I see that the paperwork for Lieutenant Watada's trial got screwed up. I don't see scheduling a new trial as being double-jeopardy, as Lieutenant Watada's lawyer suggests, but, hey, it's Seitz's job to make the prosecution as miserable as possible. If the Army legal team truly screwed the pooch so badly as to cause this all to fall apart because of government incompetence, one hopes we'll see some resumes going out as soon-to-be-former Army lawyers seek new employment. I suspect it won't go that way. All things considered, however, I wouldn't be shocked to see the convening authority offer the lieutenant an article 15 with resignation or an in-lieu-of-courts-martial discharge. The latter, once the winds shift politically will set Lieutenant Watada up for his John Kerry anti-war cred for his future political career. I also have no doubt that if convicted by a court, a future Democrat administration will pardon him, making him fully free and clear. And, I suspect, even though he never heard a shot fired in anger, in a future Kerry-moment, Watada will be able to talk as if his experience as a Lieutenant are qualifiers for Commander-in-Chief, and even though he will not have heard a shot fired in anger except in audio from a TV set, his experience will be judged more authentic than my 24 years of playing at soldier, and resulting disability, at least if the current themes of the anti-war crowd hold true. Mind you, that's just me being all mordant, and I'm not lumping Mr. Willingham into that group. Speaking of...
Let's see if I can speak to Mr. Willingham's interest. And thank you, everyone, for sticking to the Rulez. Even when I know some are chomping at the bit for some "blogger, red in tooth and claw..." style action, as mentioned elsewhere, this isn't Little Green Footballs - both in tone and in readership.
If our search function wasn't broken, you would find that early on I allowed as to how, while I didn't think Lieutenant Watada was correct, he was taking an arguably ethical course of action - though there were better ways to approach the subject than the path he took. In this context I mean ethically consistent with the premise of taking your stand, and taking the lumps that may come with it if you are wrong. I don't believe that I got on the whole traitor bandwagon. I took some guff in email from the usual suspects who think I'm a squish, though I don't think I got smacked around in comments about it much.
I've hardened my attitude on his motivations from my watching the process unfold, but I haven't really made going after Lieutenant Watada a cause of mine, though I've certainly not been filing amicus briefs on his behalf.
So, what's it come down to? Why am I not supportive of making Lieutenant Watada a hero?
Simple.
Because you don't want to encourage the military, in general, to openly and defiantly question the civil authority. Certainly there can be exceptions, but, despite heated rhetoric to the contrary, the actions of President Bush are not undermining the Constitutional underpinnings of the Republic - and if you truly believe they are, the fora for *that* fight is the halls of Congress, the Federal Judiciary, and public opinion. It is not latching on to a defiant serving officer of the United States military forces and holding him up as an example for the rest of the officer corps (or troops) to follow. As I said before, that road ends in ruin, and most of the easy exits on that road occur very early in the journey, the farther down it you go, the steeper it becomes and the harder it is to brake.
It comes down to controlling those who directly control the instruments of the "State's Right to Legitimate Violence." And, if you feel the violence in question isn't legitimate - again, the fora for that is... Congress, the Courts, and Public Opinion. *Not* an infantry company headquarters. Controlling the military comes down to discipline.
Discipline, discipline, discipline. Therein lies the bedrock of the subordination of the military to the civil authority. The place for the military to voice it's objections to policy and raise legal issues is at the Joint Chiefs and Combatant Commander's levels. And if you don't think the lawyers at those levels weren't busy rendering opinions during the run up to the war, you don't understand (not unreasonably) how those headquarters are organized and operate. A recognition of that distinction is why it was only very senior flag officers of the OberKommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), like Keitel and Jodl found themselves on trial in Nueremburg for the "waging aggressive war" crimes against humanity charge. Admiral Doenitz was tried for unrestricted submarine warfare policies. Field commanders, like General Anton Dostler (interesting case in and of itself) were tried for specific violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and not on the basis of having participated in the war proper. There was an explicit understanding of the different levels of culpability inherent in position - and that lower ranking personnel (i.e., not the top, policy-making tier) were to be judged in the context of their actions in the war, not their participation per se.
