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They're playing my tune, now.

Here's an interesting collection of stuff from yesterday's MSM articles... a little window into the minds of the 4-baggers (that's 4-Star Generals for you normals).

First up, the Army. Heh. You could always call us auld pharts back... it's all we know how to do. Which Ry keeps kicking me in the teeth about.

Warfare skills eroding as Army fights insurgents By David Wood Sun reporter Originally published October 24, 2006 WASHINGTON // Pressed by the demands of fighting insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army has been unable to maintain proficiency in the kind of high-intensity mechanized warfare that toppled Saddam Hussein and would be needed again if the Army were called on to fight in Korea or in other future crises, senior officers acknowledge.

Soldiers once skilled at fighting in tanks and armored vehicles have spent three years carrying out street patrols, police duty and raids on suspected insurgent safe houses. Officers who were experienced at maneuvering dozens of tanks and coordinating high-speed maneuvers with artillery, attack helicopters and strike fighters now run human intelligence networks, negotiate with clan elders and oversee Iraqi police training and neighborhood trash pickup.

The Army's senior leaders say there is scant time to train troops in high-intensity skills and to practice large-scale mechanized maneuvers when combat brigades return home. With barely 12 months between deployments, there is hardly enough time to fix damaged gear and train new soldiers in counterinsurgency operations. Some units have the time to train but find their tanks are either still in Iraq or in repair depots.

Read the rest of the Sun article here. Interesting for all the ghosts of arguments seen in this space...

Then there's this bit about a meeting of Air Force heffalumps:

DJ US Air Force Inner Circle Tackles Combat, Budget Dilemmas

By Rebecca Christie
Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)--Top Air Force generals gathered at Bolling Air Force
Base here for a series of high-level insider meetings on the war, the budget and
the state of their service.
Gen. Michael Moseley, the Air Force's chief of staff, urged his three- and four-star generals to speak up for their service's future. To be successful, he said, the Air Force needs enough money to keep its planes in the air. It also needs more military sway, so those planes can provide the most help to troops on the ground.
"The conventional forces still believe we're going to do this and you guys just fall in on this, we don't have to tell you what's going on," Moseley said at last week's Corona conference, a meeting of the Air Force inner circle that dates back to 1944.
"We're almost speaking two different languages here," Moseley said. Moseley was discussing the difficulty of tracking Army patrols in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Air Force would like an explicit role in the nation's counterinsurgency strategy, and it worries that the Army's Future Combat Systems modernization program doesn't take air support into account.
But this sense of "us" and "them" took many other shapes. Military and civilian. Government and private sector. Western and Arab. Even the four-star generals and their wives.
Last week's conference aimed to bridge as many of those gaps as possible in a two-day span. Spouses were invited to sit in, Middle East experts offered a guided tour through the Sunni-Shia divide, and reporters were granted entry for the first time in the event's history, which predates the Air Force's official 1947 founding.
Dow Jones Newswires was the only news organization invited to sit on the proceedings. Other news outlets were invited to a Bolling media briefing with Moseley and Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne that touched on many of the event's key themes.
First on the agenda, Moseley and Wynne made a public break from fighter jets in a bid to reshape the service's fundraising pitch. Competition for the Pentagon budget has grown tighter in recent years, despite soaring U.S. defense spending, and the Air Force has been hard pressed to explain why the service needs two next-generation fighter planes.
The fighters are still there - internal budget plans show no cuts to either the F- 2 Raptor or the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter over the next five years. But tankers are now at the top of the wish list, followed by a new search and rescue helicopter and space communications programs. All of these programs have had a tough time winning funds from Congress in past years.
"We have been painted along the way as a bunch of people who only care about one particular flying machine. And of course, we know that's not true," Moseley said, laying out the new strategy for the generals. They got roughly the same pitch as the journalists, and for the same reason - the Air Force is counting on its commanders to reinforce its marketing efforts.

