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Apropos of nothing...

By The Armorer on August 29, 2005 | | Comments (6) | TrackBacks (2)
We come as conquerors, but not as oppressors.

-General Eisenhower to the German people as Allied forces entered Germany, 1944.

The success of this occupation can only be judged fity years from now. If the Germans at the time have a stable, prosperous democracy, then we shall have succeeded.

-General Eisenhower in Frankfurt, October 1945.


Doing some research for unrelated topics I came across those quotes, along with the question, "Why didn't President Bush say something like that when we entered Baghdad?"

Mebbe because it's been done before, and has bad resonance?

People of Baghdad, remember for 26 generations you have suffered under strange tyrants who have ever endeavoured to set one Arab house against another in order that they might profit by your dissensions. This policy is abhorrent to Great Britain and her Allies for there can be neither peace nor prosperity where there is enmity or misgovernment. Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators.

Proclamation to the People of the Wilayat of Baghdad, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Stanley Maude, March 1917.

"We fought this war and are reorganizing these new governments for the purpose of maintaining a democratic peace; but if continual quarrel and war are to succeed these changes on the map, the purpose of the war and the treaty will fail."

-National Geographic, 1919.

There is no quick, short answer to the problem of Iraq. Just as there was no quick, short answer to Germany and Japan, either.

Just as there *still* are foreign troops in Bosnia and Kosovo. Changes of the magnitude we're trying to implement take generations to take root and flourish. But I wonder if we have the stomach for it?

Because if we don't - well, we have to rethink how we are going about things, and the Army we are building to do the military side of things.

Because if we build the Army of Rumsfeld's dream of military power - we have no choice but to build coalitions of sufficient size that others can provide the manpower garrisoning of this type requires. Then the US Army becomes the instrument of battlefield destruction and annihilation of an enemy's capacity to resist in conventional fashion.. but others will have to take up the slack that long term suppression of guerilla movements requires.

Food for thought.

Summary: Because they lack a coherent strategy, U.S. forces in Iraq have failed to defeat the insurgency or improve security. Winning will require a new approach to counterinsurgency, one that focuses on providing security to Iraqis rather than hunting down insurgents. And it will take at least a decade.

Read Andrew Krepinevich's piece here.

This is the very antithesis of the Army Mr. Rumsfeld is trying to build, I think.

The problem is - we can't afford both Armies, which means we need partners... but most of the major players who could make the difference are either competitors, or, frankly, just don't give a rat's ass until it's their butt in the fire. The Continental Euro's didn't act on the Balkans until we agreed to do the initial heavy lifting. They have been participating in Afghanistan, but in most respects have so gutted their miltary capacity that they can't provide that much more support, even if they wanted to - unless we were going to do the logistics.

A double-edged sword, eh? A militarized Europe is a dangerous Europe. A relatively un-militarized Europe (and take away Brit and US capacity) is essentially a genocidal maniac's dream.

Sigh. I shouldn't read so much.

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More On The "Oil Spot" Strategy. from Garfield Ridge on August 29, 2005 10:43 PM

On Sunday I wrote about the Oil Spot strategy proposed by Andrew Krepinevich for use against the Iraqi insurgency. Turns out I was not alone in many of my criticisms-- read Jason's thoughts at COUNTERCOLUMN, and this post and this Read More

Is it Saturday yet? Friday, atleast? from NIF on August 30, 2005 7:41 AM

Today's dose of NIF - News, Interesting & Funny ... It's Kerry-180 Tuesday Read More

6 Comments

By Cassandra on August 29, 2005 1:22 PM
And Hell will freeze over before the American taxpayer will ante up for the kind of military that would be able to do what Mr. Krepinevich advocates... but hey... dream on.
 
By John of Argghhh! on August 29, 2005 1:44 PM
Without it being a cheaper draftee army, that's for sure. Which then, of course, won't be what we have now in terms of overall professional quality.
 
