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        <title>Comments for More on ships and things Naval.</title>
        <description>We&apos;re the Military and Airpower Guys of Jonah Goldberg of National Review Online + a stray we found wandering around looking lost.  All original material JHD, BHD, JR, WT,  and KA 2003-2007</description>
        <link>http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/04/more_on_ships_a.html</link>
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            <title>More on ships and things Naval.</title>
            <description>Having found another ship that looked odd to my taste, I thought I would continue with that meme for a bit, with this picture that tickled the historian in me. The French gunboat Fusee. What&apos;s really interesting about it to me? Not so much the ship, which is from the transitional era, this photo being 1886, but because of all those obsolete leviathans in the upper left - the old wooden ships of the line, that not very long before, had been the epitome of naval power, now just sitting there being recycled into roof beams for dark smoky old...</description>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Apr 2007 08:02:58 -0600</pubDate>
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            <title>Comment from Justthisguy on 2007-04-14</title>
            <description>
                Curiously, just about a hundred years ago the USN told GE and Westinghouse to go pound sand when they wouldn&apos;t meet cost and performance standards for turbines for Texas and New York. The Navy built vertical inverted triple expansion reciprocating engines for those ships, in their own shops. The contractors came around and were much nicer and more reasonable on the next class of BBs. I&apos;m glad to see the Navy looking out for our national interest again.
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            <link>http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/04/more_on_ships_a.html#comment-58909</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 14 Apr 2007 02:22:20 -0600</pubDate>
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            <title>Comment from CDR Salamander on 2007-04-13</title>
            <description>
                Much rather you post naval items that you find interesting then navel ones....

As for LCS CANX - good call by SECNAV.  Very good call.
            </description>
            <link>http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2007/04/more_on_ships_a.html#comment-58904</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Apr 2007 23:18:37 -0600</pubDate>
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            <title>Comment from BillT on 2007-04-13</title>
            <description>
                <![CDATA[<em>What I find refreshing is that it's just unusual to see a DoD entity just terminate a contract on performance/cost issues.</em>

What I find curious is that DoD entities are still doing business under cost-plus, since the biggest killer of new items has usually been the unholy overruns associated with them.

Take the late, sorta-kinda-unlamented Comanche, as a prime example. The original concept of a small, fast, agile, survivable, single-pilot killer scout that would (doctrinally) range the battlefield in flights of three to five morphed into a large (bigger than a Cobra), fast, agile, non-survivable, dual-pilot flying UHF radio.

All the bells, whistles and pie-in-the-sky avionics added after the contract was awarded killed Comanche, and we didn't even get any proof-of-concept stuff for our bucks. Twenty years after project initiation, no software was written because no hardware was ever developed -- all the funding was spent developing the fragile-but-"stealthy" airframe.

Putting a stealthy airframe on a helicopter is like putting a turbine engine in a jeep.

Nobody has figured out how to make a main rotor system both efficient *and* invisible to a pulse-Doppler or synthetic-aperture radar system, and the biggest threat to a helicopter is still the bad guy on the ground who acquires it visually and has the firepower to knock it down: the French learned that in Algeria, we re-learned it in Vietnam, re-re-learned it again in Grenada, re-re-re-learned it again in Panama, re-re-re-re-learned it again in Gulf I, re-re-re-re-re-learned it again in Afghanistan and re-re-re-re-re-re-learned it again in Iraq. ]]>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Apr 2007 12:05:03 -0600</pubDate>
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