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H&I* Fires, 19 JUN 2007

By Denizens on June 19, 2007 | | Comments (27)

Open post for those with something to share, updated through the day. New, complete posts come in below this one. Note: If trackbacking, please acknowledge this post in your post. That's only polite.

You're advertising here, we should get an ad at your place...

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No comment needed.

Speaks for itself, eh?

Now, everybody generate positive waves for Fuzzybear. I said *No Negative Waves*, Moriarity!

Colonel Steve Townsend responds to an article critical of the Stryker in the Washington Times.

Money graf:

Finally, if you want to know about Stryker utility or effectiveness, why ask think-tank critics?

Ask any of my soldiers which type of unit and vehicle they want to fight with. Ask any commander in Iraq what type of formation he would like to have for this fight and I think the answer will overwhelmingly be Stryker.

Ask me what type of unit and vehicle I want to fight with in Iraq -- Stryker.

As to the comment about added armor straining the engine -- maybe so, but we have not seen any empirical data to support the claim. Our Strykers didn't seem to strain too much when our brigade moved more than 250 miles from Mosul to Baghdad at 60 miles per hour.

One wonders what this press would have done with the Sherman during WWII...
-the Armorer

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I’ve never been in favor of kindergarten and other graduations, but this one takes the cake. ‘Please be an individual, but only in the officially acceptable methods.’
--
Someone has A Few Thoughts on the Evolution of Infantry: Past, Present, and Future. Not as funny as John’s Ammunition series with D’oh, but pretty good, IMO.
--
Old munitions find a way to be pains in the patoot still. Dang.
--ry

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News from MNF-I:

Sheiks meet, discuss progress

Wounded Soldier reaffirms commitment to fight

Brigade helps Iraqis help themselves

Firefight claims insurgents

-the Armorer

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Someone's having a birthday! Congrats, Matt! I'm *still* a bigger blogger'n you. In surface area and mass, anyway! -the Armorer

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Cassandra on men. If you're giggling about that sentence... shame on you. -the Armorer

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*A term of art from the artillery. Harassment and Interdiction Fires.

Back in the day, when you could just kill people and break things without a note from a lawyer, they were pre-planned, but to the enemy, random, fires at known gathering points, road junctions, Main Supply Routes, assembly areas, etc - to keep the bad guy nervous that the world around him might start exploding at any minute.

*Not really relevant to today's operating environment, right? But, it *is*

The UAVs (oops, can't call 'em UAVs anymore - they're now Unmanned Aerial Systems... some Colonel got his Legion of Merit for that change...), er, um UAS's we fly over Afghanistan and Pakistan looking for targets of opportunity are a form of H&I fires, if you really want to parse it finely. We just have better sensors and fire control now.

I call the post that because it's random things posted by me and people I've given posting privileges to. It's also an open trackback, so if someone has a post they're proud of, but it really isn't either Castle kind of stuff, or topical to a particular post, I've basically given blanket permission to use that post for that purpose. Another term of art that might be appropriate is "Free Fire Zone".

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27 Comments

By MajMike on June 19, 2007 8:15 AM
for the record, they did note that it was in fact a "beautiful mare". just sayin'
 
By Marine6 on June 19, 2007 9:40 AM
I vote we send a few cavalrymen to the Project on Defense Alternatives. Marine6 Sends
 
By DougK on June 19, 2007 10:08 AM
"One wonders what this press would have done with the Sherman during WWII..." Well, they might have done some good, actually. It might not have been necessary for Belton Cooper to write such lamentable memoirs, we might have gotten the M26 into production sooner, Lesley McNair might not have wielded such undue influence over the Army Ground Forces Board and foisted the ridiculous "tanks shouldn't fight other tanks" doctrine on us in favor of his beloved artillery and tank destroyers (to the detriment of a lot of dead tank crewmen) or, at the very least, we might have at least fielded up armored Shermans and adopted the 17 pounder gun and told the contractors, engineers, and Navy transporters to adapt. Instead, the status quo reigned and we didn't rid ourselved of McNair's folly until we killed him ourselves, alas too late and with a lot of other guys in an unfortunate "friendly fire" bombing incident. To be fair, our doctrine dated to the pre-war era, but was perpetuate for far too long (at least two years longer than necessary) because of inertia in the system, the not-invented-here syndrome (see: 17 pounder gun) and plain old flawed doctrine and personal bias. The press might have changed some of that.
 
By DougK on June 19, 2007 10:19 AM
Double post, my bad...dunno' whu' happen'd. Put a round of APDS into the second one for me or sumthin'...
 
