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A thought for the Copperheads...

"Experience proves that the man who obstructs a war in which his nation is engaged, no matter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life or history. Better for him, individually, to advocate 'war, pestilence, and famine' than to act as obstructionist to a war already begun.... The most favorable posthumous history the stay-at-home traitor can hope for is -- oblivion."

~~ Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs

I wonder how General Petraeus' memoirs will read...

Confused by the term "Copperhead?" Click here. There's room for argument all around the war. There are plenty of people making the case for principled opposition (though I believe a good chunk of the political opposition to be opportunist) and I recently ran into someone who is war-weary and casualty-conscious in a way that surprised me.

One problem for the conduct of this war is that we've not actually declared it a war (for good reasons and bad) and the administration is painted into the corner of what would traditionally be considered campaigns of an overall war have been mounted as separately authorized undertakings - kind of like WWII being conducted with Congress authorizing the separate Army and Navy campaigns in the Pacific, and each invasion in Europe, North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and finally, France - with a re-authorization needed to take the war into Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany.

But, since we've decided to do this without a draft, and don't consider the individual fights to be true battles for survival - that may be apt, I suppose...

Whatcha think?

14 Comments

Yes. I believe that is our current situation. When we chose the misnomer of "pre-emption" in Iraq, that is how people decided it was a "war of choice" rather than necessity. I think it will be interesting to read Petraeus' memoirs particularly how he reacts to now being labeled Bush's political hack instead of being given his due as a commander who, through trial and error during his first mission as a field commander in Northern Iraq, developed an idea for counter-insurgency that actually worked and then presented it as n option for the entire nation which the president bought into and which meets the president's goals. arguably, it is the political goals of the civilian controlled government that the military must plan to meet. It is an instrument to enforce those political goals, not the instrument which makes it. while it can shape the final goals through advice and reporting of the ground situation, it never, ever sets them. I was just reading this op-ed from Real Clear politics: Salute and Disobey Hat tip SWJ; which basically approaches this subject from three points of views, mostly refuting Desch's arguments regarding what the generals should have or would have done for planning of Iraq and what the civilian administration should have done in re-action. Basically, he advocates that the administration and Rumsfeld should have provided over all objectives and gotten the hell out of the way. Richard Meyers, former Chief of Staff, totally disagreed. Desch went on to reply with a total dress down of Petreaus as mentioned earlier: a political general. an interesting read and goes along with your post. If more time later, I plan to address this op-ed because it basically represents the difficulty of balancing civilian goals, civilian control and military operations.
 
General Grant's statements might have been true, once; they haven't since Vietnam, and possibly Korea. Now it's seen as a feature. I don't know how to persuade that significant proportion of our population that there really is a valid threat. But days after 9/11, there were teach ins being organized at my university to agitate against "bombing Afghanistan," as they put it. Some people refuse to be convinced. As far as our armed forces' size and strength, is a draft really necessary? We had larger active-suty, reserve, and national guard forces in the 80s & early 90s, and did it with volunteers. I don't know if it's possible to do that now - the resident brain trust could do that much better than I - but it is an option that doesn't seem to be discussed much. But then I've been away for a while.
 
Actually, U-M, the "why is recruiting hard now when it wasn't in the 80's" question is being bruited about at the watercolor. On offer as contributing circumstances... 1. There *is* a shooting war on. This tends to discourage the "but I only did it for the GI Bill" types. 2. The economy, as a whole, is in pretty good shape, reducing that incentive, despite the Democrat's and Anti's use of that shibboleth in terms of who serves. 3. The available prime demographic is smaller.
 
Dunnigan & company over at Strategypage have also claimed that our smaller forces are better, man for man (and woman for woman {g}) than those 80s or 90s forces. If I read their logic correctly, it goes back to quality over quantity. I'm sure the regulars here would agree that literally quadrupling special forces slots would result in an overall less-capable force. D & Co. argue something similar would occur if we greatly increased conventional forces. John: you've probably already seen this, but just in case: Why Congress Has Not Declared War Since World War II.
 
Casey - clearly the current forces are better, soldier for soldier, and unit for unit, than the units I served in in the 80's (which, on balance compared to most militaries I partnered with over the years - were at least as good, and oft times better). The question still remains, are they sufficient to the task? My answer - if we're going to do major combat operations or smash-and-grab punitive actions, they probably are. If we're going to do things like Iraq again, absent a large multi-national contingent with serious numbers and capabilities - they are not. However, as I've oft-times stated, I'm not all that keen on what we chose to do in Iraq, and was not from before the time it became apparent that it wasn't going our way - so I think our forces are about the right size for what we need - and that we've let our wants, vice our needs, put us in this corner... kinda like living on credit, except there are lives at stake. That said - we did it, we need to give it an honest shot and try to clean it up. But I hope the lesson is taken to heart - it's just a hell of a lot harder to knock a society onto a different path than we accepted. And I lay that lesson at the doorstep of President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld, and their advisors who championed the idea. This does not mean I'm going to vote for any of the Democrat candidates currently running... just in case someone was running out to check my registration (which is *undeclared* - I still haven't picked a party...)
 
