December 04, 2003

Welcome to the New Model Army.

Photo courtesy US Army.

The new Chief of Staff, Army, GEN Schoomaker, has just put out the first look at where he sees the Army going.

For the historically-minded among you, welcome to the 21st Century Pentomic Division, consisting of brigade-sized battlegroups.

For the even more geek historians amongst you, the Revolt of the Infantry is over. And they won. Nearly completely. During WWI and II, the Division Artillery commander was a Brigadier General, while the manuever brigade commanders (Regimental Combat Team commanders) were Colonels (see BG McAuliffe, Anthony, 101st ABN, Bastogne). After the war, the Infantry staged a revolt allied with tankers and got the arty guys knocked down a peg. I won't go into why it was a good idea the way it was done before, but I will admit that the changing nature of things made the change essentially harmless, except to artillery egos.

Now, under the Chief's vision - if you read between the lines, there won't be any artillery brigade-sized elements in divisions to be commanded, and possibly anywhere in the force. The Chief intends to break up the non-direct combat brigades (and it looks like the aviation brigades, too) and spread 'em among the combat brigades and create new, and smaller, all-arms brigade combat groups.

The original reason the artillery command structure was built the way it was is because manuever commanders wanted to 'own and direct' their supporting artillery strictly for their own use - even if it wasn't being used. In order to better mass availlable fires, the artillery command and control was centralized. Brigades in contact still got their own battalion of artillery on a string, but when a brigade came out of the line, the artillery was assigned to other missions.

With the new concept of dispersed operations over larger terrain with smaller units, the artillery is going to have to stay close to the supported brigades. so we are in a sense going to create, on a large scale, what we now think of as Armored Cavalry Regiments - which are all-arms formations with their artillery and support organic.

The ubiquity of digital comms will still make it possible to mass fires of different units, as long as they are in range of each other. Until the on-the-drawing dreaming-board 60km range guns come on board, decentralized control is going to be the norm, so this makes sense.

The cultural implications are immense, as are the impacts on the school system in developing officers at much lower levels to handle more complex operations than they generally have hitherto. Combat experience in WWII shows that young officers are up to the challenge - the challenge is building a system that will train them in something other than combat OJT (on the job). TRADOC, Training and Doctrine Command, is the responsible agency - and they been robbed and canniblized for the last 15 years to pay personnel bills. They were barely (and I'm being kind) keeping up before. I see a lot of work out there for guys like me.

The other aspect of this is the Chiefs (long-overdue) re-emphasis on Soliders First - All Other Jobs Second. A very Marine way of doing business.

One wonders how long it will take after this hits the street for someone to say, "Look, the Army is rebuilding itself into the Marines." (they aren't, but it sure looks that way on the surface) and make the obvious suggestion.

The document is here/ You'll need Powerpoint or Powerpoint reader to open it.

Comments on Welcome to the New Model Army.
MAJ Donnie briefed on December 4, 2003 06:40 PM

John,

Phew. Where to start?

What are those red patches on those soldiers right shoulders? Red and white patches on BDUs? NOT Camo, thinks I...

I'm of two minds regarding this new philosophy. On the one hand, anything the Infantry wants, we should get ;-)

On the other, fire support and fire control are tricky, tricky, tricky operations to master. Land navigation is all well and good, but when an Infantry unit has to direct fire based on terrain features (as we often do in a hurry), it takes an extaordinarily quick 2LT, or even CPT to do it.

And we all know what happens when you misdirect Arty support.

I just hope the new TAC gear in the field is solid enough to make those calculations for the somewhat slower officers, or we are going to see a lot of friendly fire casualties.

John of Argghhh! briefed on December 4, 2003 06:57 PM

Donnie - that's the Mulitnational Force and Observers patch. The guys in the Sinai. That is a personnel weenie doing the shooting.

You're still gonna have trained artillerists computing data and FO's and fire supporters. There will still be an FSE at the brigade headquarters and the JTF/Division Headquarters who can mass fires if need be. There just isn't going to be a green-tab 06 around. That's where my comment about radical change in philosophy and schooling comes in. Many artillerymen successfully command divisions, corps, and armies. What we may see is artillerymen commanding some of these brigades. And that means that we are going to have to train artillerymen to be more manuever oriented. The good fire supporters already are - my company commander, TF commander, and Brigade commanders all put me in the succession of command chain ahead of the next lower down commanders - because they trusted that I knew the plan and could handle the manuever until the situation was stabilized. Less technocrats - that job is NCO work anyway. At the same time, youse guys are going to have to get better at understanding indirect fire employment - and like with fire supporters, the good maneuver guys I worked with did know that. They left the technical stuff to me.

On the whole, I think this can be a Good Thing, and will place a premium on good officers and great NCOs. But we have to make a cultural shift to do it. No better time than in the middle of a war, when the impetus of combat ops is there to focus people and help reduce the 'rice bowl' issues that prolonged peacetime engenders.

And Airborne School must be pussy these days if you can still type at night after a day of training - or are you still in Week 0?

I did it as a senior captain. The perks weren't worth the abuse. Fortunately, I wasn't the most senior guy!

