TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTION OF THE CITIZEN SOLDIER

It's long, but eminently skimmable. I really would like to hear your thoughts. Active, Reserver, serving, formerly served, retired. And the rest of you, who would foot the bill. If you would like to have this to forward on to people, either send 'em a link, or drop me a line, I'll forward you the email this comes from.

Moskos is a proponent of a return to the draft. Recognizing that as politically a dead issue, he proposes this solution instead. I think it's worthy of consideration and discussion. If we get a good dialogue going, I'll provide the comments to FPRI to forward to Mr. Moskos.

Bill? This *is* your life, after all - whatcha think? It's long, most of it is in the Flash Traffic/Extended Entry.

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TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTION OF THE CITIZEN SOLDIER
by Charles Moskos

April 7, 2005

Charles Moskos is professor emeritus of sociology at Northwestern University. A former U.S. Army draftee in the combat engineers in Germany, his research has taken him to combat units in Vietnam, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Somalia,Haiti,Bosnia, Kosovo,and Iraq. The author of many books and over 200 articles in scholarly journals, his writings have been translated in 19 languages. This essay is based on a presentation at an FPRI conference on "The Future of the Reserves and National Guard," held on December 6, 2004.

TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTION OF THE CITIZEN SOLDIER

by Charles Moskos

The desirable end-strength of our armed forces, especially that of the Army, has become a subject of concern. All agree that the military manpower demands owing to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan are causing extraordinary strain. Recruitment and retention shortfalls in the Army is expected to be especially severe in reserve components. Indeed, the Army Reserve is "rapidly degenerating into a broken force" in the words of its top commander in early 2005.

Our focus here will be on the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, by far the largest of the reserve components (RC) and the forces experiencing the greatest difficulties. As of this writing (January, 2005), RC make up some 40 percent of the military in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Among the Army dead in OIF, about a quarter have been from reserve components.

Survey and interview data collected by the writer in OIF December 2003 found large differences in the morale of the active duty versus the reserve Components. These differences have been widely affirmed in the intervening time. Reservists were markedly more dissatisfied than the active force. But this was not because of the mission itself, but rather due to the reservists' perception of inadequate training and poorer equipment compared to that of the active duty forces. The recurring theme was that reserve components were treated as "second-class" members of the Army.

The rest is in the Flash Traffic below.

In addition to the complaints about training and equipment, reservists mentioned the following:

1. Reservists frequently serve longer in theater than do active-duty soldiers and are less likely to know the end date of their OIF deployment.

2. Stop-loss affects reservists more than active-
duty soldiers.

3. Promotions for reservists often get stalled
because their home unit cannot promote them while
they are activated for OIF and they cannot be
promoted in OIF because they are reservists.

4. Advanced military schooling that would be
available if they were still in their home unit is
delayed and not likely to be properly available
when they return to their home unit.

5. Civilian contractors received much higher
compensation for doing work similar to that of
reservists. Guards working for KBR, a
Halliburton subsidiary, are said to receive three
times more compensation for the same guard duty as
do reservists. Civilian contractors often had
better "BDUs" (battle dress uniforms) and boots
than reservists.

6. Career reservists should be allowed to
acquire retirement pay earlier even if prorated
lower.

7. Those activated from the Individual Ready
Reserve (IRR) rather than regular reserve units
are typically used as fillers. In these cases the
families of the activated IRR soldier do not have
a local soldier support system. Some system
should be developed where IRR families could come
under the purview of the nearest military base.

Very noteworthy, the morale issues that have come to public attention in OIF have revolved around reserve units. The most notable has been the prison abuse scandal of the 372nd Military Police Company (based in Maryland) in Abu Ghraib. There was also the case (October 2004) of the reservists in the 343rd Quartermaster Company (based in South Carolina) who refused orders to deliver fuel on the grounds their vehicles were inadequately armored and the fuel to be delivered was contaminated. On December 8, 2004, Specialist Thomas Wilson of the 278th Regimental Combat Team (Tennessee) asked a pointed question about insufficient vehicle armor of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld that became a national story. In addition, significant numbers of persons called up for IRR duty have sought to avoid being activated and made their cases public by taking legal action.

In contrast, reservists in Bosnia and Kosovo had generally high morale. In point of fact, reservists typically had higher morale in these peacekeeping missions than their active-duty counterparts. This was in large part due to the reservists performing morale boosting duties such as military police and civil affairs. A similar situation of high RC morale occurred in the Gulf War where 8 percent of the American troops were from the Reserves and 6 percent National Guard.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF RESERVE COMPONENTS
It was the aftermath of the Vietnam War that caused a significant reappraisal of the reserve components. What became known as the Abrams Doctrine led to many essential supporting tasks shifting to reserve components. This would preclude the Army from being sent into another unpopular war because public support would be needed to call up the reserves in the event of a major conflict. In Vietnam, ten percent of the troops were from the Army Reserve, with virtually none from the National Guard. Unlike the current deployments, such reservists served as individual fillers in active units. In OIF and OEF, the general pattern is for reserve units to be mobilized for service and deployed in their home units.