By John of Argghhh! on June 19, 2007 10:38 AM
Doug - the flip side of your coin is that... we might have adopted the German tank development doctrine... and never had enough tanks, and a bewildering variety. The balance lies somewhere in the middle. The real point is - nothing is going to be perfect for all purposes.
 
By DougK on June 19, 2007 11:02 AM
Somewhere in the middle would have been light years better than what we had. The comparison is really not fair, though. The usual camparison is to the Tiger (PzKw VI), of which ~1,500 were built...not surprizing since it's construction was more akin to that of a Forumula I car...WAY too sophisticated for wartime production. We didn't need monuments, we needed tanks...but tanks intended to fight other tanks. Our failure was one of doctrine, not capacity. We were just building the wrong vehicle for the task at hand because of misguided doctrine...mainly (but not exclusively) because of the bias of individual and institutional mindset. We could have built the right vehicles in numbers also (~50,000 Shermans were built, in various permutations). Objections to change ranged from ship transport load considerations to bridge loading/width. Insurmountable? Doubtful. Inconvenient? Certainly. Death in a flaming tank, however, is for sure inconvenient. I would cite as validation of my position, the complete turnabout in our armored doctrine postwar that the Army underwent as a result of the lessons learned from the very expensive victory in Europe, in human terms. Unnecessarily expensive, as it turns out. Had the the human costs of this particular folly been more prominently reported, it might have been addressed sooner.
 
By J.M. Heinrichs on June 19, 2007 12:40 PM
There were opportunities to make changes to the tank programme, but two obstacles existed. The doctrine and kit-making chaps ignored the fact that lessons can be learned from losses, and thus the advice and suggestions from British liaison personnel were denigrated. As well, they had Gen Patton's approbation for their work. The Brits pointed out the inadequacies of the Sherman and its 75mm on the basis of their bitter experiences, but because they had lost ... Eventually they made their own mods resulting in the Sherman Firefly (17lbr), which could match the Tiger's firepower. While the influence of McNair may have been influential, it was because it was the status quo, and thus substantial effort would have been necessary to correct it. I suggest that the the kicker may have been Patton's approval of the Sherman as designed, and if he was satisfied, then the Sherman was good to go. Cheers
 
By Oldloadr on June 19, 2007 12:55 PM
As to the comment about added armor straining the engine -- maybe so, but we have not seen any empirical data to support the claim.
Operating in combat in the desert strains mechanical contraptions, period. The affect of extra armor over design could only be studied in terms of engine life expectancy. If the Army has a PM schedule (of course they do), it may need some tweaking, but using engine strain as a reason to snipe at the Stryker shows, at the least, ignorance of military equipment and at the most full frontal cynicism. I opt for the latter since: 1. The writer ignored the soldiers on the ground who told him an M-1 would have faired no better against the IEDs that penetrated the Strykers and gave the last word to a retiree who “writes on defense issues.” As much affection as I have for our brotherhood of retirees, I just don’t think we know more than the guys on the ground using the stuff. 2. The writer makes an issue of wheeled versus tracks as if the tracks themselves were part of the armor. The only difference I saw was that the track vehicles are a lot slower (easy targets in urban areas) and they tore up the pavement even as the reconstruction people were trying to repair the roads. I agree with DougK that constructive criticism could be a great benefit to both the effectiveness and safety of the troops in the field. The problem is, there isn’t a lot of constructive criticism being offered, it’s mostly of the John Kerry, y’all are too stupid to hold real jobs kind of criticism. (and that’s my editorial for the day)
 