MAJ Donnie briefed on December 4, 2003 07:31 PM

Hehe, I don't start Jump school 'til Monday morning, you old goat...I don't expect to be doing much typing next week ;-)

Sir, I'm all for Artillerymen commanding what-the-fuck-ever they want to command...with the possible exception of an Infantry Brigade.

Unless they send them to IOBC/IOAC, and make them command an Infantry PLATOON, not a Company or Battalion first. Fire and manuever is a horse of an entirely different hue than FSE -- and don't get me wrong, there have been (and probably will be) times when I wished I could attend the Artillery Officer's Basic Course...that's good shit for any Infantryman to know, and the pitiful intro they gave us in the 80's wasn't near enough.

The big guns are both the most wonderful, and the scariest fucking things I've ever had the privelege to call in. It's the scary part I worry about ;-)

John of Argghhh! briefed on December 4, 2003 08:07 PM

Goat, huh, punk?

Old age and treachery will deal with disrespectful weasels like you, boyo. Remember, you are still in *front* of the guns.

MAJ Donnie briefed on December 4, 2003 08:21 PM

Give us a break, John...after all, we did say "Sir": ;-)

"Sir, I'm all for Artillerymen commanding what-the-fuck-ever they want to command...with the possible exception of an Infantry Brigade."

Seriously though, thy rank upon retirement has been disclosed to me by the STRAIGHT WHITE GUY (a.k.a., He Who Doth Protest Too Much), and I have nothing but respect for:

a) Senior officers
b) They who command the guns by which we are often saved...

So...having completed the correspondence pieces of C&GSC, my question to you stands yet: Just how bad are they going to fuck with me on the sand tables at Leavenworth?

MAJ Donnie briefed on December 4, 2003 08:23 PM

Uh-oh...

Did you say "the most senior guy"?

AND I'm a leg Ranger?

Fucking blackhats are going to have fun, I guess... :-(

gunner briefed on December 4, 2003 08:25 PM

Unless I am mistaken, in Israel, all officers have to pass either Airborne, Armour, or commando(?) school, thus giving them a higher rifleman/leader ratio many others do not. Also the talk about the training needed for FO and such. The Marines, and I have two in my close family, have been doing it very well for many decades. The situation when the army convoy was attacked and lynch was captured may have turned out to our advantage from what i heard.
I say this from a laymans point of view. Correcting a falsehood does not bother me.

John of Argghhh! briefed on December 4, 2003 08:33 PM

Oh, you poor, sad sack you. Ranger. Strike 1. Leg, Strike Two. Field Grade, Strike 3! You won't have to be student company commander, there is that consolation. But you'll probably be a stick leader.

Yer gonna have sore arms. But they will be polite about it.

John of Argghhh! briefed on December 4, 2003 08:44 PM

I can't comment knowledgeably about Israeli officer training.

As for FO's and such. It all depends on how much of an FO he needs to be. Just handling conventional fires isn't a problem, and in the age of GPS, as long as you can keep cardinal directions straight, land nav isn't as critical, either. The real issue comes in complex fire planning and control of air assets, and coordinating the two together, while also using the indirect to suppress for the close air and attack aviaton. The Marines use NGLO (Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers) Teams for that (at least that's what they used to call them.). GEN Schoomaker wants every platoon leader to be able to do what we now have specialized personnel doing. There is merit in that, but again, it goes back to can we make the needed changes in the way we school people in lockstep with the reorganization of units. 3rd Infantry Division is going through that reorg right now, and is expecting to start high-level collective training at the BCT level in January.

We're going to be pushing a lot of responsibility AND task sets two levels farther down than they usually exist now. Onto people with 5-8 years less experience than the ones doing it now.

It's a time-distance equation here. Can we cram the extra training needed into the time available - and give them enough experience in application that it all sticks?

That's what will make it interesting, and I'm going to have work for years as part of making it happen. Don't forget - on top of all the warfighting skills we are pushing down, we are also having to train the OOTW (operations other than war) tasks as well.

You can looks at how we churned out junior leaders in WWII by dumping a lot of training on them and throwing them into battle. Many did exceedingly well and went from 2LT to LTC in two years. Many more just got themselves and their troops killed.

It's just another challenge to overcome - and the only reason we can even begin to countenance trying it is because we are at war, and that focusses people.

DarthVOB briefed on December 5, 2003 01:36 PM

It's about damn time, I say. The problem in the past, as I see it, is that the CS/CSS officers have been conditioned to believe they are managers of specialists first and leaders of soldiers second.
When that changes, the Army will be in much better shape for this new alignment. As an illustration, note the difference in leadership style and training focus of two Signal captains...one having been branch detailed Armor for 4 years and one having been raised at Sidewalk City (Ft. Gordon).

John of Argghhh! briefed on December 5, 2003 11:16 PM

I agree, Darth.

John of Argghhh! briefed on December 5, 2003 11:16 PM

I agree, Darth.

John of Argghhh! briefed on December 7, 2003 11:06 PM

Apprently, I really agree. Damn dial up.