[This is one of the more rambling and incoherent things I've written in some time, but dammit, I just don't have boatloads of time at the moment or in the near future. So I'm burying the rest of it in the Flash Traffic/Extended Entry - carry on if you must.]
From Dictionary.com:
dis·ci·pline1. training to act in accordance with rules; drill: military discipline.
2. activity, exercise, or a regimen that develops or improves a skill; training: A daily stint at the typewriter is excellent discipline for a writer.
3. punishment inflicted by way of correction and training.
4. the rigor or training effect of experience, adversity, etc.: the harsh discipline of poverty.
5. behavior in accord with rules of conduct; behavior and order maintained by training and control: good discipline in an army.
6. a set or system of rules and regulations.
7. Ecclesiastical. the system of government regulating the practice of a church as distinguished from its doctrine.
8. an instrument of punishment, esp. a whip or scourge, used in the practice of self-mortification or as an instrument of chastisement in certain religious communities.
9. a branch of instruction or learning: the disciplines of history and economics.
The italicized elements are the ones that are relevant. Too many people default the meaning to number 3, especially when they think of we soldiers. However, number 3 is but one tool for development of the others - and a last resort tool, at that. The way to get to element number 5 is via 6, implemented via 1 and 2, only going to 3 when the others fail.
Mr. Willingham observed:
As a civilian who never had the slightest inclination to become military, truly I'm puzzled by the subjugation of the ego necessary for the soldier to submit to the command structure, even as a recognize its necessity within that context.
Heh. I'm hardly a drone, the will beaten out of me. Nor do I want to be just a cog in a faceless crowd - I blog, eh? Not the act of someone who just wants to blindly subordinate themselves to the greater societal gestalt. I did do team sports - and captained them, but I also wrestled - and I liked that because it was just me and my opponent. I would win or lose, based solely on my performance on the mat - and if my team mates weren't as skilled or talented - I could still be a state champion, as I was, regardless of the performance of the overall team. Of course - it was still a team effort and we all worked to support each other.
I would observe that in any hierarchical organization, some form of subjugation of the ego is needed, else all is chaos, and working to a common goal is problematic, if everyone insists it be done their way.
It is only a question of how much and to what purpose that are truly in play here. If you take a look at any group of professionals whose work object includes as a primary focus life-threatening emergency situations, you will find some form of organizational structure and discipline designed to maximize, in context, the ability of that group to respond effectively and as safely as possible. In other words, it's a police thing, a firefighter thing, a Smoke Jumper thing, a working on an airport flight-line thing, a NASCAR pit crew thing. Heck, stripping away the danger aspect - it's even a McDonalds lunch rush thing. The forms and needful level of adherence differ, but the underlying premise does not. Of course, bad and weak leaders skew things - whether it's the weak McDonald's manager, or the petty tyrant Captain commanding a company in the assault.
Let's take a look at a quote from Book 20, Military Fundamentals, 1935 edition, published by the US Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill - if only to show the pedigree of the concept, and that it's not new, nor had the Army been a slave (all sorts of bad examples notwithstanding) to a popular concept of a soul-crushing leviathan out to erase the individual. The guidance here was for young officers getting their acculturation to the nuances of pulling people along, vice pushing them. Yes, this bears on Lieutenant Watada - it is, in fact, the crux of the issue.
Para 196. Object.The object of military discipline is to create in the mind of the soldier a confidence in himself and his comrades that they may be capable of organized and efficient effort. In military life it is especially important due to the absolute necessity for close coordination under adverse conditions and for interdependence in the confusion of battle. Discipline produces pride of the soldier in himself and confidence in his ability which allows him to surmount any difficulty or master any situation. Without proper discipline a group of men becomes simply a mob incapable of accomplishing an assigned mission. Winning battles requires organized and coordinated effort on the part of the entire force engaged and this coordinated effort can be attained only with disciplined troops. Each arm or service has its particular function to perform and in training its men to play their parts them must be so disciplined that the individual maintains a high standard of service under adverse conditions.
