Time for a Red Ensign Moment.

March 15, 2002 Shah-i-Kot Valley, Afghanistan. In the mountains of Paktia Province east of Gardez, members of an anti-tank team from the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) Battle Group take a much-needed rest on the trail. The oxygen-poor atmosphere of 3,000 metres is very hard on these soldiers, who carry particularly heavy loads of weapons and ammunition. They are engaged in Operation HARPOON, the Canadian Army's first non-defensive combat mission since the Korean War, which is itself a component of Operation ANACONDA, a major US-led assault on Taliban and al-Qaeda positions. The 3 PPCLI Battle Group is deployed in Afghanistan on Operation APOLLO, Canada's military contribution to the international campaign against terrorism. Photo by Cpl Lou Penney, 3 PPCLI BG

A Canadian soldier speaks out:

We are driving good soldiers out of the Army

by Lewis MacKenzie
Maj-Gen MacKenzie

Since my early retirement from the Canadian Armed Forces in 1993, the strength of our military has steadily declined from some 83,000 to less than 55,000 deployable personnel. The Army, which was my home for 36 years, is now 3,000 soldiers short of being able to fill the seats in Maple Leaf Gardens. The Toronto Police Services have 2,000 more police officers than the Canadian Infantry has soldiers from private to general. As a result, we have little to offer our allies when they set about taming rogue states, war criminals, ethnic cleansers, and various goons such as those immolating villages in Western Sudan.

This has led to problems with deployability and force tailoring to meet operational needs. It also creates dependencies which limit employability - admittedly a goal of some politicians in a multilateral world.

In an effort to deal with the shrinking force pool, the previous commander of the Army, Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery, introduced a new method of preparing contingents for overseas deployments. Rather than building a contingent around an established 600- to 700-strong unit -- like the 3rd Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (3PPCLI), which served with the United States in Afghanistan in 2002 or the 1st Battalion of the Royal 22nd Regiment (1R22eR, a.k.a. the "Van Doos"), which secured the Sarajevo airport in 1992 -- contingents would be created from company-sized building blocks, each one being approximately 100-soldiers strong. These companies could be plucked from units spread across the country. This method has become known as "plug and play" and came into effect in 2002.

The General goes on to discuss how the current leadership of the Army have reacted and adapted (reluctantly and against their better judgement - but the civilians say "This is how it is." and the soldiers have to salute, else you have a banana republic.

That did not surprise me. Despite the fact politicians praised "plug and play" as a visionary and brilliant concept, it compromised two sacrosanct Army principles. General Jeffery realized this fact, but had been forced to make such a distasteful decision due to a lack of resources."

Why is this important? As you have read here, and on other milblogger pages, this is why:

The first principle to be sacrificed is that of unit cohesion. Most soldiers don't risk their lives for God, Queen or country. They do so for their buddies, particularly the ones a few metres on each side of them. Don't take my word for it; ask someone who landed on the beaches of Sicily or Normandy. And the best way to foster that intense loyalty and commitment is within a unit based on the time-honoured regimental system.

I would add (especially if you are Canadian) ask any of the soldiers in the pictures above or below, who waltzed with the elephant in Afghanistan.

What are the second and third order effects, you might ask? Organizational attitude, flexibility, and adaptability.

The second principle to be trumped by the move was flexibility. Over the years, the Canadian military brass has been conditioned by relatively stable peacekeeping missions in places such as Cyprus, from 1964 to 2002. In such cases, Canada deployed custom-organized units that fit a specific and consistent mission. On the other hand, combat-arms units -- infantry, armoured and artillery -- have been organized since the 19th century to adapt to changing missions in volatile environments. That flexibility is squandered when we cannibalize these units to produce smaller forces with narrow roles.

For example, a Canadian contingent that just returned from Kabul was deployed without its mobile logistics company, relying instead on a static base camp manned by civilian contractors. When NATO officials requested that Canada expand its mission to include mobile operations, we had to turn them down -- proffering the phoney excuse that our soldiers were not adequately trained.

Another third order effect? Your best leave. The mediocre almost never leave - they know a good deal when they see it. It's the good ones that leave. (And that shouldn't be taken to infer that all the soldiers who stay the whole course are mediocre - the warriors reading this know exactly what I mean and what kind of slacker I'm referring to).

Many soldiers at the sharp end have noted the folly of the compromises. The current commanding officer of the 1st Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, the same unit I had the pleasure of commanding in the late 1970s, has tendered his resignation after only one year in command.

Lieutenant-Colonel Shandy Vida is an outstanding officer. You would be proud and comfortable to have your son or daughter serve under his leadership. He is a soldier's soldier and bristled at the compromises forced upon him, as he patched together a large part of the infantry component recently deployed to Afghanistan. To him, "plug and play" is not the way to send our soldiers to do dangerous work.

One hopes the current Canadian government will take the advice of those who do the killing and dying at their command.

There's more stuff in the whole piece, available here, courtesy of my source of All Things Forces, JMH.

If you are a registered user of the National Post, the bit was first published there.

Bn Headquarters during Operation Anaconda.