't). TRA does not demand that we go. It sets up legal means by which we can justify, to ourselves, selling them arms and possibly going. But it does not demand that we do go. It gives us room to decide not to go. Congress may or may not be down with this, not to mention some of the Presidential candidates we currently have. It is not by any means assured we will go. Honor compels us, the Truman doctrine(kinda-sorta) compels us, but nothing legal does. And I'm not entirely sold that we're hurt economically if we don't. Gear like Patriot batteries to be flown have to rounded up, palletized, and then loaded. That's a pretty decently long job, oh and that's if they get their orders to do so quickly. (Armorer and Bill might have some real life experience on the length of time, but I've never seen a report that says faster than 5 hours for a force that wasn't dedicated as QRF.) It can take days before we know what we're going to do. As someone already said, it depends on who is CIC and potentially who is dominant in Congress(Pres. can go for 90 days before Congress can reign him in, unless they changed that after Panama). All of that adds time. Not just for air and air deployables, but also to sea assets that then have to wait around for orders. 5) Economic arguments.(Have I said that I'm not a fan of economic determinism lately, or uni-cause theories of conflict?) Sacrificing Japan is a rather neutral proposition, legally but not morally. We've got what amounts to a gentleman's agreement to do something. NOthing legal. Lots of moral though. Considering how important the PRC is to us economically, a bit more important than Japan right now, one can even make an argument on economic grounds that doing so is stupid! No it's the moral that compels. There's more to be had shaking hands with the devil than in fighting him. Our oil supply is untouched. Okay, Toyotas might cost a little more but that's incentive to buy American or European. But China's happy, They're trading with us big time. Japan doesn't have the wherewithal to go on their own, but how does this hurt our economy? It really doesn't, not in the short term Nobody has mentioned S. Korea. Why? Not only is it a bit far for anything from there to be useful, but China is such a huge partner with them that doing so guarantees economic collapse. (The A-10s stationed in Korea would be a welcome addition to the ROC in fighting on the ground, but they aren't likely to go considering the distance and the question of whether there'll be a place for them to land). AUS? Hell, they've signed a major nuclear fuel supply deal with the PRC a few years ago. Siding with China is more in their economic interests, in the short term, than in resisting. This is not sufficient a cause. Look at it from a reasoning position from the PRC side. Who cares if Taiwan declares independence---they're still so tied economically that it won't bloody matter. Why fight anyways? Doing so is bound to hurt you more than help you(the goose that lays the golden eggs is going to have a drought if you do)? What's the point? What motivates you to go after Taiwan? She has no real natural resources, not enough to be willing to go thru all of this? Spratleys, Paracels, Ryukus, and other island chains? Sure. BUt Taiwan? Why? We've been pissed before and haven't closed the Strait to them before---back when they were a net exporter and needed desperately the hard currency that came from those exports. Why? Economics is not enough of an answer. And what about all this talk, on the grande strategic level(which I never intended on going, and had reasons for why things were done as they were---what part of most basic, least convoluted scenario aren't people getting?), of 'mortal economic threats'? Show me how PRC can't do that to them right now? Show me how these nations you've described haven't got serious economic ties to China such that going against her isn't as much a 'mortal economic blow'? AUS has many economic deals with China. As does Britain and Japan. Whether China goes kinetic or not doesn't change the fact that they're all pulled by China's economic orbit and that a disruption of trade with China is a serious blow to them. This is a two edged sword you're wielding like it's a katana. It always seem to cut only one way. Never considering for a moment that they can all gain by not flinching. During the crisis shipping can be routed westward to continue to Japan. Japan is no worse off after than before because China can screw with them regardless of whether they hold Taiwan or not. The basing of PLAN in the Indian Ocean guarantees that economic weapon against Japan. The fact that so much shipping to Japan has to run about the entire length of China's coast, in striking distance, doesn't change one gd whit if China owns Taiwan or not. They just own a defile that shipping tends to go thru because it is faster, and ergo cheaper. Farking dual edged longsword instead of a single edged katana. (Sorry about getting snippy, I'm getting tired and the Wife's already bugging me about trying to get a good night's sleep(for once).) Want a list of wars in MAD times that weren't about money or economics? How about Panama? How about Somalia? What vital economic interest was served there? How about Kosovo, where we pissed off the Russians and the Chinese(dang Prince of Darkness)? Vietnam, when the Sovs didn't think we'd stick around and so got caught spending like crazy to keep the war going? Economics is not enough to explain war. It has applications but as an answer for all wars since the adoption of MAD theory? Oh hell no. "Apparently you missed the "nuance" there since my point was nuclear MAD (along with economic MAD) makes our discussion a little moot for the immediate future. Get your knickers out of a twist and pull them out of butt crack." No, I saw the 'nuance'. That's just the nicest way I have of calling it crap from start to finish. A war for survival? Not really. Not the way I think you mean it. And not