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Sigh. Oh no, not again...

Just as in "The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy," I find myself in this dilemma:

Curiously enough, the only thing that went through the mind of the bowl of petunias as it fell was Oh no, not again. Many people have speculated that if we knew exactly why the bowl of petunias had thought that we would know a lot more about the nature of the universe than we do now.

I just had an "Oh no, not again" moment. This time regarding the USAF/Guys on the Ground Of Any Army and their liaison (or the whole system) for working with forces on the ground in Afghanistan, as evidenced in another friendly fire death - Canadians again.

Alan at GenX@40 sent a link to this article in the Globe and Mail:

Friendly fire claims former Olympic athlete ALEX DOBROTA AND OMAR EL AKKAD

From Tuesday's Globe and Mail

World-class runner and former Olympian Mark Anthony Graham was killed in Afghanistan yesterday, mistakenly hit by fire from a U.S. warplane.

While no death is worth more or less than any others, some are more newsworthy. The war with the Taliban claimed Ranger Pat Tillman, ex-pro football player, and it was now claimed a former Olympian, Private Mark Graham of the Canadian Forces. And, eerily enough, both in friendly fire incidents.

Clearly, there's still work to be done in coordinating close air support. Absent any better news than I have now, I'm not suggesting who is at fault. It's a complex geometry controlling close air, I've done it myself, and there is plenty of room for error in the air and on the ground.

From the Canadian Ministry of Defence:

Canadian Soldier Killed, Others Wounded in Friendly Fire Incident CEFCOM NR–06.022 - September 4, 2006

OTTAWA – One Canadian soldier was killed today at approximately 5:30 a.m. Kandahar time as Canadian troops participating in Operation Medusa, 15 km west of Kandahar City, were mistakenly engaged by an aircraft supporting ISAF combat operations.

The name of the deceased soldier will not be released for another 24 hours at the request of the family.

A number of Canadian soldiers suffered non-life threatening wounds during today’s incident - all but six will return to duty. These casualties occurred on the third day of Operation Medusa, a significant combined effort between the Afghan National Security Forces, Canada and our other NATO partners in the International Security Assistance Force.

Operation MEDUSA is a large-scale ISAF stabilization operation aimed at removing armed militants from the Panjwayi and Zhari district region so that displaced villagers can return to their homes and re-establish their livelihoods without living in constant fear of the Taliban.

Regardless of the causes - it's been a tough week for the Canadians, and we'll let Private Graham stand in for all their recent casualties.

0905graham.jpg

0905graham.jpg

Now is the time at Castle Argghhh! when we dance: In Memoriam.

6 Comments

I know I shouldn't jump the gun - there's going to be an investigation, and I'm sure it's going to get to the bottom of this incident. But I'm with my bud Abthorpe on this: It's hard to imagine, however, how a pilot might have mistaken Canadian LAV-3 armoured vehicles for a cluster of insurgents, Major Abthorpe said. "They're supposed to make visual contact," he said. "The LAVs were out on an exposed open slope, so what actually happened is hard to say. . . . Confusion, chaos, smoke on the battlefield, early morning mist, and everything like that all probably played a factor." How do you mistake a cluster of armoured vehicles used extensively by your main ally in this area for Taliban? Not only do they not operate any LAVIII's, they don't have anything even close. I understand it's a "complex geometry," as John says. I'm just really frustrated - the preliminary details of this suggest more than just a garden-variety mistake. Part of me actually hopes it was the Canadian soldier controlling the A-10s from the ground who screwed up instead of the pilots - I'm sick of hearing about "cowboy Americans" in the Canadian press, over backyard fences, and around water-coolers at work, like somehow human error is limited to USAF pilots. But...how the hell do you mistake a bunch of LAVIIIs in the open for Taliban yahoos with AK-47s? I'm having a tough time with this one.
 
I know I shouldn't jump the gun - there's going to be an investigation, and I'm sure it's going to get to the bottom of this incident. But I'm with my bud Abthorpe on this: It's hard to imagine, however, how a pilot might have mistaken Canadian LAV-3 armoured vehicles for a cluster of insurgents, Major Abthorpe said. "They're supposed to make visual contact," he said. "The LAVs were out on an exposed open slope, so what actually happened is hard to say. . . . Confusion, chaos, smoke on the battlefield, early morning mist, and everything like that all probably played a factor." How do you mistake a cluster of armoured vehicles used extensively by your main ally in this area for Taliban? Not only do they not operate any LAVIII's, they don't have anything even close. I understand it's a "complex geometry," as John says. I'm just really frustrated - the preliminary details of this suggest more than just a garden-variety mistake. Part of me actually hopes it was the Canadian soldier controlling the A-10s from the ground who screwed up instead of the pilots - I'm sick of hearing about "cowboy Americans" in the Canadian press, over backyard fences, and around water-coolers at work, like somehow human error is limited to USAF pilots. But...how the hell do you mistake a bunch of LAVIIIs in the open for Taliban yahoos with AK-47s? I'm having a tough time with this one.
 
....not only could you be jumping the gun, but you're also very eager to get your comment out...twice. darn echo. In all honesty though, I agree with you. I'm anxious to see how this all plays out. At least it's not being covered up though.
 
I heard about this on the Canadian Forces Network radio in Europe. Sounds to me like the controller on the ground gave the A10 pilot the wrong set of GPS coordinates. Mixed up those of the target with the troops to be supported. Might have tricky to get visual confirmation in a misty, mountainous environment.
 
David - was that about *this* incident or the one a month or so ago, where troops were knocked about but only one slightly injured? Regardless - it shows that Allied Air/Ground support needs to be looked at closely. I have to make this observation - but, AFAIK, Marine pilots don't have near the problem working with their guys - which isn't quite the slam on the AF it sounds like, as it is a suggestion that if you are going to be getting Close Air, you need the level of training and integration that the Marines have. But on a completely unrelated note - sign me up for CAMRA! (click the DWMF link and look at the page)
 
Might have tricky to get visual confirmation in a misty, mountainous environment. You're right, that's quite possible. So what's the default at that point? Fire anyhow? Lay off and reconfirm coordinates? RTB? These guys are in uniform, so I know there's a procedure - what is it? And was it followed? After the fiasco in April 2002 with Schmidt and Umbach disregarding procedure and disobeying their controller's orders, I can't take it on faith anymore that the pilots didn't screw up. I'm not rushing to judgement, but I'm not inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt on this one either.