The size of the active duty military is considerably smaller than in the recent past. The number serving was 2.5 million in 1960, 2.1 million during the Gulf War, and 1.4 million today. The number of reservists in drilling units is currently about 860,000. This has led some (including this writer), though not many, to argue for a return to conscription. The proposed conscription would be three-tiered: military, homeland security, and civilian service.

Inasmuch as a return to conscription is very unlikely,innovative thought must be given to a new concept of the citizen soldier in the 21st century. More explicitly,the issue is how to recruit more active-duty soldiers to perform duties currently being conducted by reservists. The purpose is to take some of the pressure off reserve components by creating a new form of citizen soldier -- the short-term recruit. In this way, both active and reserve components will be enhanced. But before turning to that core issue, some prefatory remarks are in order on the sociology of reserve components.

What is termed the sociology of the military has been, in effect,the sociology of active duty forces. Reserve forces have rarely been the object of theoretical analysis and, until very recently, of not much more empirical research. Although the Army reserve components are the central concern, many of the findings have applicability to the reserve components of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The guiding principle is that reserve components are more than just an organizational variation of active components.

There are key social and organizational distinctions between active components and reserve components. The focus here is on the Selected Reserves of the U.S.Army -- the drilling units of the Army Reserves and Army National Guard.

Training. The "Total Force" concept means that many reserve units will be deployed almost immediately as integral elements of the active forces in the event of major mobilization. Yet we must first note some of the obvious training differences between reserve forces and active forces. Reserve components are officially allocated 39 days per year for training, normally two weeks of annual training and one drill weekend each month at a local armory or reserve center. The actual amount of effective training is often less owing to unit formations, administrative chores, and travel time between an armory and external training sites. nformed observers hold that reserve components train, at best, approximately one-fifth of the time that actives do. The high level of discrepancy between a soldier's military occupational specialty and his reserve assignment is aggravated immeasurably by the lower level of time available for reserve training. Such MOS (military occupational specialty) mismatch is a minor problem in the active forces. When IRR soldiers are called into active duty, it is estimated that a majority enter their units with an inappropriate MOS.

Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Motivation. Though normative inducements characterize both active and reserve military members,non-monetary inducementsin reserve components may in fact exceed those found in active components. For many reservists, military training adds another dimension to one's lifestyle. To view reserve duty principally as "moonlighting" behavior, as is common in much of the extant research, misses the basic point of reserve service. Indeed all straightforward applications of the moonlighting theory of occupational choice have found only a small relationship between "primary-job" characteristics and reserve recruitment and retention.

Family. Some amount of conflict between family roles and military duty is almost expected. The differences in family conflict between reserve and active components are especially pronounced. In general terms, military/family conflict in the active forces is likely to be more severe at junior levels than at senior levels. That is, coping processes reduce family conflict as a career member advances through the system. In the reserves the situation is the opposite. Time demands beyond the statutory 39 days are minimal for junior personnel, but become increasingly pronounced for career reservists. Thus, military/family conflict heightens rather than diminishes as one moves up the reserve career ladder.

Another difference between family life in reserve and active components requires comment. In the active force military/family conflicts are likely to be shared experiences because much of family life revolves around the military post. In the reserves, military/family conflicts must be worked out within the family itself as there is little interaction between spouses of reservists. Unlike what occurs among wives of active-duty members, networking among wives of reservists is relatively uncommon.

The Double-Bind of Career Advancement. Reservists face a truly critical conflict with civilian employers (and,to some extent, with co-workers). The fundamental organizational fact for career reservists is the inordinate amount of time that must be spent on reserve duty. Informed estimates are that the typical field-grade officer spends some seventy days a year on reserve duty. These extra demands take the form of administrative duties, military schools, workshops, conferences, overseas training deployment, and so forth. Some of these time demands are compensated for through various supplementary pay procedures. But the reality is that much of the overtime is simply donated.

The overarching trend to make the reserves comparable with active components shows up in career development, often with intractable problems. Among the NCOs the demands of career development are most pressing in the need to take military courses required for MOS change and promotion eligibility. For officers, the move toward reserve/active comparability is even more striking. Schooling includes staff and war colleges and a multitude of specialized courses. The difficulty for career reservists -- whether NCO or commissioned -- with regular civilian employment is how to find the time to take such career development courses.