doing a Taiwan invasion(whether or not Taipei ever declares independence)? Well, they don't survive if they don't do it some point in the mid-to-long range future. The people put up with the CCP because it makes things better, and as they get wealthier they get frustrated with all the crap they put up with, but a Periclean strategy? Well, that works for them(invasion of Vietnam, the war with India, talking trash about fighting us) keeps the locals happy and in line(ever notice how many Russians now wish for the old Sov Un back and how that coincides with the nonsense they put up with from Putin?). They've a tight rope to walk, and entirely of their own making. I am dealing with them as adults. I just deal with them like they're from the Mid-West and look at things just like I do, with a Westerner perspective. Nor do I infantalize them by thinking 'face' is everything to them. It is important, but not everything. But, the CCP continues to stay in power because of the promises they make of a resurgence of Chinese dominance. That means three things. Strong economy(check). Territorial integrity(nope, Taiwan is rogue. Bits and pieces out in the Pacific they claim are recognized as theirs. Being a 5k year old civilization has its benefits and its detractions.). Being a superpower('does the sorta-kinda hand wave'). This is the three legs of the stool the CCP stands upon. One leg goes and they fall(and they're close to that. Look at the increase in riots every year for the last five. They have to do something soon to make the nationalism more than empty rhetoric.). Sure, they put their pants on one leg a time just as I do, but to them pants isn't the major form of dress(don't take this literally). I treat them like big boys, but understand that to them that means a very different thing because they aren't from my 'family'. "Number one, who was talking about the "moral" thing to do?" I have. The entire time. There's no legal or economic reason that I see as so important as to demand military action. I see moral ones, but nothing we can't work around economically or legally(if said is even required). "That is not a good comparison." YOu miss the point. They already have things to be pissed at Iran for, threats to their long term survival and economy(sponsorship of terrorism). With China? Not so much. Again, AUS is not in much of a threat from China(for a long while). The economy of AUS is intertwining much like the JAP and US are(uranium deal, DFI, etc). I'm not seeing AUS being 'left hanging'. What I'm showing here is the predeliction to 'diplomacy: first, last, and always' in many corners of Britain, many of them in the gov't. Hell, going to war totally f's up all the deals the Brits have in Hong Kong. Not a mortal blow, but having all that nationalized is not going to be pretty. THey have much to not lose by staying out of it, at least physically. Politically, well, you don't lose much for a stiffly written memo. For the most part, your timing is horrendously off. Horribly. It takes a long time to get there, and I've listed the reasons for why. I've listed reasons for why certain things were done or not done. You want to go down the rabbit hole of the 50 some odd scenarios? Fine. But none of that doesn't speaks frag all to the basic question I asked: is it worth the cost to do it that way, and if not why are we so wedded to it? I don't care what your issues with experts are, Kat, 'cause they aren't mine. Sometimes you just have to accept they do know more about something than you do. Sometimes. I'm not saying roll over like a puppy every time(christ, like I am trained for this, or have the credentials or CV to show people should trust me on it), but, damn, get a mad on about 'elites' much? I listen to the plumber not because he's smarter than me, but because he knows what he's doing because he does it all the time. Sometimes I catch him trying to rip me off or lying to me. But the fact remains that he knows the material better than me because his livelihood depends on it.
 
By MR T's Haircut on September 21, 2007 6:38 AM
Kat, I disagree with you. This all boils down to 3 things: 1. Will of the Nation 2. Tyranny of Distance 3. Sustainment. Is Taiwan "worthy" of defense? Does the U.S. have the resolve to commit national resources to the defense of Taiwan. Will the American public have the resolve? You are incredibly niave with your assumption on Distance. Citing Guam and Diego Garcia as the springboards for fighter acft, is not plausible and takes away credibility. Further familiarity is required regarding our allied capabiliities and will as well. Australia does not have an offensive deep tiered Navy. She does not have the manning to man the ships she has, and she certainly does not have aircraft carriers. (HMAS Melbourne decommissioned in the 80's) Japan has a defense capability and the jury is out if she would use it offensively in any conflict with China. Japan has had opportunity to flex military muscle in Iraq and in Afghan and has refrained. Why would China be different? Sustainment... This is the critical center of gravity for both China and the U.S. They must use time and distance to gain ground rapidly and secure Taiwan. Additionally, PRC will need to surge in troops and air defense on the island rapidly. To do this, she will have to deny the U.S. the ability for sustainment. She can and probably has figured out where we will likely establish our CVOA's and will prepro subs and mines in those area. Sink on Carrier, we will have a new dynamic. Sink 2 Oilers/Ammo carriers, you have effectively denied us the approaches to Taiwan and we will not be able to sustain operations with sea power. (we can however take it to China in the form of Sub enforced Blockaid. Sink any ship in the quarrantine zone with subs) No this will be costly. MAD is not a figure in this calculus with the Taiwan, we will not exchange a nuke over Tawain with China as a first course of action. Nukes are off the table. India will be the key...