At some point in 2003, Lieutenant Watada both signed a form, and in a ceremony raised his right hand and recited this oath:
"I, Ehren Watada, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter; So help me God."
The written form (slightly different) was DA Form 71, 1 August 1959.
This is what Lieutenant Watada agreed to - voluntarily. Without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. Nowhere in the document is there a codicil that says "Except when I disagree with it."
And he undertook that obligation as an officer - which comes with greater responsibility, among them the requirement to lead and be an example.
Service members, as laid out in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, are required to obey all lawful orders. They are required to not comply with unlawful orders. Paradoxically - they could be charged under the same article - Article 92, Failure to Obey, because the the requirement is to obey lawful orders. That can make your head spin if you aren't careful.
Lieutenant Watada asserts that President Bush committed the United States to an unlawful war. This would be a war that the United States Congress, speaking as the voice of the States Assembled, authorized the President to conduct. That makes it seem pretty simple on the issue of legality.
But, of course, it isn't. The Constitution requires that citizens also obey all ratified treaties as if they were laws passed under Constitutional precepts. It is this provision that requires that military operations be conducted within the framework of the Laws of Armed Conflict and the 4th Geneva Convention - so, in fact, military personnel are required to act in accordance with those norms - and can face prosecution, and have - for failure to observe those niceties. Therein lies the kernel of Lieutenant Watada's assertion that his refusal to deploy is in fact lawful because the war is unlawful. I would note, by extension, that this in effect sets the corollary that *every other member of the Armed Forces who has deployed to Iraq, and the civilians who voted to authorize the President to attack,* are, in fact, war criminals - and thus should be subject to prosecution, if his view of the law were to prevail - yet, in a sense, that issue has already been answered for soldiers at his level.
Now, that in fact is a feeling strongly held by many in the anti-war community, though you don't see them screaming to have their favorite politicians of the left who voted for authorization to in fact face a tribunal... no, they'll settle for some symbolic, oh, and btw, generally Republican, heads as tokens to satisfy honor. But I'm in danger of digressing in what is too long a screed already. So I'll pull back from that precipice.
Back to Lieutenant Watada. I agree with Sanger that you can not like the war (I was not a fan of invading Iraq, that evidence is all around in this space), and you can be unhappy that it was authorized - but under most readings of international law, there was sufficient legal wiggle room in the UN sanctions authorizations. The invasion, while perhaps ill-advised, and badly executed in the long-term, and perhaps not even just under Just War theory - was legal, under international norms. The war is legal under applicable US law, no court having yet gainsaid that - giving Lieutenant Watada no cover there. Tossing out Nuremberg isn't useful here as I discussed above - that tribunal was set up to try the senior leaders who formulated the policy regarding Nazi prosecution of, and conduct in, the war. The military personnel below the very senior OKW flag officers who found themselves facing trial found themselves facing trial for very specific acts and policies that were violations of the LOAC and Geneva Conventions. They were not hauled into the dock for simply wearing the uniform and fighting - because there was a clear understanding that the run of the mill German serviceman was, in context, lawfully engaged in the conflict as an individual, that the Joint and Several aspects of guilt or innocence in that regard lay with those who gave and implemented the orders to engage in the conflict.
The Convening Powers had no intention of setting the precedent that each soldier should be subject at that level. Lieutenant Watada in a sense seeks to protect himself against charges that, should his view prevail, should properly only be laid against President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs. Conceivably, also Secretary Powell and the NSC. Since the issue of the legislature was moot in Nazi Germany, the culpability of the members of Congress voting for or against the war would be a new wrinkle.
All that just above here is mostly academic and me thinking out loud and losing focus.
All of this was explained to Lieutenant Watada - probably more clearly and concisely than I just did. He did not accept that answer. Therein lies the precipice from which he jumped, and which constitutes the bulk of my non-support for his action.
The issue is one of whether or not the officer corps gets to pick and choose what it wants to do, outside of the specific provisions of the Constitution, UCMJ, LOAC and Conventions. The law on the subject is really pretty clear, and soldiers get plenty of instruction in it.