The double-bind affects those with the mostdemanding civilian jobs, especially if these demands are part of an upward career movement in civilian life. For such individuals, and they are often those with the most promise as future senior officers, time not money is the key variable. Even if reservists do somehow find the time to attend a military school or devote extra time to their units, the reservists often find their civilian work situation suffers correspondingly. Because of this double bind, a continuation of present trends could mean that future NCOs and officers in the eserves will likely come from a narrower band of civilian backgrounds than in the recent past. This trend will become even more pronounced in the wake of OIF and OEF.

A NEW CITIZEN SOLDIER
The era of the Abrams Doctrine has come to an end. Mobilization on the scale of OIF and OEF reveals that heavy reliance on reserve components for such missions cannot be a long-term option. This is due to both unpredictable disruptions in personal and familial life and, most especially, the increased likelihood of casualties. Emerging problems in recruitment and retention make reserve components a less reliable manpower resource. Now is precisely the time to explore the use of short-term active-duty enlistments to perform duties currently conducted by reservists and even active-duty personnel. Namely, college graduates (and to some degree stop-outs) to fulfill the demands for a 21st century citizen soldier.

Two-thirds of American high school graduates now go directly on to some form of higher education. Of these, about half will graduate with a bachelor's degree. Each year 1.2 million young people graduate with a bachelor's degree. Yet military recruitment ofcollege graduates at the enlisted level is minuscule.

Recruiting just 10 percent of these college graduates would solve the current recruitment woes of the armed forces.

Very significantly, among the college graduates, 40 percentintend to go on to some form of graduate work. In point of fact, a higher percentage of youth now go on to graduate school then went to undergraduate school in the post-WWII years of the original G.I.Bill. The average college graduate today leaves with about $19,000 in debt. The average debt of one who attends graduate school is $38,000!

The most practical way of alleviating impending shortfalls and excessive reliance on reserve components is to introduce a short enlistment option targeted at college attendees and college graduates. This would entail a 15-month active duty commitment. Such 15-month enlistees could well perform many of the roles now being met by reserve components as well as some number of active duty personnel.

There is a definite, albeit limited, market of college graduates who state a propensity for military service if the active-duty commitment is 15 months coupled with generous educational benefits. In the fall of 2002 enlistment propensities of undergraduates were assessed through surveys conducted at four representative universities: Northwestern University, University of Arizona, University of California-Los Angeles, University of Illinois-Chicago. A similar survey was completed in October 2004 at Northwestern University. These were the first and only surveys on enlistment propensity ever conducted on a university campus.

Options were given with different enlistment lengths and educational benefits. The educational benefits options ranged from $60,000 for a four-year enlistment to $15,000 for the 15-month enlistment. Across all universities, shorter terms had a notable positive effect on enlistment propensity. Twenty-three percent indicated an enlistment propensity for the 15-month option (with $15,000 in educational benefits) compared to two percent for the four- year option (with $60,000 in educational benefits).

Few of the students at the more selective universities had close relatives or friends who were serving in the military. Noteworthy, there was no correlation between military knowledge (half of the students did not know a colonel was higher than a major). There was also no correlation between political values and enlistment, with liberals and conservatives having the same propensity.

Very significantly, the October 2004 survey at Northwestern specifically asked how many of the students would consider serving as a prison guard in places like Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. In return, they would have their student loans forgiven and be given G.I. Bill benefits for graduate school. A remarkable 11 percent said that this would be a "very likely" option and another 18 percent would "seriously consider" such an option. Noteworthy is that the leading scholar on prison guards has also argued that short-term
"citizen-guards" are preferable to professional prison guards.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST A 15-MONTH ENLISTMENT
Three major arguments are raised against the short
enlistment. These are given below with rejoinders.

1. "Short enlistments would increase demands on
the training base." Let us remember that almost
one-third of our service entrants now fail to
complete their initial enlistments. In fact,
soldiers signing up for long enlistments -- four
to six years - have attrition rates double that of
those who enter with two-year enlistments.
Completion of an enlistment term is also strongly
correlated with higher education. Much better to
have a soldier serve 15 months honorably than be
prematurely discharged. A 15-month enlistment
option would both reduce personnel turnover and
counter shortfalls in end strength.

2. "Today's military requires highly technical
skills that cannot be met by short-termers."
Precisely. Higher compensation should be aimed at
those who skills require extended training and
experience. In the draft era, the pay ratio
between a senior NCO and a private was six to one;
today it is less than three to one. Future pay
raises must be focused on the career soldier. 15-
month enlistees could readily fill the multitude
of jobs that require only a short formal training
period or even just on-the-job training. It is
well documented that higher educated recruits not
only have markedly lower attrition rates, but also
have the skills and motivation to quickly learn a
wide variety of military jobs.