By fdcol63 on August 29, 2005 3:13 PM
But put enough boots and firepower on the ground to adequately suppress the insurgents, and you're considered an "oppressive occupier", which in itself encourages more hostility and opposition among the natives. I think it's a delicate balancing act, in which you're caught between a rock and a hard place either way. But what's the alternative? To allow ourselves to become so paralyzed by fears of failure and second-guessing that we sit by and do nothing? I think the bitter aspect of the bitter/sweet reality of instantaneous access to news and information is that we are not insulated enough from the "moment" to allow events and their long-term effects to mature or become realized. As you asked, John, do we have the stomach to let these generational changes take root and flourish ... or will we slink away from the challenge due to our aversion to risk and our myopic self-interest?
 
By ry on August 30, 2005 12:18 AM
The idea of a System Admin(or second force for stabilization operations--Barnett's term for it is SysAdmin and since he lectures at NDU I use it) isn't all that new. At one point in time this was called the Navy Dept. But it is expensive as all hell. We can't get the funding we need for a military to do the teeth kicking job. It's a nice idea, but like Cassie says--good luck prying those pennies from people. Not gonna happen. Coalition warfare seems to be how we built anyways, John. I'm surprised to hear you implying that it wasn't the case. Isn't that kinda how things broke down in NATO once The Wall fell? Why complain about it ten years after the fact? It's what we got. They are adapting. They are overcomming. They are winning(what was your wrestling mantra?). I've got other issue's with Krepinivich(when don't I have issues--where's my rock to hide under?). It seems like he, and many others, are demanding a rhubric so they have something concrete to declare failure with. I don't like that. It ignores that things are dynamic and not static. It isn't like building a carbuerator--where there's a right way following a check list and a wrong way by doing it willy nilly. Ops that are scripted to the hilt fail because they aren't flexible or adaptable to conditions as they change. Stuff that doesn't have a schwerpunkt tends to have problems because you can't decide what to do. Seems to me that Ol' Bush and Rummy took a page out of the book of the German General Staff--define a goal and let the boys who actually have to do it find the best way of achieving those goals. Worked for them--and they're considered the masters of Operational Art. The only metric is: have you achieved your goal. I've found in my experiences that when you have competing minds/wills that's the only metric that matters.(going back under my rock again.)
 
By rammer on August 30, 2005 12:49 AM
You point out a hard problem. We have built a military that can destroy an opponent country's organized military in weeks with almost no friendly losses and have used it to do so. This is a capability that is at least to me having grown up during Vietnam both shocking and awesome. Then the same force is turned to the problem of the subsequent occupation of the defeated nation. In this it seems our forces are less able to achieve swift results; although, they are doing well. Achieving quicker success for this problem does seem to require more troops be deployed sooner than the current leadership has provided. Affording both a high tech, high tempo, high lethality military and a manpower rich force is very difficult as you point out, because the salaries of the manpower rich force will consume all of the funding for the high lethality force. A number of strategies could be taken. One approach is to plan to augment regular forces with reservists and Allies. This approach has been the centerpiece of our plan for many decades now. In fact though it is a good strategy, because with a high lethality, high tempo, high tech force all countries can be defeated; so, to oppose the US is very dangerous to a foreign power. That is a course few countries do choose. If the ability to hold the very existence of an organized government at risk were to be compromised, then this concern would weigh less heavily on potential opponents. Furthermore, it has to be better to be able to win any war than secure any peace, because the potential opponent must be deterred and real opponents defeated prior to peace being secured. As a result we will continue to be driven to a split force characterized by an expensive, American and manpower lean core combined with an extended manpower rich force of reservists and allies called upon as needed. In order for this to work, it is important to know which part of the battle we are fighting and use each force to the fullest extent necessary to both win wars and secure peace.
 
By cw4(ret)billt on August 30, 2005 10:39 AM
Winning will require a new approach to counterinsurgency, one that focuses on providing security to Iraqis rather than hunting down insurgents. Hunting down insurgents and speeding their entry to Paradise is an extremely effective way of providing security, to my way of thinking. And some surgical airstrikes coupled with the judicious use of psyops might have a salutory effect on their recruiting efforts, too. But then, that's just me...
 
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