A new Air Force strategy calls for the service's top officials to make three public appearances per month, accompanied by two media engagements and one internal speech. Other generals and senior executives should aim for one of each category per quarter, said Brig. Gen. Erwin Lessel, the Air Force's director of communications.
"We're an unknown quantity. We're stealthy across most of America," Lessel said. While the Air Force is trying to bridge the culture gap at home, it also is keeping an eye on culture gaps abroad. The service has snagged Marcelle Wahba, a fluent Arab speaker and Middle East expert, as its new policy adviser on loan from the State Department.
At Corona, Wahba said the Middle East needs a more comprehensive strategy that takes into account the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as well as the war in Iraq and the Iran issue. She urged Air Force leaders to consider Arab sensitivities to the perception of being dominated or occupied.
For example, Iraq is unlikely to allow forces from other nearby countries inside its borders, even for military training or reconstruction aid. Also, local leaders will adamantly defend their independence. She offered the following assessment from one contact in the region: "We grudgingly put up with our own dictators, but we will never accept a foreigner dictating to us." Wahba disagreed with the notion that there is widespread support for a "caliphate," or massive pan-Arabic state. Most Arabs see this as a "ludicrous fantasy" of militant extremists, not a real or desirable goal, she said.
That viewpoint may be a tough sell within the Bush administration. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has frequently invoked the caliphate as al Qaida's ultimate goal. Army generals, too, sometimes cite the push for a unified Arab nation as the root of violence in the region.
Some Air Force generals had similar starting points. During an active panel discussion, officers asked Wahba and two other Middle East experts what role Islam should play in identifying potential U.S. enemies.
The panel unanimously urged the military not to see Muslim faith as a sign of terrorist inclinations. But Air Force adviser Lani Kass, a contributor to the U.S. strategic plan for the terror war, said extremists have to be taken seriously.
"They want to restore Islamic glory by the sword," said Kass, a former Israeli Army officer. In their view, "In my view, saying this is a minority view - and it is - does not rightly approach the problem."
The Air Force discussions were punctuated throughout the conference by the noise of jets overhead. But none of the airplanes were homegrown - instead, the backdrop was the relentless commercial rhythm of Washington National Airport.
Bolling doesn't have its own airstrip any more. Likewise, Air Force officials may no longer be able to count on flying alone to take their service forward.
By Rebecca Christie, Dow Jones Newswires

7 Comments

You know, at the squad and probably up to the platoon level, the Army Infantry is probably the best it's ever been. And after almost five years of fighting, that experience is carrying up to the company level. And battles are won at the company and platoon level. And that probably applies to some other areas, as well, especially the MPs. So I can't totally agree with that sentiment. Now, other folks such as the Armor and Artillery are probably a bit out of practice in maneuver warfare-we don't do big bombardments, and we don't face counterbattery, and even seeing a whole platoon of tanks operating together is enough to get treadheads excited these days. But in a larger, macro sense, I'd say that the current GWOT has done a huge service in helping to return the non-Combat Arms areas of the Army to the Warrior mentality, something that got lost even during the Cold War.
 
concur with HL as above. i feel that the mounted combat arms may be losing a wee bit of that fingerspitzengefeuhl necessary for large scale conventional warfare. unless the training centers find a way to push some of that back to the forefront, it will be a long learning curve to regenerate that kind of knowledge base.
 
I guess if you use simple extrapolation it'd be reasonable that conventional war type equipment training would have drastically fallen. However the war would have purged out a lot of green which is probably worth more IMIO.
 
"Which Ry keeps kicking me in the teeth about." Dude, I'm genuinely hurt that that's what you believe I think. I like simple. Simple works. I don't like trying to have a 'Swiss army knife Army'(an Army that tries to be both the masters of guerilla warfare and conventional warfare). I like segregating responsibilities to eliminate confusion in certain areas(admit that it'll raise confusion in others), not because I think people are dense. I know the Army and the rest of the military could concievably be a Swiss Army knife. One of the first introductions I had to the broad pool of skills available was Leon Uris' 'Battle Cry'. Sure, just like we chemists have to learn all the sub disciplines(organic, inorganic, bio-chem, analytical, physical) just to graduate with a bachelors. That doesn't mean it isn't overly hard for the benefits gained at times, or the best way of doing things. I'm trully sorry you thought that I believed Big Army was incapable of any flexibility. I don't. I just know that specialization is the best way to go in many situations(specialized tools, moving into sub fields for graduate work, different MOS, etc). I also think that there's an element of "if'n it ain't broke don't fix it" at play. Big Army is really good at what it does. That edge saves lives, on both sides. So let's stand up another force dedicated to doing jobs that Big Army doesn't typically do.(and well, it avoids the mental problem of how is a populace supposed to deal with the dissonance of the guys fighting all out one day being the benevolent reconstruction troops the next). I'm really sorry you felt I was insulting you like that, John. It wasn't intentional at all and not what I was trying to convey at all.(Besides, I don't kick in the teeth. I just ankle bite.)
 