A major morale problem among reservists is pulling
guard duty for various installations. This could
be an appropriate task for a short-term enlistee.
Item: the total length of a training for an
military police officer -- from service entry to
completion is 14 weeks. The short-term enlistee,
moreover would be ideally suited for duties in
peacekeeping missions such as in Bosnia, Kosovo,
the Sinai (and perhaps Korea). These are the very
missions the surveys show are most appealing to
college students. Indeed, short enlistment
soldiers are especially suited to those MOS's now
confronting recruitment shortfalls and excessive
reliance on reserve components.

3. "A short enlistment option would attract
soldiers who otherwise would sign up for longer
enlistment." Quite the contrary. A 15-month
enlistment coupled with educational benefits would
attract college attendees and graduates who
heretofore never would have considered entering
the armed forces. The short-term option
recognizes that there is a dual market in
recruitment. One based on salary, skill training,
and career benefits; the other on those seeking a
temporary break between college and graduate
studies or between school and career.

Also to be considered are the considerable long-term budget savings by introducing a new form of the citizen soldier. With a higher proportion of non-career soldiers, the exponentially growing retirement and medical costs forthe career military would markedly reduce. In 2004 alone, the Army spent $1.5 billion in recruitment expenditures.

A CITIZEN-SOLDIER CONCEPT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
The following is a list of preliminary recommendations.

1. Inasmuch as the biggest disincentive for
college students is a long enlistment term,
introduce a 15-month enlistment option with
generous educational benefits.

2. Counterbalance the prevailing econometric
approach so prevalent in the Defense Department
with social psychological theories in recruitment
analysis. Take, for example, the concept of
"reference groups." This is to say that people
get their cues from meaningful groups rather than
material incentives. For recruitment purposes,
nothing would be more meaningful than one's
friends joining the Army.

3. Consider a cohort enlistment for certain
colleges to serve in a specified peacekeeping
mission.

4. Emphasize military service as a rewarding
experience between undergraduate and graduate
school or between school and career.

5. Now is the time to consider linking all
federal aid to college students to some form of
national service. Through federal grants and loan
subsidies for college education we now pay
students not to serve their country. We have
created a G.I. Bill without the G.I.

6. Establish a commission to look at military
recruitment options, military personnel costs,
homeland security needs, civilian national
service, and federal student aid. Very
troublesome, we do not know the true personnel
costs of the AVF. The costs of civilians
performing tasks heretofore done by military
members are put in the "operations" budget
category, not "personnel."

CONCLUSION
Without attracting significant numbers of college graduates, military recruitment will lead to the following realities: (a) lowering of entrance standards, (b) higher entry pay and larger enlistment bonuses, (c) an expanded recruitment force with attendant costs, (d) increased contracting out of military functions, and (e) more recruitment of non-American citizens. These outcomes can be avoided only by creating a new form of citizen soldier. The short-term recruit will be a supplement -- not a replacement -- for the citizen soldier
concept presently inherent in reserve components. It will have some functional equivalents of the draftee of old.

Let us also keep in mind the long-term benefits for the country if military service became more common among privileged youth. We will have future leaders in civilian society with a rewarding military experience -- and who will be future informal recruiters. This can only be to the advantage of the armed services and the nation.

The time has come to move the concept of the citizen soldier from the periphery of military thinking to the very center of our security concerns.

Editor's Note
Related articles on FPRI's website include:

"The Future of the Reserves and National Guard: A Conference
Report," by Michael Noonan, FPRI E-Notes, January 19, 2005
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050119.military.noonan.citizensoldier.html

The Future of the Reserves and National Guard: Roles,
Missions, and Force Structure, by Frank G. Hoffman, FPRI E-Notes, February 8,
2005
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050208.military.hoffman.rolesmissionsforcestructure.html

For the full-length version of the Hoffman paper, see Orbis, Spring 2005.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00304387

Total Force Policy and the Abrams Doctrine: Unfulfilled
Promise, Uncertain Future, by James Jay Carafano, FPRI E-Notes, February 3,
2005
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050203.military.carofano.totalforcepolicyabramsdoctrine.html

On Fighting a 16-Division War with a 10-Division Force, by
Keith W. Mines, FPRI E-Notes, March 8, 2005
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050308.military.mines.16dwar10dforce.html

Video on the Web
A War of a Different Kind and the Reconstruction of U.S.
Reserve Forces, by Stephen M. Duncan, Keynote Address, FPRI Conference,
December 6, 2004
http://www.fpri.org/multimedia/20041206.duncan.wardifferentkind.html

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