By DougK on June 19, 2007 1:25 PM
Ah...another victim of the "Patton myth" in tank procurement in WWII. I refer you, Sir, to the excellent article, based on primary sources, in "Armor Magazine" Sept-Oct 2001 by Chas. M. Baily "Tank Myths", wherein he convincingly demonstrates that Patton was in no position whatsoever to insinuate himself in tank procurement decision between Geo. Marshall and his theatre commander or Gen. Devers in derailing the T26 tank program. The timeline in presented in that article which I have in pdf format, but which is not available online without authorization, to the best of my knowledge. I'll summarize: 24 May '43: War dept approved production of 10 T26 tanks as part of larger production order on T20 series. 13 Sept. '43 In endorsement to earlier Armored Command letter requesting adjustment of production numbers of M4, Ord. Dept. requested production of an additional 500 T26's. Ge. Lesley McNair, CG of AGF, SUCCESSFULLY OPPOSSED THIS REQUEST. 13 Nov. '43 Gen. Jacob Devers, CG of European Theater of Ops, requests production of 250 T26's. 7 Dec. '43 Because of McNair's continued opposition to production of the T26 and other objections, MG Jos. McNamey queried Devers whether his request was based on operational requirements. 10 Dec. '43 Devers confirmed his request for production of 250 T26's 16 Dec. '43 Gen. Russell Maxwell, G-4, directed the CG ASF to produce 250 T26's to meet Devers requirements. 21 Dec. '43 Gen. Marshall demonstrated his involvement in the T26 cabling Devers about the decision to produce them, advising a 9 month delay before production. 15 Jan.'44 Marshall asked new CG, ETO, Eisenhower if the requirements for the T26 still stood. Eisenhower confirms it. 21 Feb '44 Ord Dept. estimates 1st production or 250 T26's in Oct. '44. Production begins in Nov. Protos' form batch of 10 ordered in May '43 arrive in Feb '44 20 May '44 Armored Board, Ft. Knox emphasized that T26 not ready for production in it's present state. ______________________________________________ Thank you, Gen. McNair, for losing us all that valuable time. General Patton had nothing whatsoever to do with this decision nor had he that kind of influence, as is conclusively demonstrated in this paper, which I wish I could post here, but copyrights apply...
 
By jim b on June 19, 2007 2:53 PM
The spirit of McNair still lives in the continued use of the M-16 Poodle shooter family. I have no idea who most of the characters in this play are, however, the spirit of this clash of opinions lives on in the Egos of those responsible for improvement of gear. Even when it is painfully obvious. Ditto for the 9mm vs 45 pistol. Every so often we simply opt for stupid. They there are those who make it a career to defend it. Part 2, if Strykers are not good enough what is? What vehicle is it that will be bullet proof enought to satisfy everyone?
 
By DougK on June 19, 2007 3:16 PM
"if Strykers are not good enough what is? What vehicle is it that will be bullet proof enought to satisfy everyone?" A vehicle that could not move of it's own weight and you could not afford even if it could. You go to war with the Army that you have, and improve it as you can, as you can, learning as you fight, but being willing to learn...and being willing to accept that 100% protection will never be possible. Not welcoming reports from the field is not compatible with several parts of that statement, no matter from whence they come.
 
By DougK on June 19, 2007 3:23 PM
Argghhh! is right...shoot me, John...just shoot me.....
 
By John of Argghhh! on June 19, 2007 3:37 PM
Doug - is the comment window never closing for you, or do you get the white screen and error message? If you get the error message, your comment has posted... If you don't, don't worry about the double-posting. I've got a little widget that periodically wakes up, looks around, and sweeps 'em up. And since I've paid *two* webmonkeys to fix this problem, the floggings have commenced!
 
By jim b on June 19, 2007 3:47 PM
You must be using the old model webmonkeys. They are especially vulnerable to the double post IED (Iritating Entertwice Distraction). I bet the Brits have some kinda heavier cannon you can use, or simply add armor. New model web monkeys will take too long to spin up, and they will cost too much. What does it mean when I hit post and I go blank?
 
By John of Argghhh! on June 19, 2007 3:59 PM
What does it mean when I hit post and I go blank? That you should cut back on your Scoresby's intake...
 
By DougK on June 19, 2007 4:08 PM
I don't get an error message...but it can take, like, forever for the window to close. I have tried it both using preview and not using preview. The first time I think I was just not patient enough, but the second time I really don't know what happened because all I did was try to change a word after hitting "post", but I didn't hit "post" a second time. I guess it didn't like that (changing a word while sending). If posting a long reply, will the thing "time out" after a while...I worry 'bout 'dat...some of these things do...I could always use notepad and copy/paste. That "timeline" post took a while, which is why it's full of typos...I was hurryin'....
 
By John of Argghhh! on June 19, 2007 5:32 PM
What typos? 8^) Sometimes the typo fairy shows up and does you a favor. She's quirky tho. For some reason, if you're being a jerk in your post, she doesn't help at all... and might even behave badly herself.
 