When the First Cav used to evaluate us (back in the late '80s and early '90s) during our Three Day War, we flew Vietnam scout tactics with Cobras, because zipping along below the hilltops and screaming down creekbeds was perfectly suited for the rolling terrain at AP Hill. The Horse Blankets were amazed that we'd get from FARRP to fire position, identify the targets, hit them with rockets to scatter the grunts and button up the tankers, polish things off with TOWs and 20mm and get outta Dodge in less time than *they* had planned to get from laager to fire position. "Why do you fly so dam' *fast*?" "So we'll be re-armed in time to catch the follow-on echelon in the same spot. If we hit them further out, then we use more fuel getting to 'em; if we hit them any closer in, the survivors could overrun the FARRP while we're refuelling." Guerrilla warfare tactics and conventional warfare rationale...
 
That's not the same thing though, Chief. I may have mis-spoke when I used the word guerilla warfare. Let me clear up. Sure, you can take a LT or a SPC or a CPL and teach him fight low intensity conflicts, fight high intensity(total mobilization), and reconstruction winning of hearts and minds. I just don't think it's smart. Learning to do things the enemy doesn't anticipate is smart. Taking advantage of an institutional bias is smart. But that's not the same thing as having some 22 yr old kid one day be a tough as nails grunt and the next be a really efficient beat cop making friends and placating the locals while catching bad guys while not making people mad thru cultural insensitivty. Two wildly different skill sets, and, more importantly, mind sets. I got my head kicked in by a guy who used to teach at the survival course down in Panama(waaaay back, maybe before I was even walking. Guy by the name of Thurston.) over the idea of making mechanics in the Army practice more 'warfighting' mindset. Following HL's line of thought. He quite clearly and poly-syllabically informed me that the amount of training it takes to be a good infantryman and a good mechanic made the two virtually incompatible. I'm saying it's a mind set problem. At 22 I was far more odd than I am now. i've mellowed. I'd say the same proll'y is true for a lot of us. Do we want to risk taking a guy like Ghent and make him hesitate because he's having to go thru the mental checklist of whether he should be in policeman mode or in warfighter mode? I don't. Would I want a 35 year old who has kids whose first reflex learned thru having those kids is not to kick tail and take name, unlike the 22 year old without kids, being the beat cop? You bet. The thought process that leads to zipping below the horizon to get in close and clobber the enemy before he even knows what is going on is *not* the transparent, good will making, engendering good will thru cultural tolerance mind set. I think that the latermind set is either something you're inherently are born with or something you gain over time thru aging/maturation. So we set up a 'occupation force' and a 'warfighting force'. The warfighting force gets the people who are 'let's go blow chit up real good' types, and made up of people who really see war as being only or even mostly that. That's indicative of a Ralph Peters(war is a struggle of annihilation of enemy forces) mentality instead of the Tony Corn(cultural sensitivity) or even Liddel-Hart mentality(give them an out so they can quit). There's lots of guys out there that cannot be both beat cops and tough as nails. Let's not forget that strageic "insert rank" has as much a potential to adversely effect things as positively. Shuffle the guys who don't naturally think like PAtreus into 'warfighting' and those who do into 'Occupation'. Doing otherwise leaves us open to things like the Pendleton 8, Haditha, etc. Some people simply can handle complex situations and others can't.(I'm one who couldn't. Too stubborn and prone to acting reflexively still). Pretending otherwise is just being willfully ignorant of the failings of those around them and people in general in my opinion. It isn't smart. It doesn't get the job done. I don't think I'm selling people short. I'm just taking stock of people of my own age frame both in and out of the military. A small fraction have the maturity to be beat cops in a war zone. Most of us, myself included, don't. I don't think it's something you can train to instill. It's something you have to be born with or learn thru experience gained thru having 30+ years under your belt. I could be wrong.
 
And to be honest. I'm not sure I agree that your example is 'guerilla' warfare. Sneaking up and ambushing your enemy in a battle of annihilation ain't quite the same thing(from a theoretical/definitional perspective). THat's very reminiscent of Civil War cavalry or Mongol horsemen. Not guys in little black pajamas employing the dictums of Mao to gain the hearts of the masses into revolution or uprising. It's the ideas behind what you do more than what you do from where I sit. Sneaking up and bushwacking someone while they laager isn't necessarily guerilla warfare. Smart, effective, and, from where you sat, Unca Bill, fun? Most definitely. But it isn't Roger's Rangers hiking into the boonies to sucker punch some French supply convoy or scare the bejeesus out of a critical fort. I guess I could've used the term '4th Gen War' instead of geurilla but I'm becoming less and less sure that that or any of the other 'buzzword warfare' really amounts to much. (Hides last beer I'm likely to get outta Bill's garage fridge for a while and starts estimating what a Big Boot from Bigfoot will feel like. I already know what Big Tribble's feels like.)
 
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