This is so frustrating. It seemed to me to be the right thing to do at the time. Saddam was thumbing his nose at the U.N. sanctions. He was shooting at our planes. Terrorists were using Iraq as a way station on their path to jihad. His actions made it appear as if he were trying to hide evidence of a significant WMD ability, if not actual program. Four years in I'm wondering. I discounted the usual suspects; the peace-at-all-cost crowd, the bomb-them-back-to-the-stone-age group and nutcases on both the right and left. I tried to evaluate the evidence we were presented before deciding to support Bush's decision. From my admittedly civilian viewpoint we went about the business too tentatively. I think we should have surged sooner. I understand we were trying to bring the provisional Iraqi government into the process but at what price? Despite any misgivings I might have about the conduct of the war I still support Bush's decision. At the time he made it what else should he have done? I don't see how we can conduct successful law enforcement actions against the overall terrorist threat. While using the military might be a bad fit trying to use law enforcement is a worse one. We're in a damned if you do and damned if you don't situation. You're never going to convince certain segment of society of the need to use force, no matter how necessary it might be for survival. Their power to delude themselves is more powerful than anyone else's power to reason with them. I'm not saying they're stupid, just unwilling to see past their own prejudice. What I fear most is some sort of meaningless "ceasefire" that politicians say is a way to achieve peace with honor that solves nothing and merely postpones the eventual escalation of terror. I've managed to depress myself, if not anyone else so I'll stop here. Slog, slog, slog.
 
Steve - I'm just not a fan of pre-emptive war absent the kind of compelling case the Israelis had in 1967. Doesn't mean I'm right. I didn't like Kosovo, either, though that has thus far certainly worked out better, being a completely different case. I can live with targeted smash and grabs, but I'm just not happy with being the guy who starts the war. I understand that's surrendering the initiative. But the military is a pretty brute force approach to things. Nothing is as simple when viewed from the past looking to the future as it is looking from the then-future to the past. Which is one of those things I dislike about Monday Morning Quarterbacking historians and others. I'm at least consistent - I don't like us starting things, absent a more compelling consensus or clear and present danger, whether they are going seemingly well (Bosnia/Kosovo) or not-so-well (Iraq, and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan) - if for no other reason than I don't see any reason to suspect the American people will support a long endeavor that carries with it dribbles of body bags stuff with Americans. They'll support a years long effort with lots of American body bags if they see a compelling danger (ala WWII) but we just don't have the stomach for a long-running war with casualties. Oh, I know it would help if the press didn't portray seemingly nothing but the bad stuff, etc, leave aside their biases, but the reality is - the American people like relatively neat, somewhat tidy solutions. They just don't like their wars like that. I don't think anybody planning the war thought that the people were going to be more supportive than they have been, either - Rumsfeld, et.al., just believed they had found a New Way that was going to get them around that problem - especially after the somewhat unique example of the Afghanistan campaign. I think they were ambushed by the reality of it all, as well. Just one guy's relative (around here, anyway) minority opinion...
 
I guess, John, the question remains: If the American public doesn't see it as a compelling threat, will they be convinced at a point in time where it would require a massive campaign (WWII in scope and casualties, if not more) to put a stop to it, if at all. Being on campus, many in my age group will be blind untill the last day, possibly even beyond that. Some will dhimmi right away, working against the 'freedoms' that they so cherish. This is just the two cents of a college punk, however.
 
Geo - *most* populations are like that, valuing life, however constrained, over strife. Tyrants rely on it.
 
Rumsfeld, et.al., just believed they had found a New Way that was going to get them around that problem - especially after the somewhat unique example of the Afghanistan campaign. That New Way was, unfortunately, a rehash of MacNamara's failed ideas about Vietnam -- the Afghanistan campaign wasn't just unique, it was an anomaly. Carter stepped into the same hi-tech trap in the '70s when he appointed Stansfield Turned to "reform" the CIA by removing HUMINT and replacing it with ELINT. I think there are a couple of us still around who remember how well *that* went, and not just in Iran... Technology's a really handy tool in warfare, but never make the mistake of believing it can be the entire toolbox.
 
There was a book about the Viet Nam thing, written by a reluctant combatant. It was "If I Die in a Combat Zone", I think. The author was ready to split for Canada, had funny papers and false clothes and all that and was right on the border, when lying awake late at night his philosophy major and reading of Socrates came back to haunt him. Socrates could easily have escaped; his friends had a ship waiting and were ready to bribe the jailors. Socrates considered that his polity had raised him, and protected him before, as he had protected it before as an infantryman, and that he had no right to go against its laws, though they did injustice to him in that instance. The writer of the book changed his mind, showed up for his draft notice, and got to experience the absolute polar opposites of 1. A KewlManly&Wonderful officer to his being RTO to said officer, being Eagle-Scout-like in his virtues and also 2. A Despicable loathesome imitation of an officer who got one of his own men run over by one of his own tracks, and killed, because the doofus wasn't paying attention
 
P.s. I don't think either of said officers got what they deserved, at least in this life.
 
The author was ready to split for Canada, had funny papers and false clothes and all that and was right on the border, when lying awake late at night his philosophy major and reading of Socrates came back to haunt him. And we'd be in a sorrier world without the full impact of Socrates' action. Plato would likely have viewed him as a hypocrite and opted to pursue a career as a math teacher.
 
Dang, Chief, I think there comes a time for every thoughtful guy who fancies himself to be a grownup, when he has to consider the question: Just exactly what, would I rather die than put up with. This might be an urgent question at times for those in the military trade. It really is a very ancient philosophical question, though. I'm afraid my answer might depend on my emotional state induced by whomever might be trying to make me consider the question. (I mean, like, in the field, yaknow)