We don't get to make those choices, except in the context of applicable law and regulations governing the military, and the admin regulations that govern release from service. We certainly don't get to pick and choose and keep our commissions, obligations which all officers freely accept. Even in a draft-fueled Army. (Well, one exception - we did draft doctors, who were commissioned.)
And frankly, even less so in wartime.
Add to that Lieutenant Watada has chosen to take the fight public, while still wearing the uniform. And saying he's got no problem with war in general, but he's going to pick and choose which campaigns he will allow himself to be assigned to. This is not how competent Armies are run.
It just doesn't, nor can it, work that way. When he chose to go the "cause celebre" route, he lost most of my sympathy, simply because those of us who control the implements of lethal force, in this society, subordinate ourselves to the civil authority. And surrender, knowingly, some of our civil liberties - to better protect the civil liberty of society in general.
It is not for serving officers to openly second-guess the President, the Secretaries, and the Congress. Lieutenant Watada apparently feels he's in the right, and he's going to do that anyway.
He's thrown the dice. There are some that see him as the little boy pointing out a naked Emperor. And there are those who fervently wish that to be an outcome of this, in a sense.
If that's how it plays out - beware sowing the wind, lest ye reap the whirlwind.
Ry's comment in the Legal Updates post actually summarizes my feelings on the subject pretty well, and with a lot fewer words.
Walker said:
Personally I'm inclined to honor him all the more for taking a more public and blatantly political option.
Walker - you really, really, really don't want the officer corps to start acting out like that. Down that road lies ruin. It is the place of the Congress to do that. The place of the people acting individually and in concert to do that - but it most emphatically is *not* the place of the people commanding the troops to do that.
One of the veiled references in the comments was ghosting me.
There are some around here who might just have similar experiences with other deployments.
I did not like the precedents set by the Kosovo conflict, and I most emphatically did not like the prosecution of it - and I had my role in it. But it was also my duty to obey the lawful, if distasteful, orders given me.
So I did.
As should have Lieutenant Watada. If he wanted me to honor him, he would have resigned before waiting to see if he was going to Afghanistan (of which he approves) vice Iraq. Or, he would have done his duty, deployed, done his best to take care of his soldiers (his greatest responsibility), come home, resigned, and stood tall against the war. Those are all honorable constructs. What is effectively open rebellion against the civilian leadership of the Republic is not, in this context, honorable. The arguments Watada makes against Iraq can apply to Kosovo. Would you have been as supportive of Watada had he refused to participate in the Kosovo campaign? If so, then you are at least consistent. If not, you let your politics trump your ethics (btw - that's a general comment, and not one aimed at Mr. Willingham.).
I give him credit for taking a stand, and in such a way that he'll potentially pay a price for having done so, and I have not really attacked him personally in this space. But I think it's a bad precedent to set. And I don't think it's heroic. I might have handled it differently, myself, but I wasn't the I Corps commander, so I didn't have all the information he had when the how to proceed decisions were made.
Sheesh. This thing must end somewhere. So it will end here. Good thing it's Saturday, it ain't gonna get read much.
Okay. I couldn't leave it alone. All my argument above is actually hinged on Watada's words and actions. Bill, in a comment to a different post, lays out what is likely to be the Army's case (and which I was alluding to when I suggested Watada should have taken a different approach to things).
The Nuremburg Defense (which is no defense at all, as far as the lawyers are concerned) doesn't apply to LT Watada's case.The legality of a deployment order (or any other type) does not hinge on the particular status of the destination, but on whether the issuing office actually has the authority to issue the order. For example, Headquarters, 3ID has the authority to order LT Watada anywhere on the globe; Finance and Accounting, Fort Lewis, does not.
An illegal (or unlawful) order is one which contravenes the UCMJ or which would be considered a violation of the Law of Land Warfare (the omnium-gatherum lumping the various Hague and Geneva Protocols together). For example, calling artillery on a church -- or a synagogue, or a mosque -- in order to kill or dislodge a platoon of enemy troops is not unlawful; doing it solely in order to cow the locals is.
LT Watada did not refuse to obey an illegal order, he disobeyed a lawful order.
Period.



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