By ry on June 19, 2007 9:33 PM
"I vote we send a few cavalrymen to the Project on Defense Alternatives." Why's that? This is sounding a lot like an alternative to the seperate SysAdmin concept that's floating around. Different than the 'paramilitary' forces too. Dedicated light infantry for stabilization operations. There's value in the concept, given that a large amount of what we've been doing for the last 15 years is MOOTW. When I want somebody's balls kicked up between their ears I'll call on the cavalry. When I want to bring someone into the fold I'll draw on someting else. That's not a slight. That's wanting to use the right tool for the right job. I don't use a chainsaw to cut a 6oz steak. --- Tanks. I dunno. Patton went around the country at one time or another telling people that the Sherman was the best there was. He wrote in his journals and letters that he knew it wasn't so good but the men had to believe in it to do the jobs they were given when given them. Yes, there was a doctrine problem. The whole 'tank destroyer' concept--thin skinned and intended to fire from concealment, which wasn't always available, but tended to turn up as a brewed up carcass---was meant to take on tank formations. It didn't work so well. Eventually was abandoned. But I'm also thinking of AC Clarke's short story 'Superiority'. We could've had better. We could've spent the time, in the midst of war, to get something better. And that would've had costs too, potentially disasterous ones. We could also apply this to the Eastern front where the Russians suffered even greater casualties becuase of logistical and other inadequacies. They could've waited until that was made good. But at what cost? Mistakes of judgement are always made. 20-20 hindsight always sees the better road.
 
By DougK on June 19, 2007 10:13 PM
The other reason the "tank destroyer" concept failed was precisely because it was intended to "take on tank formations"...formations that never (or seldom) materialized. By the time the Shermans were fielded and we had a solid beachhead, the Germans were soon in retreat. Blitzkrieg was a thing of the past and that's what they had in mind to defeat when tank destroyer doctrine was conceived. It was we who were on the offensive and TD's "firing from concealment" aren't part of that mission profile. If you have a tank that can engage other tanks, you also have a vehicle that can do infantry support (which they eventually figured out)...the TD is redundant...an encumbrance, in fact, particularly if you're advancing. They were eventually consigned to the SP gun role. I understand that a good plan now is better than a perfect plan later, but we didn't really have a "good" plan...we had a seriously flawed plan (as regards armor and mounted combat). The Brits had a better understanding of what was needed, hardware-wise, (the M3 Grant-Lee thing was another good example) but we were loathe to listen. Hindsight needn't be invoked, all the information was available, but somebody wasn't disposed to listen, which was actually the origin of this thread...and where, maybe, the press could have been of some use, though the lag phase to production still would have to be overcome.
 
By Barb on June 19, 2007 11:28 PM
Doug - whether you get the white screen or it just takes forever, it's usually in process. I've seen the window delay as well - and I just close the window ... but the comment always makes it. John - I didn't know you had a code widget to clean up after the Castle Echo. I've cleaned up a few extras manually as well - I'll just sit back and sip my margarita from now on ;-)
   
By Barb on June 19, 2007 11:51 PM
What? Am *I* the 'little widget' of which you spoke? Dang... am I that predictable? *sigh*
 
By John of Argghhh! on June 20, 2007 8:03 AM
Barb - no, I didn't make myself clear. I do have a plug-in, called "Blog Janitor" that cleans up duplicates, and auto-closes comments and trackbacks.
 
By J.M. Heinrichs on June 20, 2007 2:31 PM
I don't think I was referring to any putative involvement by Gen Patton in tank procurement decisions against successors to the Sherman. Rather, I was referring to decisions made during the late design and early production of the Sherman, when the Brits were lobbying for changes based on their recent battlefield experiences. Cheers
 
By DougK on June 20, 2007 6:21 PM
Then I may have rushed to assume you were assigning blame to Patton (many do, and in error...he had no such influence). The Brits had many good suggestions, which went unheeded because streamling production was McNair's specialty (and in all fairness, he was good at it, as he was at organizing training and both were part of his job). Unfortunately, he was also so dogmatic and focused as to be obstructionist to the ultimate detriment of the armored forces. That's why the Firefly's had to be converted on your side of the pond and we had to plod along with insufficient firepower.
 
By John of Argghhh! on June 20, 2007 6:30 PM
This is where I note that CAPT H is an officer of the *other* sorta anglo Army on *this* side of the pond. The one with the french accent. I know, his spelling can throw you off, what with those superfluous vowels and such... And he's a tanker by trade and temprament, if he currently doesn't serve in that capacity.
 
By DougK on June 20, 2007 10:05 PM
"This is where I note that CAPT H is an officer of the *other* sorta anglo Army on *this* side of the pond. The one with the french accent." You mean the ones with the RAM-tank-almost-a-Sherman? ;-) So THAT's why he was posting at the time he was...I thought he just had insomnia! 'Kay, then...Sorry, it was that "programme" thing and Firefly ref that really had me thinkin' Albion. Oh, well, still Allies and all. So..."Fireflys on their side of the pond..." (pity we couldn't 'a done it...howzat' for 'Murican English?) Cheers back at'cha! Doug